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This thesis analyses the problem of creating computational models of ontology evolu-
tion in legal reasoning. Ontology evolution is the process of change that happens to
a theory as it is used by agents within a domain. In the legal domain these theories
are the laws that define acceptable behaviours and the meta-legal theories that govern
the application of the laws. We survey the background subjects required to understand
the problem and the relevant literature within AI and Law. We argue that context and
commonsense are necessary features of a model of ontology evolution in legal reason-
ing; and propose a model of legal reasoning based upon creating a discourse context.
We conclude by arguing that there is a distinction between prescriptive and descriptive
models of ontology evolution; with a prescriptive model being a social and philosophi-
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The knowledge we have of the world is not static. We continually encounter new
situations that don’t fit within our established theories. We can reflect upon and spot
contradictions in our intuitions. We then need to adapt our theories to resolve these
problems, so that we can continue to use them to plan our interactions with the world.
Computer software is based upon a representation of a domain. A programmer will
choose a representation that enables them to specify an algorithm on this representation
which produces a useful behaviour. When the domain changes the software must be
manually changed.
Researchers in Informatics have recently started to investigate ontologies, models
of a domain, as a way to define domain knowledge which can be used by generic
problem solvers to produce useful behaviour within the domain. However, when the
domain changes the ontology must also be manually changed.
We would like to have automated methods to reduce this maintenance burden. But
how can we automate this process of adapting a representation to its domain?
1.1 Ontology evolution
This is the problem of ontology evolution:
How can we create automated methods to evolve a model of a domain?
We want the new model to be a better representation of the domain than the original
one. The original model had a problem: for example, it gave an incorrect prediction or
it gave conflicting predictions. We want to replace the original model with one which
1
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doesn’t have this problem. But there may be several different possible new models.
How do we find these new models and decide amongst them?
The challenge for research in ontology evolution is to create theories about how
ontologies evolve. In order to investigate ontology evolution we need case studies:
examples of situations in which ontologies have been evolved. We want to use case
studies from a domain to investigate how we can build computational models of the
ontology evolution in that domain. We survey existing ontology evolution research in
section 2.2.
We have been investigating ontology evolution within legal cases. There are many
historical cases where the ontology of the Law has changed. We have studied some
of these cases to explore how computational models of these changes could be con-
structed and how useful they would be. Further discussion of the legal domain is in
section 2.3.
1.2 Legal Reasoning
The relevant problem in Law1 is to interpret the ontologies that are used in legislation.
These ontologies are frequently incomplete, they can’t be clearly applied to some sit-
uations. In these problem situations we can’t determine whether some object in the
domain should be included in the definition of a term in the ontology.
The problem is that there can be conflicting intuitions about how laws should be
interpreted. The challenge is to find an interpretation of the law. However, the different
parties in a legal case will have different aims when interpreting the law. A lawyer will
want to find an interpretation that aids their client. A judge should aim to find an
interpretation which uses the methods sanctioned by the legal system to resolve the
case.
Consider the following analogous situation. You are walking in the woods with a
friend when they suddenly point at a tree stump and exclaim “Great! A chair”. You
interpret “chair” as referring to the tree stump. Now consider another situation in which
you ask your friend to buy a “chair” for your house and they return with a tree stump.
In the second situation, was your friend’s interpretation of “chair” correct?
In the first situation your friend was using the term “chair” because a tree stump
1In this thesis, we will generally use the upper-case “Law” to refer to the subject, which studies legal
systems, and lower-case “law” to refer to legal rules.So “English Law” refers to the English legal system
and “an English law” refers to a rule in English Law.
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had the same functional properties that were relevant to your current (shared) context
of the forest. When you interpret your friend’s remark, you adapt your definition of
“chair” to include the tree stump in that particular context. In the second situation you
used the term “chair” to refer to an object which would be considered a “chair” in the
context of your home. The meaning of “chair” can vary between these situations, and
shouldn’t refer to a tree stump in the context of your home.
Your friend could argue that since “chair” could refer to a chair in the forest then
why shouldn’t it refer to a chair in your home. They could further argue that it is fash-
ionable to use a tree stump as a chair, it might give the house an eco-home ambiance.
Your friend has adapted their representation of “chair” to include tree stumps in the
context of a house. You might counter their argument by arguing that it is an unusual
interpretation of what a “chair” is, and so they should have recognised that you prob-
ably didn’t intend this meaning. These arguments give conflicting interpretations of
what the meaning of “chair” is in this context.
In this example the problem of interpreting “chair” is to determine what you meant
by “chair” in the second situation. This problem is not too difficult to solve, since
you presumably know what you meant. In the legal domain the problem is analogous,
but significantly more difficult since there isn’t an oracle that can define a term. The
background context of a case provides some information about how a law can be inter-
preted, but this background context doesn’t always give a definitive, clear meaning for
the law.
We will survey the relevant aspects of Law in section 2.3. We are specifically
looking at ontology evolution in legal cases. We give an analysis of legal cases in
section 3.1.
1.3 Thesis
We will argue for the following claims in this report:
1. Ontology evolution in legal cases occurs as a side effect of arguments about the
meaning of legal rules and principles.
2. There is a distinction between prescriptive and descriptive theories of ontology
evolution in legal reasoning.
3. A complete descriptive theory of ontology evolution in legal reasoning is an AI-
complete problem.
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4. A combination of the features of the different theories could provide the basis
for a useful system for aiding the construction of arguments about the mean-
ing of legal ontologies. However, any system would require significant human
interaction to produce useful output.
Claim one is the main claim of this report. Ontology evolution in legal cases results
from a particular process of legal reasoning: reasoning about meaning.
Claim two is about the types of theory of ontology evolution that we can create. We
argue that there are two different possible types of theory: prescriptive and descriptive.
Claim three is a claim about the possibility of developing a descriptive theory of
ontology evolution in legal reasoning.
Claim four is a claim about what types of system can be developed now, and how
useful these systems would be.
1.4 Chapter Overview
Chapter 2 gives a survey of research in ontologies and ontology evolution, and provides
the necessary background in Law to understand our research. This chapter can be
skipped, or selectively read, by those with the necessary background.
In chapter 3 we give an overview of the Law and some example legal-cases. This
provides an analysis of the phenomena we will be trying to model: the argumentation
about the meaning of a legal ontology that occurs in a legal case. We also look at the
problems of working on ontology evolution in legal cases.
In chapter 4 we discuss the problems of ascribing meaning to legal language, and
how these problems affect our attempts to model ontology evolution.
Chapter 5 gives an overview of the research in AI and Law on legal case modelling.
There has been some research trying to model the argumentation in legal cases, some
of this is relevant to our research. We also discuss the limitations of current techniques
in AI and Law for modelling ontology evolution in the Law.
Chapter 6 introduces the techniques we have been trying to use to model the on-
tology evolution in legal reasoning, and our attempts to apply these techniques to our
problem.
Chapter 7 is the culmination of the thesis. In this chapter we discuss the require-
ments on a theory of ontology evolution in legal reasoning. We distinguish between the
different types of possible theory, summarise our arguments for the claims introduced
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in section 1.3, and describe further work.
Chapter 2
Subject Survey
The previous chapter gave an informal introduction to the problem of ontology evolu-
tion. In this chapter we survey ontology and ontology evolution research, and cover
the necessary background on Law to understand our research.
2.1 Ontology
Ontology is the study of conceptualisations, the collections of concepts we use to form
representations of our world. It began with the work of philosophers such as Aristotle1,
who tried to form sets of fundamental concepts that could describe all the things that
existed. The subject has since been developed by generations of philosophers.
The original concern of the philosophical study of ontology was to discover a single
ontology which described everything in the world. Philosophers studied these upper
ontologies with the aim of discovering the ultimate nature of reality.
We are interested in research into ontologies within Computer Science, where re-
searchers have adapted the subject to aid the development of intelligent computer sys-
tems. The concerns of Computer Scientists are more pragmatic than Philosophers: the
aim of Computer Scientists is to develop useful knowledge-based systems.
2.1.1 Formal Ontology
Computer Scientists recently became concerned with ontologies whilst trying to build
knowledge-based systems, systems which use explicitly declared domain-knowledge
to solve problems within a domain. Knowledge-based systems require ontologies to
1such as his work on Metaphysics
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describe the application domain. For instance, a financial expert system would require
ontologies of credit ratings and consumer habits to define rules about who should be
given credit.
The standard definition of an ontology for computer science was given by Tom
Gruber as “An explicit specification of a conceptualisation”[52], where a conceptuali-
sation is “an abstract simplified view of the world that we want to represent for some
purpose”.
The emphasis is on the idea of making the conceptualisation explicit. As we men-
tioned in the previous chapter, every program is based upon a representation of the do-
main it operates in. These representations are frequently implicit within the program,
and only discussed in documentation regarding the design of the program. The moti-
vation behind ontologies research is to make these conceptualisations explicit within a
representation language.
Gruber’s article goes on to discuss the need for these ontologies to be shared, so
that components within a distributed knowledge-based system can share knowledge.
This emphasis upon a shared conceptualisation led to an expanded definition, given
in [133]:
“An ontology is a formal, explicit specification of a shared conceptu-
alisation. A ‘conceptualisation’ refers to an abstract model of some phe-
nomenon in the world by having identified the relevant concepts of that
phenomenon. ‘Explicit’ means that the type of concepts used, and the
constraints on their use are explicitly defined. For example, in medical
domains, the concepts are diseases and symptoms, the relations between
them are causal and a constraint is that a disease cannot cause itself. ‘For-
mal’ refers to the fact that the ontology should be machine readable, which
excludes natural language. ‘Shared’ reflects the notion that an ontology
captures consensual knowledge, that is, it is not private to some individ-
ual, but accepted by a group.”
For example, a medical-informatics system might have information about patients
stored at different hospitals. The system would need to have protocols for establishing
connections between hospital systems. These connections would then need to share
information formalised within a common logic, so that the meaning of the expressions
passed between the hospitals is the same. The system should now also require that the
ontologies used by the hospitals are the same, so that the expressions passed between
the hospitals use a common language that is mutually understood.
Without a shared ontology messages might not be mutually understood. For in-
stance, one of the hospitals might send an expression such as “requires(patient12312,drug12321)”
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to another. If the other hospital used “needs” rather than “requires” to express a rela-
tion between patients and medications, the message would not be understood by the
receiving hospital. The receiving hospital wouldn’t understand that “requires” means
the same thing as “needs” and so the patient might not get the medication they require.
This was the initial ideal behind ontologies research: we could design distributed
systems that could effectively share knowledge by using a common ontology. We shall
look at some of the problems with this ideal below (see section 2.1.4).
It should be noted that the term “ontology” was used prior to Gruber’s work to
describe various research projects in Artificial Intelligence. For instance, Pat Hayes
was attempting to create an ontology of naive physics back in the late 1970s [62]. This
notion of ontology is slightly closer to the sense in Philosophy, since it aims to create
a fundamental conceptualisation of the world for an AI agent. The more recent sense
is about creating ontologies to enable practical knowledge-based systems to function
within a specific domain.
The term “formal ontology” is also used to describe modern reincarnations of
the Philosophical project, for example the work of Philosophers such as Barry Smith
[120] and Nic Guarino at LFO[53]. These projects are mostly concerned with devel-
oping philosophical and logical foundations for ontology and building formal upper-
ontologies. We are not concerned with these projects, although we shall consider re-
lated themes later in this thesis.
2.1.2 Formalisms
Formal ontologies require mathematical logics. A variety of logics have been investi-
gated in the field of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, a subfield of Artificial
Intelligence.
A useful abstract definition, taken from [66], is that an ontology, O, consists of
a pair O = (S,A) where S is a signature, the non-logical terms used to express the
ontology, and A is a set of axioms within a logic (which use the signature).
This high-level definition gives us a representation of ontology that makes it easy
to understand abstract problems relating to ontology. However, if you want to build a
knowledge-based system you must use a particular logic. We shall look at description
logics, first-order logic, higher-order logic and RDF as knowledge representation lan-
guages capable of representing ontologies. Naturally our discussion of the formalisms
is quite cursory, readers seeking more rigorous formulations should consult the refer-
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ences.
2.1.2.1 Description Logics
Description logics form the core of most research into ontologies, due to the descrip-
tion logic OWL2 being promoted as a W3C3 standard. The W3C is trying to create
the Semantic Web [13], an extension of the current World Wide Web from being about
hypertext documents to being about things and their connections [140].
The Semantic Web requires a formal logic to represent the meta-data in a language
that computers can understand. Description Logics were chosen as a suitable formal-
ism for the purposes of Semantic Web.
Description logics are subsets of first-order logic which allow unary relations,
called concepts, and binary relations, called roles. The logic is restricted to assert-
ing relations of inclusion and equivalence between concepts, with roles being used to
define auxiliary concepts. The reason for these restrictions is that they have nice the-
oretical properties, this subset of first-order logic is decidable. In practise, it is not
clear what the benefit of this restriction is, is since the computational complexity of the
decision procedures of standard description logics is PSPACE-complete4 [36].
Description logics also distinguish between a T-Box, which contains terminolog-
ical assertions, and an A-Box, which contains assertions about particular individuals.
For instance, an assertion that “All Cats are Animals” would belong to the T-Box and
an assertion that “Tiddles is a Cat” would belong to the A-Box.
OWL is the merger of the DAML and OIL projects. The language is at the top of
the Semantic Web stack (see figure 2.1), the technology stack proposed by the W3C as
a basis for the Semantic Web. OWL syntax is based upon XML and RDF, an example
of an OWL ontology is shown in figure 2.1.
The formal semantics of OWL is based upon model theory, the same as first-order
logic which we discuss in the next section.
2.1.2.2 First-order Logic
First-order logic is the original mathematical-logic, independently created by Gottlob
Frege [43] and Charles Pierce [96]. The logic extends propositional logic with objects,
2Web Ontology Language
3The W3C is an organisation founded to guide the development of the World Wide Web.
(http://www.w3.org)
4The PSPACE complexity class contains the class of NP problems
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Figure 2.1: The Semantic Web technology stack. OWL is at the top of the ontology
section of the stack, above XML and RDF. The stack also includes concepts, such as
Trust, which are regarded as being critical to the success of the Semantic Web.
and relations and functions over those objects. The objects form a domain of discourse
which the propositions are about.
Propositions in first-order logic are formed according to the syntax shown below
(quoted from [95]). The main distinction with description logic is the addition of
boolean connectives and n-ary relations and functions.
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FOL Syntax:
Sentence → AtomicSentence
| (Sentence Connective Sentence)
| Quantifier Variable, . . . Sentence
| ¬Sentence
AtomicSentence → Predicate(Term . . .) | Term = Term
Term → Function(Term . . .)
| Constant
| Variable
Connective → ⇒ |∧|∨ | ⇔
Quantifier → ∀|∃
The syntax of first-order logic with equality, specified in Backus-Naur form.
Example: Consider the following example theory, with an ontology as follows:
Variable → X | X ′ | X ′′ | . . .
Predicate → likes | person
Function → father
Constant → john | bananas | bill
where the predicates have their intuitive natural-language meaning, and the fol-
lowing axioms:




These axioms have the consequence that likes(bill,bananas). Note the choices
that we have made in presenting this theory. Bananas are represented as a con-
stant, rather than as a concept in their own right. This is exemplary of the diffi-
culties of knowledge engineering.
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First-order logic provides a logic expressive enough to act as a meta-logic for any
other logic [124]. Indeed, several AI researchers have proposed first-order logic as
being an adequate foundation for Knowledge Representation in Artificial Intelligence
[46] [124] [75]. However, there have been critiques of this position [86] [14].
First-order logic has a Tarskian semantics [134], where the meaning of an expres-
sion in first-order logic is based upon the models of that expression. A model of an
expression is an interpretation of it’s syntax in terms of the domain of discourse, where
the domain of discourse is a mathematical set of objects. We shall consider this notion
of meaning further in section 4.4.
We shall use first-order logic to formalise any examples in this thesis as it is ade-
quate for our purposes.
2.1.2.3 Higher-Order Logic
We mention higher-order logic as there have been some uses of this logic to formalise
knowledge, in particular the Ontology Evolution in Physics research we discuss in
section 2.2.3.
First-order logic restricts quantifiers to objects in the domain of discourse. How-
ever, some expressions are naturally formulated with quantification over relations. For
instance, the principle of induction over the natural numbers states that any property
which holds for zero and which if it holds for n then it also holds for n+ 1, therefore
holds for all natural numbers. In first-order logic we could only express this property
for a particular predicate, whereas the principle should be applicable to all predicates.
We need to use second-order logic5, which allows quantification over predicates and
functions, to formalise this principle.
Higher-order logic extends the quantification over functions and relations to quan-
tification over higher-order functions and relations. This enables expressions that can’t
be directly stated in first-order logic, but it also creates problems (such as Goedel’s
incompleteness theorems [93]).
2.1.2.4 RDF
We have just surveyed some quite expressive logics with rigorous meta-logical theo-
ries. However, many of the ontologies in widespread use are based upon lightweight
representations, such as RDF.
5Alternatively, an infinite number of first-order axioms can be used.
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RDF is a simple subject-verb-object triple representation formalised in an XML
schema. Although RDF is not a mathematical logic - there is no proof theory for RDF
- it does have a model-theoretic semantics6.
RDF ontologies can be naturally viewed as graphs of RDF resources connected by
edges (which represent the triples). An example of an RDF ontology in XML format










This RDF ontology uses the namespace at http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-
ns# to express that Eric Miller is a person who has an email address em@w3.org and
that he is a Doctor.
2.1.3 Example Ontologies
Ontologies research is motivated by the desire to create practical knowledge-based
systems. In this section we consider some example ontologies and their applications.
2.1.3.1 SUMO
The Suggested Upper Merged Ontology (SUMO) project was founded as an attempt
to unify various upper ontologies into a single upper-ontology which could enable
ontology interoperation [94].
The ideal behind the use of such upper ontologies is that domain specific ontolo-
gies can be mapped into the upper ontology and hence the relationships between the
6c.f. http://www.w3.org/TR/rdf-mt/
7Taken from http://www.w3.org/TR/rdf-primer/
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Figure 2.2: An example RDF graph. The nodes are resources, either things or data. The
edges express triples, relating two resources into a Subject Verb Object triple. For ex-
ample, the edge between “Eric Miller” and “http://www.w3.org/People/EM/contact#me”
expresses that the contact resource has the full name “Eric Miller”.
domain ontologies can be formalised using the upper ontology. There is little empirical
evidence to support this claim, and in general upper ontologies have not been of much
use in solving interoperability problems8.
The problem for upper ontologies is that they are too general to be of much use
in specific problems. You need to have domain specific knowledge to solve domain
specific problems. We discuss the problem of ontology matching further in section
2.1.4.
2.1.3.2 WordNet
The WordNet project was founded by George Millar to create a database of English
words and their linguistic categorisations [90]. WordNet has become one of the most
8c.f. Barry Smith ([121] p159): ‘The initial project of building one single ontology, even one single
top-level ontology, which would be at the same time non-trivial and also readily adopted by a broad
population of different information systems communities, has largely been abandoned.”‘
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Figure 2.3: A section of SUMO, showing the upper ontology containing the most ab-
stract concepts and the mid-level ontologies for particular domains.
important resources for natural language processing.
WordNet is not a formal ontology in the strictest sense. It doesn’t provide logical
representations of the concepts that the words denote. It only provides their linguistic
categorisations, links to related words and English language descriptions of their mean-
ing. However, it does satisfy a lightweight sense of ontology, since it uses a taxonomy
of linguistic terms to discuss a domain of discourse composed of words. WordNet also
demonstrates that lightweight ontologies can be very useful, even if they can’t be used
to perform logical reasoning.
2.1.3.3 SNOMED-CT
The medical community is one of the most significant real-world users of ontologies.
There have been several popular medical ontologies, such as GALEN [106], UMLS9
and SNOMED-CT [126].
SNOMED-CT (Systematised Nomenclature of Medicine - Clinical Terms) is a
9http://www.nlm.nih.gov/research/umls/
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merger of the original SNOMED-RT ontology with the CTV3 ontology. The ontology
was created as part of a joint venture between the College of American Pathologists
(CAP) and the National Health Service (NHS) in the United Kingdom.
The ontology provides a comprehensive terminology of medical concepts, it con-
tains approximately 300,000 concepts. The ontology is used for managing knowledge
about patients and ensuring consistent usage of terminology across sites10.
SNOMED-CT is formalised within a description logic [126]. However, the design
process of SNOMED-CT, which makes extensive use of feedback from clinicians, cre-
ates incorrect relationships and duplicate concepts [27].
There has been some research into the changes that have occurred to SNOMED-CT
[26], which we will consider in more detail in section 2.2.1.
2.1.4 Interoperability
As we mentioned earlier, one of the aims of ontologies research was to enable knowledge-
based systems to share knowledge. This ideally requires a shared ontology, but real-
world systems don’t necessarily have shared ontologies. In particular, in a dynamic
Semantic web setting it is unrealistic to demand that people ensure that their ontolo-
gies are compatible. Such a demand might prevent people from putting ontologies on
the Semantic Web.
The World Wide Web was popular as it allowed anyone to put a hypertext document
online, without having to consult and agree with others about that document’s content.
Similiarly in a distributed system using ontologies it would be desirable for anyone to
put an ontology online and for it be integrated with other ontologies automatically.
This has led to research on various forms of ontology integration [66]. There are
many ways in which ontologies can be combined or compared. We shall consider the
problem of ontology matching, which demonstrates many of the problems faced by
any form of ontology integration.
2.1.4.1 Ontology Matching
The problem of ontology matching is to find matches between terms in two ontologies
such that any expression mapped to another ontology has the same meaning as it did
in the original one[66].
10See http://www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk/systemsandservices/data/snomed for a description of
the usage of SNOMED-CT within the UK
Chapter 2. Subject Survey 17
An example of an ontology matching system is the S-Match system [50]. This
system matches terms in two ontologies by comparing the hierarchy of the taxonomy,
the term structure and by using external resources. An example of an external resource
is WordNet. Predicates in different ontologies might be matched according to their
WordNet relations. For instance, if the word used to denote a predicate is a synonym
of a word used to denote a predicate in the other ontology then the predicates might be
matched as being interchangeable without any loss of meaning.
Ontology matching is based upon ensuring that the meaning of matched concepts
is the same in the two ontologies. Since the ontologies are based upon a mathematical
logic the meaning is theoretically based upon the model-theoretic semantics of the
two ontologies. However, ontologies are created by people using natural language
words. The intended meaning of the concept is based upon the natural language words
[88]. Matching systems, such as S-Match, can use this feature to match terms using
resources such as WordNet. However, it also raises interesting questions about what
exactly the meaning of an ontology is. We shall consider such questions further in
section 4.4.
Current ontology matching systems have problems with the background knowledge
required to match ontologies. A deliverable of the Open Knowledge project [117]
noted that
“Recent industrial-strength evaluations of matching systems ... show that
lack of background knowledge, most often domain specific knowledge, is
one of the key problems of matching systems.”
2.2 Ontology Evolution
This thesis is concerned with the problem of ontology evolution, which is related to
the interoperability problems we saw in the previous section.
Ontologies are about an application domain, but our understanding of any domain
changes over time, hence our ontologies must adapt to reflect this changing under-
standing. An ontology that didn’t change would soon become useless to us.
This creates a problem since ontologies are naturally static. We need to design
mechanisms that manipulate an ontology so that it evolves along with our understand-
ing of the domain.
But what is our understanding of the domain? If the ontology simply is the explicit
specification of our understanding of the domain, and so the two are intertwined, how
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can our understanding change without the ontology changing?
There is an interesting distinction here between the implicit and explicit knowledge
that an agent (whether human or machine) has11. An ontology is part of the explicit,
shared knowledge that an agent has. Implicit knowledge is the knowledge that an agent
has that is not explicitly shared as part of some social discourse, see section 6.3.3 for
further discussion.
The evolution of an ontology will depend upon the implicit knowledge that an
agent has. The distinction between implicit (tacit) and explicit knowledge is recognised
within the field of knowledge engineering [114] [128].
We are faced with two types of ontology evolution. One in which human beings
are the arbiters of domain understanding, and this can change without the ontology
being updated. And one in which an autonomous agent has an ontology representing
its understanding of the domain, and so the agent must adapt the ontology to better
reflect the domain.
In the first scenario the implicit knowledge is stored in people’s brains and we need
to design tools for ontology evolution which help people use this implicit knowledge
to guide the ontology evolution. In the second scenario the implicit knowledge must
be provided by the autonomous agent: the agent must determine how to evolve the
ontology using the implicit knowledge and reasoning mechanisms they have.
We shall consider examples of these different scenarios in the following sections.
2.2.1 Tools
The first scenario suggests a form of ontology evolution in which humans change their
representation of the domain and want to adapt an existing domain ontology to reflect
this new representation.
There has been some research into this problem within the ontology research com-
munity [132] [131] [41] [130]. Stojanovic et al [130] highlight six phases for ontology
evolution, based upon a process of identifying the need for changes, then determining
the appropriate changes, then enacting the changes and rechecking the ontology.
As noted previously, there has been some research into the evolution of the SNOMED-
CT ontology [26]. This research has focused upon classifying the changes that occur to
SNOMED-CT, in particular making a distinction between the changes due to a change
in reality and the changes due to a change in our understanding.
11c.f. the traditional distinction in A.I. between declarative and procedural knowledge.
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The aim of these research projects is primarily to help people tasked with manag-
ing ontologies to evolve their ontologies. The research doesn’t address the problems
of meaning that arise when considering how an autonomous agent might evolve an
ontology independently. Our research is concerned with this problem, since we want
to design mechanisms that can function without human intervention, so this research
is not particularly relevant to us.
2.2.2 ORS
The second scenario forms the basis of research within the DReaM12 group. In par-
ticular the ORS system [87] and research on Ontology Evolution in Physics [22]. The
focus of both research projects is on signature evolution, c.f. the high-level definition
of ontology given in section 2.1.2.
The ORS system actually involves both kinds of scenario. The ontologies used
by ORS agents were created by people to fulfil some purpose. However, the ORS
agents were designed to use these ontologies to autonomously achieve goals within the
domain.
The problem that ORS was designed to solve occurred when a planning agent
wanted a service from a service-providing agent and there was an ontology mismatch in
their communications. The planning agent had to create a plan that involved requesting
some services from service-providing agents13. The planning agent was tasked with
spotting any mismatches that occurred during plan execution and repairing its own on-
tology to solve the mismatch problem. A mismatch might be a relation with an extra
argument or a relation that is a superclass of the expected one in the planning agent’s
ontology.
When a mismatch occurred the planning agent used a decision tree to decide what
repair to make to its ontology. Once the repair was made the planning agent resumed
its plan.
There were several types of mismatch that the planning agent could not repair,
such as a relation that didn’t occur in its own ontology or was not a sub/super-class of
another relation in its ontology. The scenarios that ORS could handle were restricted
to agents using a different version of the same ontology. The differences between the
two ontologies could not be too great as the repair mechanisms would not be able to
12Discovery and Reasoning in Mathematics, although the research includes more general AI themes
13The actual examples were based upon hand-crafted ontologies for tasks such as booking travel and
accommodation for a conference
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identify an appropriate repair.
2.2.3 Ontology Evolution in Physics
Ontology evolution in physics [22] is a research project which studies repair plans in
the physics domain. The aim is to formalise repair plans which emulate the discovery
of new physical concepts by using historical physics experiments as case studies. This
research is the most relevant prior work on ontology evolution to our own research.
The basis of the Ontology Evolution in Physics project is the study of repair plans.
These are similiar to proof plans14, which formalise meta-level heuristics used by
mathematicians in theorem proving. Repair plans are designed to capture heuristics
used to spot and enact common repairs to ontologies. Repair plans have been used
to make changes to the signature of an ontology, such as adding in new objects or
functions, in order to resolve problems with the ontology.
The main components of a repair plan are the trigger formulae (the conditions
under which the plan can be used), the schema that is matched to the existing ontology
and the change to the schema that is made to the ontology. Repair plans are defined in
a higher-order logic, see section 2.1.2.3.
An example of a repair plan is the inconstancy plan [28], which has been used
to model the creation of the Modified Newtonian dynamics theory. The inconstancy
repair plan is triggered when a function is observed to be dependent upon a parameter
that it is defined to be independent from.
The motivating intuition behind the inconstancy repair plan is that there is some un-
derlying parameter that varies between distinct sensory ontologies that is creating the
different observed values. The current theory doesn’t take this parameter into account,
so the repair is to include it into the theory.
The repair is to identify the parameter which causes the unexpected variation in
sensory observations and redefine the existing function so that it is dependent upon the
parameter.
The inconstancy repair plan is defined below (the definition is taken from [28]):
Suppose we have an ontology Ot representing the current state of a phys-
ical theory and some ontologies Os representing sensory information aris-
ing from experiments, such that different sensory ontologies give distinct
values for function stuff (~si) in different circumstances. Suppose function
14A related area of research within the DReaM group. Proof plans are used for meta-level reasoning
in mathematical theorem proving.
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V (~si,~bi) of the ith sensory ontology, where ~bi contains variables distin-
guishing among these circumstances, returns distinct values in each of
these circumstances, but is not one of the parameters in ~si, i.e., stuff (~si)
does not depend on V (~si,~bi). We will call stuff (~si) the inconstancy and
V (~si,~bi) the variad. The Inconstancy repair plan establishes a relationship
between the variad V (~si,~bi) and the inconstancy stuff (~si).
Trigger: If stuff (~si) is measured to take different values in different cir-
cumstances, then the following trigger formulae will be matched.
Os(V (~s1, ~b1) = v1 . . .) ` stuff (~s1) = c1
...
... (2.1)
Os(V (~sn, ~bn) = vn . . .) ` stuff (~sn) = cn
Ot ` stuff (~x) ::= c(~x) (2.2)
∃i 6= j. Ot ` stuff (~si)− ci 6= (2.3)
stuff (~s j)− c j
where~x can be instantiated to~si for 1≤ i≤ n, Os(V (~si,~bi) = vi) is the
sensory ontology containing observations made under the condition
that V (~si,~bi)= vi and V (~si,~bi) is not an existing argument of stuff (~si),
i.e., V (~si,~bi) /∈~si.
Add Variad: The repair is to change the signature of all the ontologies to
relate the inconstancy, stuff (~x), to the variad, V (~x,~y):
ν(stuff ) ::= λ~y,~x. F(c(~x),V (~x,~y)) (2.4)
where F is a new function, whose value we will seek to determine by
curve fitting against the data from the sensory ontologies.
Create New Axioms: We calculate the axioms of the new ontologies in
terms of those of the old as follows:
Ax(ν(Os(V (~si,~bi) = vi . . .))) ::= {φ{stuff/ν(stuff )(~bi)} |
φ ∈ Ax(Os(V (~si,~bi) = vi))}
Ax(ν(Ot)) ::= {φ{stuff/ν(stuff )(~y)} |
φ ∈ Ax(Ot)\{stuff (~x) ::= c(~x)}}
∪{ν(stuff ) ::= λ~y,~x. F(c(~x),V (~x,~y))}
i.e., the axioms of ν(Ot) and the ν(Os(V (~si,~bi) = vi)) are the same as
for Ot and Os(V (~si,~bi) = vi . . .) except for the replacement of the old
stuff with ν(stuff ) and the replacement of the definition of stuff (~x)
by the definition of ν(stuff (~x)) in ν(Ot).
Repair plans do not currently deal with the problem of selecting between different
possible repairs, or with evaluating the quality of a repair, however this is a current
research goal of the project15.
15Prof. Alan Bundy, personal communication
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We will consider the relevance of repair plans to our research problem in section
3.2.2.2.
2.3 Law
For our purposes, we can consider the Law as fulfilling two main roles within a society.
The first is to resolve disputes between members of the society. The second is to ensure
that the outcomes of these disputes are “fair”16.
The members of the society can be individual people or recognised legal-entities,
such as a corporation. The members of a society can perform various actions that affect
other members of the society, in positive or negative ways. These actions can create
conflicts between members of the society. The role of a legal system is to determine
what actions are permissible and what sanctions should be brought against a member
who performs an illegal action.
A legal system requires mechanisms to determine and specify permissible actions,
to recognise and enforce violations, and to judge what the sanctions should be in case
of a violation.
Legal systems use legal rules to specify what the law is. Although, how these
rules are created, what form they take and how they are applied differs between legal
systems.
2.3.1 Legal Systems
The law is enacted through legal systems. They provide mechanisms for people to
create and enforce laws within a society. There are two prominent families of legal
systems we shall consider: common law and civil law [32]. There are other forms of
legal system, but all the cases we consider will involve these two.
In [70] Peter Legrand points out that “In comparative law, the difference in styles
of legal reasoning between legal families is often emphasised.” In particular, the per-
spective upon ontologies differs notably between common law and civil law systems.
This thesis studies common law decisions. However, our research indicates that, for
our purposes, the distinction between these systems is negligible and that the results
should be more broadly applicable.
16We use scare quotes to indicate that the notion of fairness is contentious, we shall return to this
problem later in the thesis.
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2.3.1.1 Common Law
Common law has distinctive features both regarding legal sources and legal proce-
dures. The most important sources are precedent, earlier court decisions from higher
courts are binding on lower courts. The ideal is that the law should be consistent and
so apply similiar remedies to similiar cases.
Common law uses an adversarial form of case resolution. The lawyers for the two
parties generate arguments about the law. The judge acts as an umpire, checking the
validity of the arguments and assessing which are superior.
2.3.1.2 Civil Law
Civil law is based upon codifying the sources of law into collections of definitive rules.
Applying the law should then become a process of finding the applicable rules to a case
and calculating their consequences. However, applying the rules is usually not quite as
straightforward as this.
Civil law uses an inquisitorial form of case resolution. The judge should lead the
investigation into the case, and the lawyers representing the two parties should assist
this investigation.
2.3.1.3 Mixed Systems
There are legal systems which combine elements of different legal systems. For in-
stance, the Scottish legal system, like much of continental Europe, was originally based
upon Roman civil law. However, some fields of Scots law follow the English model of
precedent based common law.
The E.U. is also potentially an example of a mixed legal system. Each constituent
country has its own national legal system, of a common, civil or mixed type, but all
recognise the European Court of Justice as the highest court in the E.U. and all are
obliged to enact European directives in national legislation. There is some debate
about whether the E.U. courts should be considered to be part of each nation’s legal
system, or whether they are part of international law. Certainly the bindings between
E.U. courts and national courts are stronger than the ones to other international courts,
such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
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2.3.2 Legal Rules
From the perspective of Computer Science, legal rules can be viewed as defining con-
straints upon how a legal system should operate. They relate objects from different
domains and put constraints upon how these objects should relate. For example, an
Act of Parliament will specify constraints between domain-level objects, such as peo-
ple, chairs and offices, and legal objects, such as rights, entitlements and prisons. It is
by placing constraints between the object-level objects and the legal ones that the law
states how social situations should be regulated. Note the normative aspect of the Law,
the constraints are not descriptions of how the world is, but instead state how the legal
system should respond to various states of the world.
An example of a legal rule might be “if, within an office environment, a person
stands on a chair then their employer is not liable for any accidents that result”. A
constraint is placed between a situation in which a person, in an office, stands of a
chair and the legal liability of their employer for an accident that might result from this
situation.
The main problem in law is interpreting legal rules. The legal system is built up
upon our natural languages, it can not escape from their limitations to accurately com-
municate ideas. In the above example the vagueness about what it means for a person
to stand on a chair, or what it means for an accident to result from the situation, would
create a “hard legal case”, a case that can’t be decided mechanically by a mere “un-
thinking” application of the rules [15].
2.3.3 Legal Questions
The ontologies underlying legal rules must be matched with the ontologies used to
describe real-world situations. A variety of questions are usually raised when trying
to apply a legal rule to a real-world situation. Lawyers recognise two categories of
questions: questions of law and questions of fact.
Questions of law are questions about what the law actually is. The legal rule is not
clear or there are conflicting rules, in this case the judges must determine what the law
is in that case.
Questions of fact are questions about what actually happened in the real-world sit-
uation. There might be sources of evidence that lead to conflicting hypotheses. The
judges must determine what is most likely to have happened in the real-world situation
and judge the case accordingly. The standards of truth can differ between types of legal
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cases. In English law a criminal case requires that the real-world situation be estab-
lished beyond reasonable doubt for the corresponding sanction to be applied, whereas
civil cases merely require the balance of probabilities to be in favour of that situation.
2.3.4 Legal Ontologies
We have seen that legal rules are the form in which the law is specified. These legal
rules mention various concepts, and in doing so define an ontology.
There are also ontologies that are not explicitly mentioned in any legal rule, but
which underlie the legal system, such as the ontologies used to describe the principles
of the legal system.
There have been various attempts to formalise legal ontologies which we shall look
at in the following section.
2.3.4.1 Formal Ontologies of Law
Thorne McCarty was one of the first researchers working on legal ontologies. He
originally worked on models of legal reasoning based upon logic programming. As a
result of this research he proposed a Language for Legal Discourse (LLD) [81] as a
basis for modelling legal reasoning.
The scope of the projects using Language for Legal Discourse was quite limited.
McCarty’s models of legal cases were not fully automated, and the work required to
hand-craft the representation of a legal case meant that few cases were modelled in this
language [82].
There have been other ontologies proposed since then, Pepjin Visser and Trevor
Bench-Capon give a survey of the various proposals in [146]. These ontologies were
primarily concerned with creating upper-ontologies for modelling legal cases and leg-
islation, and have not been extensively used to model actual legal cases.
The largest scale formalisations of legal cases have been done in quite lightweight
formalisms. Zelenkowski’s SPLIT-UP project had one of the larger databases of cases,
at one hundred and fifty [159]. However, the case representation in this project was
quite simple, simply a set of features for each case.
A more recent, and larger scale, project to create useful legal ontologies is the Es-
trella project17. The aim here is to create ontologies primarily for modelling legislation,
rather than legal cases.
17http://www.estrellaproject.org
Chapter 2. Subject Survey 26
The main difficulty in using the foundational legal ontologies is that by themselves
they aren’t especially useful. Most legal cases involve a real-world domain which must
also be formalised as part of a model of a legal case. This problem has been recognised
within the AI and Law community [18], and some commonsense ontologies have been
produced, but they are not extensive enough for the models of legal reasoning we would
like to produce. We will look further into this problem of commonsense knowledge in
chapter 6 6.3.
Another interesting example of legal ontologies research is McCarty’s modelling
of the concept of possession [84]. He analyses the concept of ownership and tries to
construct a formal model of the concept. This is particularly relevant for our work, but
McCarty doesn’t discuss exactly what reasoning is used to evolve the concept, rather
he focuses upon what changes occur to the concept and the broad social reasons for
these changes.
In [112] Edwina Rissland and Tim Friedman study the changes that occur to a
legal rule over time, based upon the features that are added and removed from the rule.
Again, this analysis is based upon long-term change to the concept, rather than the
mechanisms used to make one particular change. The justifications for the changes are
not studied.
The work of Andre Valente and Joost Breuker (with various collaborators) [19] is
of particular interest to us. Their work makes a distinction between legal (normative)
knowledge and commonsense conceptual knowledge, with legal reasoning involving
forming mappings between the legal knowledge used to describe legal rules and the
commonsense knowledge used to describe real-world events. They have developed
several systems, such as TRACS [20] and ON-LINE [144]. More recent work has
focused on the use of OWL ontologies to model legal rules and commonsense concepts
in the HARNESS system [145]. This work is quite influential on ours, in particular
their distinction between commonsense knowledge used to describe a real-world event
and the legal knowledge contained in a source of law and their characterisation of legal
reasoning as forming mappings between the legal knowledge and the commonsense
knowledge. This influence can be seen in the model we propose in section 6.4. Our
model primarily differs from theirs in the use of a contextual logic to provide a basis
for the representation.
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2.3.4.2 Textual Ontologies
The existing formal ontologies are not extensive enough for our purposes. We are
interested in modelling the evolution of legal ontologies in a manner similiar to the
Ontology Evolution in Physics project. So we must broaden the kinds of ontology we
are considering.
The Ontology Evolution in Physics project uses the documentation of historical
Physics experiments as a basis for their models. We shall consider the ontologies
defined in sources of legal rules as the ontologies whose evolution we will try to model.
These ontologies are textual, in that the ontology is defined by a natural language
discourse. The text mentions various concepts and states rules that define those con-
cepts.
Certainly natural language is not a formal logic, and so raises various problems for
constructing formal models. In particular, we are hand-crafting the representations for
our model, and might ignore relevant complexities present in the actual document. We
shall consider these problems later in this thesis.
Note that, we will use the words “word” and “concept” in different parts of this
thesis to mean essentially the same thing, i.e. the concept which the word denotes. We
use the word “word” sometimes, as this is what appears in the legal texts, although
we are usually talking about the concept that the word denotes. We only use this
terminology when the word is not ambiguous, i.e. it is agreed that there is one concept
that the word refers to, but the definition of this concept is uncertain.
2.3.5 Legal Reasoning
We are focusing upon ontology evolution in legal cases and so we are interested in the
reasoning produced in legal cases. In a legal case a dialogue between the lawyers and
the judges is conducted. This dialogue is recorded as a discourse about the case in the
case proceedings.
The dialogue in a legal case is composed of arguments18. The legal case raises
certain questions. The lawyers in the case must create arguments to support or attack
answers to these questions.
Since we are looking at common law legal-cases we are also interested in the rea-
soning with precedents. We argue that this form of reasoning is a particular form of
18c.f. [149] for an analysis of argumentation in various forms of dialogue.
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argumentation, where the domain of argumentation are the claims about similiarity
between legal cases.
Legal reasoning is arguably no different from the reasoning we use to solve prob-
lems in everyday life. However, even though the mechanisms of reasoning might be
no different, the reflective awareness of the reasoning is different. The methods of le-
gal reasoning are frequently made explicit in the discourse. Lawyers are aware of the
mechanisms, such as precedential reasoning, they are using and there are rules about
how reasoning should be conducted, which are more rigidly enforced within the law
than they are within everyday discourse.
The permissible forms of legal argumentation and interpretation are taught at ev-
ery law school. In particular, the teachings regarding statutory interpretation, such as
[39], form a distinct body of knowledge that law students will be taught. The rules of
statutory interpretation form an explicit set of meta-rules within a legal system.
2.3.5.1 Argumentation
We have claimed that legal discourse is based upon argumentation, and that legal rea-
soning involves producing a legal discourse. From a computational perspective, argu-
mentation is connected with logic. For lawyers, the logical aspects of argument are
less clear, and common law in particular has often emphasised the rhetorical nature
of argument, c.f. [97]. It is a methodological assumption of this thesis that at least
some parts of legal argumentation can be reconstructed in a logical formalism. How-
ever, this means that not all features of a legal case can necessarily be explained in the
frameworks we study.
Recently a field of informal logic has arisen, which studies the patterns of argument
in discourse [51]. It is this notion of argumentation that we are using as a basis for legal
reasoning.
The argumentation in a legal case is about the claims made by the opposing sides
in a legal case. The claimant in a legal case will claim that the defendant has vio-
lated some legal rules and that hence certain consequences must be legally enforced.
Both sides will then create arguments about these claims and their consequences. The
arguments are assessed by the judges in the legal case.
Toulmin’s model of argumentation defines a basic structure for argumentation [141].
His model of argumentation has been refined by various authors, e.g. [152], but gives
us a basic vocabulary for understanding arguments.
Toulmin’s model consists of the following elements:







The claim is the proposition that we are trying to argue for, such as “You should
carry an umbrella”.
The data is the evidence that we have for our claim, such as “It is raining outside”.
The warrant is the link that allows us to infer the claim from the data, such as “An
umbrella will keep you dry in the rain and you would prefer to be dry.”
A backing provides additional support to the warrant, such as “An umbrella creates
a barrier between you and the rain”.
The qualifier indicates the strength of the warrant, how well does the evidence
justify the claim given the warrant. For instance, we might qualify the warrant above
as being quite likely, an umbrella will usually keep you dry in the rain.
A rebuttal is an exceptional condition which prevents the warrant from justifying
the claim, such as if it was also very windy, in which case the umbrella would be blown
away or inside out and so would not provide protection from the rain.
The most important elements of argumentation are the claim, the data and the war-
rant. In many arguments warrants are implicit, creating arguments that are called en-
thymemes.
In a legal case the relevant claims are about the questions raised by the case and
the legal consequences required in the case. The evidence is primarily provided by
the relevant laws, the precedent cases and commonsense knowledge. The warrants are
based upon either legal knowledge or commonsense knowledge.
2.3.5.2 Precedent
Reasoning by precedent is reasoning by analogy: a prior case is presented as being
similiar to the current one. The claims about similiarity are attacked by making dis-
tinctions between the prior case and the current one.
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The aim of the lawyer is to identify the ratio decidendi in the prior case, the rule
that was used to justify the prior decision. Unfortunately, these rules are not always
explicitly stated in the prior case. The lawyer’s skill is to argue for a generalisation of
the prior case to an abstract rule that covers the current case. This generalisation can
be attacked by making distinctions between the current case and the prior one, which
are not accounted for by the abstract rule.
For more detail regarding reasoning with precedent see [69].
2.3.5.3 An example
The following example is taken from Twinning and Meiers [142], and demonstrates
some of the problems faced in interpreting the law. The example is about a boy named
Johnny who has recently developed a sweet tooth. One day his mother catches him
snacking on a pot of jam in the pantry. She scolds him and tells him that he “Must not
enter the pantry”. Johnny asks “What does enter mean?”, “It means to go into”, replies
his mother.
In the next few days the following incidents occur: Johnny is caught using a broom
to try and hook the jam jar out of the pantry. When caught he argues that he “didn’t
go into the pantry”. Later the family’s cat enters the pantry and starts eating the main
course for a dinner Johnny’s mother was organising. His mother walks into the kitchen
to find Johnny standing outside the pantry laughing while the cat devours the meal.
On both of these occasions there is some ambiguity about the applicability of the
norm “Johnny must not enter the pantry”. In the first situation Johnny is clearly trying
to eat the jam, and is using the broom to avoid being physically in the pantry. This
violates the intent behind the rule, and arguably also violates the rule: is Johnny going
into the pantry by using the broom as an appendage? In the second situation Johnny
should be stopping the cat from eating the meal, even if this means entering the pantry.
The example demonstrates some important aspects of legal rules. When Johnny’s
mother says “You [Johnny] must not enter the pantry” she clearly intended to prevent
Johnny from snacking on the Jam, but not to prevent him from saving the meal from the
cat. Our interpretation of the rule is controlled by contextual factors which influence
how we apply it to a real-world situation.
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2.3.6 Evolution of the Law
The simplest form of legal evolution is that rules are added, edited or deleted within a
legal system. Particularly interesting examples of this are:
• A new rule affects the interpretation of other rules (e.g. a rule is added to the law
which states that new rules take precedence over old ones.).
• A precedent affects the interpretation of a rule (e.g. a precedent case establishes a
rule that allows the use of Parliamentary debates to aid statutory interpretation19)
• A rule which affects the interpretation of other rules is removed.
• A new rule is inducted from precedent cases (e.g. in the common law a ratio
decidendi is given).
Many of these changes occur outside of legal cases, e.g. when legislation is passed
by an official body. The evolution of the Law that occurs in legal cases happens when
the available legal rules are inconclusive: when there is a conflict between rules, when
the rules are unclear or when the rules are perceived as unjust or absurd. In these cases
the competing parties must propose their theories, in favour of competing outcomes,
to the deciding audience. The audience will evolve the law by making a decision over
which theory is preferable, or by proposing a theory of their own for the case.
2.3.7 Modelling Ontology Evolution in Legal Reasoning
There are two features of the legal domain that are particularly relevant for any at-
tempt to model legal reasoning: the natural-language format of legal discourse and the
implicit biases in legal reasoning.
The first feature raises some interesting questions about how we can create a for-
mal model from the natural language discourse. The observations we have of legal
reasoning come from the natural-language case proceedings. These case proceedings
contain a description of the case and the arguments that were presented in the case.
We must take these textual descriptions and construct logical representations of the
reasoning. This requires either someone or some process to translate the text into a
logical representation. What we would like to have are models of the reasoning about
ontology evolution in the legal case.
19c.f. Pepper v. Hart [1992] UKHL 3
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The model might predict the arguments that occurred in a historical case, or suggest
plausible arguments. This distinction, between different possible purposes of a model,
is the second claim of this thesis, which we shall discuss in more detail later.
The difficulty for us is to justify the mapping from the text to the formal logic.
If we are hand-crafting the formal representations and then paraphrasing the formal
output into natural language, we are open to the criticism that the output of the model
is not related to the actual output in the case, and hence the relationship between the
formal model and the actual process is uncertain.
This problem is not specific to our work, but affects AI and Law research generally.
We must use our knowledge of the domain to justify the modelling step and to assess
the relevance of the model to the actual process.
The second feature of legal reasoning is that the case proceedings might not contain
all the information that was relevant to the outcome of the case. The judges in a case
might have implicit biases that affect their reasoning. Lawyers will appeal to these
biases when they craft their arguments. So the arguments generated in a legal case
might only make sense if these biases are recognised.
Examples of these biases are:
• Our sense what is morally acceptable
• Public Opinion
• Political factors in the judiciary.
• Economic concerns.
• Racism, Sexism, and other prejudices.
These biases are implicit constraints upon how we conceptualise the Law, and are
distinct from the explicit legal rules. For example, in the ‘Naughty Johnny’ case we
would consider Johnny to have violated the rule “You [Johnny] must not enter the
pantry” if he had stopped the cat from eating the meal. However, we might not want to
punish him for it, as we would be punishing him for being helpful. Our implicit sense
of fairness leads us to regard this outcome as undesirable.
Sometimes these biases are an explicit part of the law, and are appealed to as part
of legal argument. For instance, when a law uses terms such as “reasonable doubt” the
public opinion regarding what is reasonable is part of the law.
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Political factors may influence the reasoning of judges. For example, in the case
of Buchanan v. Babco (see section 3.2.2) it is arguable that Lord Denning’s views on
importing broad methods of interpretation into UK law were influenced by a political
desire to give the judiciary more freedom in interpreting laws set by Parliament.
Economic concerns can be used to explain the evolution of the law, the Law and
Economics movement has become quite popular recently. An example20 might be
the change to the ownership of land in U.S.A. that occurred when air planes became
common. Prior to air travel, ownership of land meant that you had property rights over
the sky above the land. This was challenged when a farmer took the government to
court for trespassing due to flights that went over his farm21. The judges held that it was
against common sense for this notion of property to hold, and so now property rights do
not extend all the way up into the skies. It is arguable that the judges were influenced by
economic concerns; to have upheld the traditional property rights would have made air
travel much more difficult if every flight was potentially subject to numerous trespass
claims.
The important distinction to make is between the explicit legal rules which place
constraints upon how the legal system should operate and the implicit biases of the
agents within the legal system. There is an associated distinction between the con-
text of decision making, in which a judge makes a decision regarding the case, and
the context of rationalisation, in which a judge proposes an argument to justify their
decision.
2.4 Summary
We have surveyed ontology and ontology evolution research. In particular the Ontol-
ogy Evolution in Physics project which is most akin to our own.
We have given a high-level overview of what the Law is and how it can evolve. We
are focusing upon the evolution of textual ontologies within legal cases, and trying to
construct formal models of the reasoning involved and the resulting changes.
In the next chapter we consider some example legal cases to demonstrate some of
the problems raised in trying to construct these formal models.
20taken from Lawrence Lessig’s book Free Culture [72]
21Actually there is more to the story. These were low-level flights of military aircraft, and the noise
caused by the flights was scaring the farmer’s chickens causing them to panic and kill themselves by
flying into barn walls.
Chapter 3
Ontology Evolution in Legal Cases
We started this thesis by proposing to study ontology evolution in legal reasoning.
However there are many activities that can create and change the law within a legal
system, and so there are different events that can lead to the evolution of legal ontolo-
gies. We have been studying the evolution of ontologies in legal cases. In this chapter
we will look at what happens in a legal case, what reasoning is used to resolve a case
and how the ontology of the law evolves in a legal case.
3.1 Overview of a Legal Case
Legal cases are used to resolve disputes about the law. Two parties have conflicting
interests which the law must resolve. A legal case provides a forum in which these
conflicts can be explored and resolved.
A legal case is raised by one party registering the case with the appropriate court.
For instance, within the UK, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) will raise a case
within the Criminal Courts on the basis of a police investigation. Alternatively, a civil
case will be raised when one of the party’s lawyers registers the case with the appro-
priate court.
Once a case has been raised with a court the parties must then prepare their argu-
ments for the case. These arguments will be used during the case to justify that party’s
preferred outcome. At the end of the case proceedings the judges1 will decide the
outcome of the case.
1We have been looking at cases in which judges have determined the outcome to the case, so our
discussion is based upon judges making all decisions, without mention of juries or other forms of arbi-
tration. Since the evolution of the law will primarily occur in appellate courts, where judges make the
decisions, this is a justified use of the terminology and will not affect our conclusions.
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The outcome of a case matters not only to the parties involved, but also the wider
legal system. In common-law systems the impact of a case can be to establish a prece-
dent on some question of law. However even in legal systems without binding prece-
dent the analysis produced to resolve a dispute in one case may have an impact upon
future cases. We have been focusing upon cases in common-law jurisdictions and our
discussion, and results, are focused upon the common law. Although, as argued previ-
ously, we think that the results should generalise to cases in other jurisdictions.
In a legal case the law must be applied to a real-world event. An event has occurred
in which one party, the party pursuing the case, feels that the law can be applied to
create a preferable outcome for them. The problem for both parties is to argue for an
interpretation of the law, as it applies to the event, that results in a legal win for them.
3.1.1 Ontology Evolution in Legal cases
We surveyed some of the ways in which the law can change in section 2.3.6. His-
torically, much new law within common-law legal-systems has been created by legal
cases. However, these days most new law is created via statutes.
What can change are the methods used to interpret and apply the law. Judges must
resolve any questions of law that occur in a legal case. It is not possible to leave a
question which might affect the outcome of the trial unanswered. In cases where the
law is uncertain, judges have to decide what the law is.
The uncertainty in the law occurs because of inconsistent law and incomplete law.
The law is inconsistent if there are multiple laws which each have clear interpretations
but which are collectively inconsistent. A law is incomplete if it has multiple inter-
pretations, so we don’t know exactly what it means. The problem of open texture,
which we will study in the next chapter, is is created by incomplete law. In particular,
incomplete laws in which the terms used are unclear, and for which there are multiple
plausible interpretations of how the law relates to the facts of the case.
We are predominantly interested in cases where the law is incomplete, as these
are the cases in which the existing law is refined by adapting it to the current case.
Although the problem of inconsistent law is also relevant to the cases we study in this
chapter, and this thesis.
The evolution of the law occurs in the resolution of this uncertainty. The reasoning
in the case is used to argue for interpretations of the law. The outcome of the case
refines the law by deciding what it means in that case.
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Our analysis of the ontology evolution in a legal case thus focuses on the ontology
changes that occur and the argumentation used to make these changes.
3.2 Some Example Legal Cases
This section presents some case studies of legal cases. The cases we have chosen
demonstrate some of the possible changes to the law that can occur in a legal case.
Our analysis of the following legal cases focuses upon the reasoning relevant to the
ontology evolution in the case. We don’t give a comprehensive account of the case
proceedings.
We start with the case of Popov v. Hayashi which has recently been modelled
within the AI and Law community [156]. We see that the case raises many problems
that make it difficult to construct a formal model of the ontology evolution in the case.
The remaining cases follow a similiar theme, all are based upon disputes regarding
loss of or damage to an object being transported internationally. These cases involve
the interpretation of international law within the English courts.
3.2.1 Popov v. Hayashi
The case of Popov v. Hayashi2 was a dispute over possession of a baseball. On October
7th, 2001, a baseball record was broken for the number of home runs3 hit by a batsman
in a game. Barry Bonds hit 73 home runs in that game. The balls from previous record
breaking games had been sold for significant sums of money, Mark McGwire’s 1998
70th home run ball sold at auction for $3,000,000.
Some people had anticipated that Barry Bonds would break the record during the
October 7th game, and congregated at the places where a ball would be most likely to
land, with the intention of catching the ball. The 73rd, record-breaking, ball landed in
one of those spots, where Alex Popov and Patrick Hayashi were standing in a crowd.
Alex Popov made an attempt to catch the ball, and briefly had the ball in his baseball
glove, but was assaulted by the rest of the crowd. The ball left his baseball glove and
was lost in the resulting fracas. During the confusion, the ball was spotted by Hayashi,
who pocketed it and only revealed it when cameras could record his possession. Popov
2Popov v. Hayashi, 2002 WL 31833731 (Cal.Superior Dec 18, 2002) (NO. 400545)
3A home run is when a batter can run around all bases. The most common type of home run is when
the ball is hit outside the pitch, which is what happened in this game. The balls are traditionally gathered
by fans and are valued mementos of a game.
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subsequently sued Hayashi for possession of the ball.
The issue in the case was whether Popov had possession over the ball, and so a
legal claim to it. The legal concept of possession was defined by case law. But prior
cases didn’t cover all possible situations involving possession, and indeed recognised
that requirements for possession differed between domains. So the judges in Popov v.
Hayashi had to find a satisfactory definition of possession for this case.
The case was resolved by acknowledging that both parties had a claim for posses-
sion of the ball, and that they shared possession. The ball was sold and the proceeds
divided between them.
3.2.1.1 Argumentation
The ontology evolution in this case is based upon the arguments regarding possession.
The existing concept of possession was vague and couldn’t be applied to the case. The
Judges needed to find a resolution of the situation that led to an acceptable outcome.
Popov had pled causes of action for conversion4, trespass to chattel5, injunctive
relief6 and constructive trust7. The main basis for these claims was that Popov had
possession over the ball, and so Hayashi had subsequently violated that possession,
both unintentionally (when he picked it up) and intentionally (when he didn’t give it
back to Popov). The desired outcome for Popov was that the ball be given to him.
The judge dismissed the trespass to chattel claim, that Hayashi intentionally de-
prived Popov of the ball, on the grounds that Hayashi had not damaged the ball or
interfered with Popov’s use of the ball.
With the trepass to chattel claim dismissed, the debate focused on the issue of pos-
session. The ball was initially the possession of Major League Baseball. When it was
hit it became intentionally abandoned property. The first person to claim possession of
the ball becomes its new owner.
The following definition of possession was proposed, by Professor Brian Gray, for
the case:
“A person who catches a baseball that enters the stand is its owner. A
ball is caught if the person has achieved complete control of the ball at the
4Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the personal property of another
5Trepass to chattel exists where personal property has been damaged or where the defendant has
interfered with the plaintiff’s use of the property.
6An equitable remedy, not necessarily financial, for the injustice. In this case, Popov wanted the ball
back.
7A particular form of equitable remedy.
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point in time that the momentum of the ball and the momentum of the fan
while attempting to catch the ball ceases. A baseball which is dislodged
by accidental contact with an inanimate object or another person, before
momentum has ceased, is not possessed. Incidental contact with another
person is contact that is not intended by the other person. The first person
to pick up a loose ball and secure it becomes its possessor.”
However, this definition denies Popov possession over the ball since he was still
in motion when he had the ball in his glove, and so didn’t catch the ball according to
the above definition. Popov argued that the requirement for complete control was too
strong. He justified this with the opinions of Professors Bernhardt and Finkelman who
suggest that possession occurs when “an individual intends to take control of a ball
and manifests that intent by stopping the forward momentum of the ball whether or
not complete control is achieved.”
This alternative definition of possession applies in cases involving hunting or fish-
ing wild animals or the salvage of sunken vessels. For example, in the case of hunting
possession occurs when the animal is mortally wounded, not when it is eventually cap-
tured. The alternative definition was needed since a mortally wounded animal can still
run for a distance before stopping.
However, the judge rejected this alternative definition on the basis that there was
no reason someone couldn’t achieve complete control of the baseball. And so Gray’s
definition applied to the case.
The next problem was that Popov was assaulted by the crowd. Popov could not
supply evidence that he would have achieved possession of the ball had he not been as-
saulted, and so could not claim full possession of the ball. However, the judge couldn’t
deny Popov possession either, since to do so would be to endorse the violent actions of
the crowd.
Since this branch of argumentation was not successful for Popov an alternative
approach was attempted. It is possible to pursue an action for conversion where the
plaintiff has failed to establish possession or title. Instead, an action for conversion can
be brought where the plaintiff has a right to possession. So Popov now has to argue
that he has a right to possession over the ball.
The court adopted the following rule regarding rights to possession: “Where an
actor undertakes significant but incomplete steps to achieve possession of a piece of
abandoned personal property and the effort is interrupted by the unlawful acts of others,
the actor has a legally cognisable pre-possessory interest in the property. That pre-
possessory interest constitutes a qualified right to possession which can support a cause
Chapter 3. Ontology Evolution in Legal Cases 39
of action for conversion.”
However a claim of pre-possessory interest for Popov affects Hayashi’s claim to
possession. The court claimed that it was required to balance the interests of all parties,
and so Hayashi’s claim to possession couldn’t be dismissed. An award of the ball to
Popov would be unfair to Hayashi.
The case has been analysed by researchers in AI and Law8 [156]. In particular, the
conflicting values raised by possible outcomes have been represented within a value-
based argumentation framework (see section 5.3). The values attached to the different
proposed outcomes of the case are part of the argumentation in the case. For instance, a
verdict in favour of Hayashi was attacked on the grounds that it would allow the result
of the case to be determined by the crowd’s assault on Popov. However, a verdict in
favour of Popov would unfairly penalise Hayashi, who wasn’t part of the crowd who
assaulted Popov.
3.2.1.2 Ontology evolution
The change to the law is not clear in this case. Prior to the case the concept of posses-
sion was uncertain. However, this definition was also known to vary between domains,
and so the general uncertainty was accepted, with specialisations for different domains.
A definition for possession was proposed in the case, but we don’t know why the
definition was acceptable. What is interesting is that the judges accepted the use of the
baseball definition of “caught” to determine the legal possession of the baseball, even
though the ball was caught by people not playing within the game.
So what we have is a form of legal evolution through the import of non-legal rules
into the legal domain. On a basic level this specifies the meaning of possession in the
case. On a meta level we have a precedent for the use of non-legal rules to resolve
a domain specific definition. This precedent could be used to justify resolutions of
similiar disputes in related domains.
The general notion of possession could be formalised as:
possesses(Person,Object) ↔ intends(Person,control(Object))∧ control(Object)
This states that a person possesses an object if and only if they intend to control
the object and they actually do control the object. However to make this definition
8The case was the suggested example for the recent workshop on legal case modelling at ICAIL
2009,http://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/ katie/LegalCasesWorkshop09-CFP
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useful for an automated reasoner we would have to define intends9 and control as
well. Defining these terms would require defining others, in a process that has no
clear ending. This relates to the problem of commonsense knowledge, which we shall
consider in section 6.3.




catches(Person,Ball) ↔ complete control(Person,Ball, t)
complete control(Person,Ball, t) ↔ momentum(Ball, t) = 0∧
momentum(Person, t) = 0
incidental dislodged(Person,Ball) ↔ dislodged(Person,Ball,e)∧
cause(e′,e)∧
incidental contact(Person,e′)
incidental contact(Person,e′) ↔ ∃Person2.contact(Person,Person2,e′)∧
¬intended(Person2,e′)
We have used event-calculus style notation [91] to formalise the idea of incidental
contact. Again, if we wanted to use these axioms in an automated reasoner we would
need to define the terms used in the above definition.
The problem for modelling the ontology evolution of the concept of possession
within the case is that there is little in-depth argumentation about the meaning of pos-
session. It is recognised that the definition of possession is contentious, but the above
specialisation is offered without any detailed explanation. The authority of the Profes-
sor seems to be adequate to justify it.
The problem with modelling something like possession is that it is ultimately a
commonsense concept that everyone has intuitions about, and these intuitions are hard
to model. The following cases feature interpretations of statutory concepts, rather than
foundational concepts. In particular we look at cases involving problems with inter-
preting international treaties. Since such cases don’t directly involve commonsense
concepts, such as possession and fairness, they may be easier to model.
9In particular, the intends relation is between a person and a proposition, which requires either meta-
level representation (see section 5.8) or a modal logic.
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3.2.2 Buchanan v. Babco
The case of James Buchanan and Co Ltd v. Babco Forwarding and Shipping Ltd10
involved the plaintiff (Buchanan) seeking compensation from the defendant (Babco)
for the sum of £30000. Buchanan had sold 1000 crates of whisky, to a purchaser in
Iran, and had arranged a contract with Babco to transport the whisky from Glasgow to
Tehran. The contract was agreed under the terms of the ‘Convention on the Contract
for the International Carriage of Goods by Road’, specifically its UK enactment in the
‘Carriage of Goods by Road Act 1965’.
On January 24, 1975, the whisky was taken from Buchanan’s warehouse in Glas-
gow and loaded into Babco’s lorry. During the following weekend the whisky, having
been left unattended in a lorry park outside London, was stolen. Since the theft was in
the UK the whisky was liable for excise duty, and Buchanan was subsequently charged
£30000 for this.
Buchanan had sold the whisky for £7000 to their buyer in Tehran, and there is no
doubt that Babco was liable for this sum, as their negligence had caused the loss.
However, a further problem arose. Since originally the whisky was intended for
export, no excise duty on the alcohol was due. But the theft happened in the UK, and
Buchanan couldn’t prove that the whisky had left the country, so Buchanan became
liable for excise duty on the whisky. Buchanan was therefore subsequently charged
£30000 for this by the Inland Revenue. Their loss therefore was the £7000 lost revenue,
and the £30000 taxes.
The debate in the case was over whether Babco was also liable for compensation
of the excise duty.
The relevant sections of the Act were as follows.
Article 17, paragraph 1, of the Convention provided:
“The carrier shall be liable for the ... loss of the goods ... occurring be-
tween the time when he takes over the goods and the time of delivery,
...”
Article 23 provided:
“1. When under the provisions of this Convention, a carrier is liable for
compensation in respect of total or partial loss of goods, such compensa-
tion shall be calculated by reference to the value of the goods at the place
and time at which they were accepted for carriage.
10James Buchanan & Co. Ltd. v Babco Forwarding & Shipping (U.K.) Ltd.,[1978] A.C. 141
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2. The value of the goods shall be fixed according to the ... current market
price or, if there is no ... current market price, by reference to the normal
value of goods of the same kind and quality ...
....
4. In addition, the carriage charges, customs duties and other charges in-
curred in respect of the carriage of the goods shall be refunded in full in
case of total loss ... but no further damages shall be payable ...”
The case went through the civil court where Master Jacob found the defendants
liable for the compensation of the whisky plus excise duty. The case was appealed by
the defendants, in which the Court of Appeal (Lords Denning, Roskill and Lawton)
agreed with the verdict of Master Jacob. When the case was again appealed to the
House of Lords the judges supported this decision by 3 to 2.
The results of the case were that:
• there could be more than one “current market price” at the same time for the
same type of goods depending on where they were going.
• the words “other charges incurred in respect of carriage” were loosely drafted
and so could be given a broad interpretation in accordance with the intentions of
the makers of the Convention; that the French text of the Convention, at which
it was permissible to look for assistance, supported a broad interpretation of the
Convention.
However the case also raised important questions about how English law could be
interpreted. The Act of Parliament was an enactment of an international treaty, which
had an English and a French version. The UK has a dualistic approach to international
treaties; this means that a treaty is not part of domestic law as soon as it is signed, it
has to be enacted by an Act of Parliament. So the law of the UK is purely that stated
in the Act of Parliament. However the French version was also a definitive version of
the treaty. Should judges be allowed to refer to the French version to help interpret the
English version, and if so how?
The French legal system has a different approach to interpreting law from the En-
glish legal system. Should English judges be using English rules of interpretation on
the French treaty? Or should they use French rules of interpretation? Furthermore was
it acceptable for UK courts to use French cases that clarified the French version of the
statute?
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In the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning advocated using a teleological approach
to interpretation11, as he considered this to be the method that would be used by a
French court. Under his teleological interpretation the phrase “other charges incurred
in respect of carriage” included excise duty. The House of Lords disagreed with his
approach, with the majority of judges advocating English methods of interpretation.
The ontology evolution in the law is partly the evolution of the concepts denoted
by “current market price” and “other charges incurred in respect of carriage”, but also
the evolution of the meta-legal rules regarding interpretation of multi-lingual treaties.
These meta-legal rules are far more vague than the law itself. There is no explicit rule
that Lord Denning uses to justify his interpretation, rather he introduces the idea of
a teleological interpretation and then states that his interpretation is teleological. The
rules used are implicit in the discourse between the judges.
3.2.2.1 Argumentation
The plaintiff’s argument was based upon two claims:
• That the “value of the goods at the time and place they were accepted for car-
riage” was £37000, the price that the whisky would have been sold for in Glas-
gow.
• That “other charges incurred in respect of carriage” included the excise duty.
At the Court of Appeal12 case, Lord Denning noted that “The common law takes
the value of the goods at the place and time at which they ought to have been delivered
by the carrier.”13
Regarding the meaning of article 23 paragraph 2 Lord Denning argues:
“Buchanan submit that it was the market price at which the whisky could
be sold at the door of the warehouse in Glasgow to a purchaser for the
home market. That is, £37,000. ... Suppose that the whisky was not stolen
in England but somewhere on the continent of Europe or in Asia before it
was delivered to the consignee in Teheran. Buchanan would not have been
liable to pay the excise duty of £30,000. ... I cannot think that Buchanan
could claim compensation for the £30,000 if they were never liable to pay
it. ... That value must be ascertained at that place and time. It cannot vary
11An approach to interpretation that tries to give effect to the telos, or purpose, of the statute: what
the lawmakers wanted to achieve, even if they haven’t clearly expressed it. See [73]
12James Buchanan & Co. Ltd. v Babco Forwarding & Shipping (U.K.) Ltd. [1977] Q.B. 208
13ibid p212
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according to subsequent events, that is, whether they are lost or stolen in
England or anywhere else.”14
Regarding the meaning of article 23 paragraph 4 Lord Denning argues:
“Buchanan submit that the £30,000 excise duty was a charge “incurred in
respect of the carriage of the goods.” I must say that, if this article is to be
construed according to our traditional rules of interpretation, the £30,000
was not such a charge. Strictly interpreted, those words comprehend only
charges for the actual carriage of the goods and other charges incurred in
respect of the carriage , such as packing, insurance, certificate of quality,
and so forth.”15
Lord Denning is notable for advocating a European method of interpretation: “We
ought, in interpreting this convention, to adopt the European method.”16 He argues in
favour of this method as follows:
“We had a valuable paper on it by the President of the court (Judge H.
Kutscher) which is well worth studying: “Methods of interpretation as
seen by a judge at the Court of Justice, Luxembourg 1976.” They adopt a
method which they call in English by strange words - at any rate they were
strange to me - the “schematic and teleological” method of interpretation.
... They go by the design or purpose which lies behind it. When they come
upon a situation which is to their minds within the spirit - but not the letter
- of the legislation, they solve the problem by looking at the design and
purpose of the legislature - at the effect which it was sought to achieve.
They then interpret the legislation so as to produce the desired effect.”17
And regarding a gap in the legislation Lord Denning argues:
“It speaks only of the charges incurred “in respect of the carriage of the
goods,” but says nothing of the charges consequent on the loss of the
goods. I think we should fill that gap. ... It seems to me that it was
intended that the sender should not be limited to the value of the goods
as defined in paragraph 1 of article 23 ... But that he should also be com-
pensated for any additional expense that he incurred directly by reason of
the loss. ... The carrier negligently left the whisky unattended, and it was
stolen ... It would be most unjust that they should have to bear this expense
themselves when it has been brought about solely by the negligence of the
carrier. The only sensible solution is that the carrier should compensate the
sender for the expense. The men who framed the Convention and agreed
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Lord Roskill notes that the plaintiffs had initially proposed an argument similiar to
the one proposed by Lord Denning above.
“Mr. Johnson suggested that unless that excise duty were included in
the normal value of that whisky at that place and time, anomalous re-
sults would follow. He instanced two lorries coming from Glasgow in
convoy on a motorway, one carrying whisky for export and the other car-
rying identical whisky for distribution in this country, both under identical
C.M.R. conditions. The former, he said, at that time would not be liable
to duty; the other would have already borne duty. He asked us to imag-
ine that both lorries had been simultaneously hijacked. Unless the duty
were included in the normal value of both consignments, one would have
identical whisky stolen at the same time with differing values.”19
So this form of hypothetical argument, involving scenarios in which the whisky
was stolen and different charges were liable, was used by both sides to justify alternate
conclusions, see Lord Denning’s use of the argument above.
The ejusdem generis rule20 was proposed as a method for including excise duty in
the list of items in article 24 paragraph 4. On this point Lord Roskill argued:
“I agree that in principle one should not in construing the text of an inter-
national convention, even when scheduled to a United Kingdom statute,
apply the ejusdem generis rule, even if as a matter of construction one
could find an appropriate genus. That rule of construction is a peculiarity
of English law.”21
Regarding the use of the French text to aid interpretation Lord Roskill argues:
“Why then, in those circumstances, when one is in doubt as to the true
construction of the English text of the Convention, should one deprive
oneself of the assistance that is readily to hand in its French text ... I
am entitled to look at the French text of the Convention ... in order to gain
what assistance I can from its terms. There I find the words “les autres frais
encourus l’occasion du transport de la marchandise.” It does not require a
profound knowledge of the French language to gain assistance from these
French words for they are quite general in their nature and wide in their
compass and in my view quite clearly entitle the plaintiffs to recover the
excise duty in question.”22
Regarding methods of interpretation Lord Roskill argues:
19ibid p218
20The rule applies to a list of categories and identifies a similiar category as being of the same kind,
and hence similiar consequences apply to it.
21ibid p220
22ibid p220
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“It would be disastrous if our courts were to adopt constructions of such
legislation different from those of other courts whose method of approach
is different and far less narrow than ours merely because of over-rigid
adherence to traditional - some might call them chauvinist - English meth-
ods.”23
Lord Lawton notes that:
“It must be permissible for an English judge to show a modicum ot [sic]
knowledge of a European language which for some centuries in its archaic
form was the language of our courts and which in more modern times
has been the language of diplomacy. The words “les autres frais encourus
l’occasion du transport” in my understanding cover more than the English
translation of ”other charges in respect of the carriage of the goods.” The
inference which an English lawyer would normally draw from the use of
the word “charges” twice in one sentence in a statute, namely, that ”other
charges” must bear some relation in meaning to “carriage charges” so as to
bring them within the same genus if nat [sic] the same species, is dissipated
by the use of different words in the French text.”24
At the House of Lords25 the appeal, by the defendants, was again dismissed (with
Lord Edmund-Davies and Lord Fraser of Tullybelton dissenting).
The arguments for the defendants at the House of Lords case were:
“The starting point must be to look at the English text, which is English
law, and at least attempt to give the words their normal, natural meaning.
... No expert evidence was given here as to the meaning of the French text
to Frenchmen.”26
“If there be an ambiguity, even in a case such as this where the English
and French texts are equally authoritative, the court can take advantage of
the French text. There is no such ambiguity here, and therefore no need to
have regard to the French text. We have no expert evidence in this case.
Schoolboy French is all very well, but one is here dealing with very subtle
shades of meaning. It is no great compliment to the official translators of
texts to say that the English is not an accurate reflection of the French.”27
“The export market price is net of export duty. There may be more than
one export market. The plaintiffs’ documents show that they differentiate
between E.E.C., United States and other markets.”28
23ibid p221
24ibid p223
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“The legal concept of “available market” has no narrow or technical mean-
ing. It implies simply that the seller can dispose of the goods”29
The plaintiffs argued:
“It was not the intention of the draftsman in the Convention that in a case
of an individual sale the task of the court would be to look at the country
to which the goods were going and then at the f.o.b. price and then deduct
something for carriage and say: that is the value at the warehouse. Goods
at a particular place have a single “normal value.””30
“As an approach to construction, it is clear from Stag Line Ltd. v. Foscolo,
Mango and Co. Ltd. [1932] A.C. 328 that a court can have in mind that
the convention is designed to create uniformity in the law between the
contracting states, and that it will construe the Act with that object in mind,
which may lead to what is sometimes described as the “broad approach.”
... On the facts of the present case, the English text is enough for the
plaintiffs’ purposes. As to expert evidence, if the court is invited to look at
the French text, it is not obliged to have expert evidence as to the French
language. It is open to the court to apply its knowledge of the French
language, although it might decline to do so if the suggested nuance were
so slight that it considered it dangerous to do so.”31
Lord Wilburforce noted:
“In a case, such as I think the present is, when one is dealing with a nu-
anced expression, a dictionary will not assist and reference to an expert
might also be unhelpful, for the expert would have to direct his evidence
to a two-text situation rather than simply to the meaning of words in his
own language, so that he would be in the same difficulty as the court.”32
“But a decision of the Amsterdam Arrondissementsrechtbank (3rd Cham-
ber) of March 30, 1977, British-American Tobacco (Nederland) B.V. v.
van Swieten B.V. (unreported), in a matter concerning excise duty, on
facts very similar to the present, decided against the carriers’ liability ...
The court took the French text “encourus l’occasion du transport” into
consideration but thought that the case was basically different from one
where customs duties - on passing a frontier - were concerned, which case
could be covered by the phrase. These cases show that there is no uni-
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“I find that the judgement of Master Jacob carries conviction. ... “In re-
spect of” is wide enough to include the way in which the goods were car-
ried, miscarried or lost.”34
Viscount Dilhorne argued:
“I am not competent to speak on European methods of interpreting legisla-
tion but I know of no authority for the proposition that one consequence of
this country joining the European Economic Community is that the courts
of this country should now abandon principles as to construction long es-
tablished in our law.”35
“What charges were the words “other charges incurred in respect of the
carriage of the goods” intended to cover? They must be charges not cov-
ered by the words “carriage charges.” They must be given a wider meaning
than charges for carriage. If one gives a strict interpretation to the words
“in respect of,” “charges in respect of carriage” has the same meaning as
charges for carriage, i.e., carriage charges.”36
“If “in respect of” is given the broad interpretation of ”in consequence of,”
content can be given to the words in question. They will clearly cover a
far wider ambit than carriage charges.”37
Lord Salmon argued:
“For a court to construe a statute is one thing but to graft a provision on
to it on the ground that the court thinks it is reasonable to do so would
bring the law into chaos and also introduce a like chaos into the business
of international carriers and those who contract with them to carry goods
by land from one country to another. For the courts to graft a provision
on to a statute or a contract is a practice which is entirely foreign to our
jurisprudence and, as far as I know, to any other.”38
The following argument of Lord Salmon’s is particularly interesting as it invokes
ideas of justice and commonsense to justify the inclusion of excise duty.
“Reason and justice seem to demand that the burden of paying the £30,000
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Again, the following argument of Lord Salmon’s is interesting, this time since it
portrays a particular vision of English justice, which may be biasing Lord Salmon’s
reasoning.
“It is perhaps worth mentioning that foreign traders all over the world
having no connection with this country have been constantly entering into
contracts which provide that they are to be governed by English law and
that any disputes that may arise under them are to be settled by arbitration
in London or by our commercial court. It would seem that our system of
administering justice enjoys considerable confidence abroad and that we
can safely leave our courts to apply their own methods of interpreting the
Convention until such time, if ever, as better methods are devised abroad
and universally accepted.”40
Lord Edmund-Davies argued that:
“But where there is no “gap” or ambiguity in the English text (as I hold
the position to be in the present case), the literal approach is preferable to
the schematic and teleological approach which Lord Denning favoured”41
The above argumentation demonstrates that there was some disagreement about
both: the meaning of the French text, and the methods that should be used to interpret
the French text. There appears to be no legal basis for the decisions taken by the
Judges, in the sense that there is no prior law that answers these questions, and so the
Judges must recourse to their biases about how the law should be conducted.
We are faced with several choices and combinations:
• Is there a gap in the English statute?
• Should the case be solved on the basis of the English law alone?
• Can we use the French version of the statute as an interpretative aid? If so,
should the English court interpret the French statute in the same manner as an
English statute? Or should the court interpret the French statute in the manner a
French court would.
• Can we use Foreign court decisions that interpret the French Convention as an
interpretative aid? If so, should we interpret them the way an English court uses
precedent or the the way the Foreign court uses precedent?
40ibid p162
41ibid p168
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Also of note is the language used to discuss the claims about the interpretation
of the law. Judges talk of a “gap” in the law, or of terms being given a “narrow”,
“technical” or “broad” meaning.
3.2.2.2 Ontology evolution
There were two changes to the ontology of the Act. First, before the case it was thought
that an object could only have one “market price”. As a result of the case “current
market price” could have at least two distinct values: the market price for a domestic
market and the market price for an export market. Second, the phrase “other charges
incurred in respect of carriage” was interpreted as including excise duty.
The broader change to the law was the change to interpretation methods for foreign
statues, with the House of Lords judges rejecting a claim that we should be using Eu-
ropean methods of interpretation for the Act. Similiar to the case of Popov v. Hayashi,
the Buchanan v. Babco case raises the issue if ontology evolution in the law can happen
through the integration of external sets of rules. In both cases, the arguments in favour
of the integration involve operations similiar to those used in ontology matching: two
different conceptual schemes are integrated by identifying their connections.
We have tried using the inconstancy repair plan (see section 2.2.3) to model the
change to the meaning of current market price. In our application the variad is the
destination of the whisky and the inconstancy is the current market price function.
Trigger:
OUK(dest(whisky1) = UK) ` cmp(whisky1) = sp(whisky)+duty(whisky,UK)
OIran(dest(whisky2) = Iran) ` cmp(whisky2) = sp(whisky)
OAct ` λItem.cmp(Item) = λItem.sp(good(Item))
Repair:
ν(cmp) ::= λItem.sp′(good(Item))+duty(good(Item),dest(Item))
In this application of the inconstancy repair plan (OUK) and (OIran) represent dis-
tinct sensory ontologies in which a consignment of whisky, denoted whisky1 and whisky2
for the respective scenarios, is being sent to a UK and Iranian market respectively. In
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the UK sensory ontology the current market price is observed to be the sale price of
the good whisky, denoted sp(whisky), plus the excise duty, denoted duty(whisky), and
in the Iranian sensory ontology the current market price is observed to be just the sale
price of the good.
The OAct ontology represents the Act of Parliament, which acts as the theoretical
ontology in our application. In this ontology the current market price of an item is
defined as being the sale price of the good that the item is an instance of. Note that this
is not what the Act actually states, but is a necessary simplification of the situation in
order to construct a basic model using ontology repair plans.
The repair is to replace the old cmp function, whose observed value varies between
the UK and Iranian ontologies, with a new cmp function, whose value matches the
observed value between these ontologies. The repair specifies the new definition of
the cmp function, in which the current market price of a good depends upon its des-
tination. Note that, our application omits describing the complete set of changes to
the ontologies as the application is intended as a simple demonstration of the use of
ontology repair plans to our work.
It is unclear what relevance the repair plan has to the reasoning in the case. The
problem for us is that the discourse of the case represents the explicit arguments made
about the meaning of the concepts in the legislation, whereas repair plans model the
implicit reasoning that suggests a change to the meaning of a concept.
Some process similiar to a repair plan may well be occurring in the lawyers’ minds
when they suggest a modification of the concept of current market price, but this pro-
cess is only a small part of the ontology evolution in the case. What is more important
are the arguments made to state that there is a problem, e.g. the hypothetical scenarios
suggested above, and the knowledge used to make the repair, such as the knowledge
that there was a distinction between domestic and export market. We have hand-coded
that knowledge into the above application of the repair plan, but we wouldn’t want to
do this for a general model of ontology evolution in legal cases.
3.2.3 Corocraft v. Pan American
The case of Corocraft Ltd. and another v. Pan-American World Airways, Inc.42 also
involved ambiguity in an international treaty. Sub-paragraph (i) of article 8 in the War-
saw Convention stated that an air consignment note shall contain, among other things,
42Corocraft Ltd. v Pan American Airways Inc [1969] 1 Q.B. 616
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the following “le poids, la quantity, le volume ou les dimensions de la marchandis”.
The United Kingdom Carriage by Air Act 1932, which enacts the Warsaw Convention
in UK law, states that the air consignment note must contain “the weight, the quantity
and the volume or dimensions of the goods”. The French version has an ambiguity
over the “ou” which could be interpreted as demanding either 1 or 3 of the 4 items.
The English version clearly demands that 3 of the 4 items must be present.
The facts of the case are as follows: Corocraft had hired Pan-American to transport
a carton of jewellery between New York and London; The carton was stolen by an
employee of Pan-American whilst being transported; The air consignment note stated
that weight and the quantity of the carton, but omitted the volume or dimensions.
Corocraft was suing Pan-American for the full value of the jewellery. However,
Pan-American claimed that they had limited liability under the Warsaw convention.
Corocraft argued that since the air consignment note was not complete they did not
have limited liability in this case.
The issue in the case was how to resolve the ambiguity in the French version,
and whether this was necessary. The law in the UK was the Act of Parliament, not
the French version of the Warsaw Convention. However, the Judges agreed that the
intention of Parliament had been to enact the French version, so the removal of the
ambiguity in the French version was a translator’s gloss and should not be considered
the law of the UK.
We note the difference between Buchanan v. Babco and this case: in Babco, an
external ontology was suggested to resolve apparent gaps or ambiguities in the target
ontology, English law. Here the ambiguity is created by looking at the external ontol-
ogy. Only when looking at the French law do we realise that our own conceptualisation
may be problematic.
The interpretation of the French version was based upon the commercial context
of the Convention. The inclusion of details on the consignment note was designed to
prevent loss of the goods in transit. However in this case the goods were stolen, and
it is unlikely that the theft would have been affected by the inclusion of volume or
dimension details on the consignment note. The volume and dimension of the package
could also be inferred from the weight, so it would be unnecessary to include them on
the note. So the ambiguous French version was interpreted as only requiring one of
the 4 details.
The case demonstrates how the intentions of a law can be used to guide its inter-
pretation. Here the intentions of Parliament are inferred from the context of the Act,
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namely that it was an enactment of an international treaty with an authoritative French
version.
The case also demonstrates the role of context, and commonsense, in supplying
the information needed to resolve the ambiguity. The Convention is a treaty created
to ensure consistent rules regarding international air transport amongst its signatories.
The focus of the treaty is upon creating conditions for trustworthy transactions that
benefit the world economy. The absence of a volume or dimension details from the
air consignment bill doesn’t affect these aims, so interpreting the ambiguity as only
demanding 1 out of 4 is in line with these aims.
3.2.3.1 Argumentation
The following facts were agreed by both parties43:
1. “The first plaintiffs and Verit Jewels Ltd. knew the volume and dimensions of
the carton at all material times and the defendants knew the same as soon as the
carton was received for carriage.”
2. “The approximate volume and dimensions of the carton could be inferred from
the information contained in the air waybill. The approximate dimensions of the
carton were 10-12 inches long; 6 inches wide; 8-10 inches deep.”
3. “The omission from the air waybill of the volume and dimensions of the carton
did not cause or contribute to the loss.”
4. “If the air waybill had stated the volume and dimensions (or either of them) of the
goods, the defendants would not thereby have been caused to charge a different
rate of freight for the goods, or to alter the mode of carriage or custody.”
5. “The carriage was subject to the Warsaw Convention as scheduled in the Car-
riage by Air Act, 1932 , and the carton was lost during the carriage by air.”
6. “The carton arrived at London Airport on about May 12, 1962, and was kept
thereafter in a safe at the defendants’ premises at the airport pending customs
clearance. On June 20, 1962, the carton was taken from the safe for clearance.
H.M. Customs officials did not complete clearance on that day and during the
night of June 20-21, 1962, the carton was stolen from the defendants’ customs
clearance office by one Edward Francis Cahillane, a servant of the defendants.”
43ibid p619
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There was an issue regarding a conflict of laws, since English law traditionally did
not require the air waybill to explicitly note the volume or dimensions. The plaintiffs
(Corocraft) argued there was no conflict of laws, and the defendants argued that even
if there was, under both traditional English law and the Act, they weren’t required to
explicitly note the volume or dimensions.
The conflict of laws is not relevant to the ontology evolution, but it is an example
of how lawyers will argue around a potential conflict of laws. The plaintiffs argued
against the conflict existing, since it would potentially negatively affect them if there
was a conflict. The defendants argued that regardless of what law held it had the same
consequences.
Regarding the ambiguity in the French law, the plaintiffs argued that “One might
be able to look to the French in order to resolve an ambiguity but not to create one”44.
Further, regarding the idea that the Act should be interpreted so as to ensure a
uniform interpretation, i.e. by interpreting the French rather than the English text; they
argued that “research shows there is no comity”45, and cited cases demonstrating that
the Convention already had different interpretations in different jurisdictions.
The defendants argued that “on its true construction the Act does give effect to the
Convention”46. On appeal, the defendants added “in the original French on its true
construction required the air consignment note to state only such of the said matters
as might be relevant or as might be necessary in the particular case”47, which they
regarded as not including the volume or dimensions of the package.
The initial judge for the case, Donaldson, consulted two French lawyers regarding
the meaning of the French text. Unfortunately they disagreed about the interpretation
of the French text.
At the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning argued that “It was plainly the intention of
all the parties to the Convention that the French text should be the one official and
authorised text; and it was plainly the intention of the English Parliament to give effect
to that French text by making an exact translation of it into English ... In order to
produce an exact translation, the translator should reproduce the French text faithfully,
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However, it is never particularly clear what the evidence is to support these argu-
ments. It seems as though the evidence is based upon commonsense knowledge about
how Parliament and the Law operate, which led to the belief that the Law should really
be what the French text states.
Lord Denning further argues that “Seeing that the French text is ambiguous and
uncertain, I should have thought that it should be interpreted so as to make good sense
amongst commercial men.”49, where good sense here means to only demand the in-
formation that is necessary to identify the package, i.e. the volume and dimension are
unnecessary.
Again, it is not clear what the evidence for this argument is, the only plausible
candidate is commonsense knowledge about the concerns of international trade.
3.2.3.2 Ontology evolution
The concepts in the Act have not changed with the outcome of the case. The laws have
changed slightly though.
The English law prior to the case stated that the following details were required:
weight(X)∧quantity(X)∧ (volume(X)∨dimensions(X))
However, after the case it is not clear what the law states, since the ambiguous
French text is now the basis for the law. The required items on the air waybill seem
to depend upon the pragmatic concerns of transporting a particular package. If the
package’s volume or dimension can be guessed from the weight and quantity of the
package, they are unnecessary. So we can’t accurate model the change to the law
without formalising the context of international trade.
Lord Denning’s approach to interpretation, namely the use of perceived intentions
of Parliament and commercial interests to justify an interpretation of the law, is in-
teresting, but it isn’t clear how we can model this change of meta-legal rules. The
interpretation principles in English law have always been somewhat vague (see section
4.1.5), so it isn’t clear how we can model this change.
3.2.4 Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines
The case of Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd50 is another case involving interpretation
of an international treaty, in this case over the interpretation of “damage” in the Warsaw
49ibid p652
50Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd, [1981] A.C. 251
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Convention. More specifically, article 22 (2) of the Carriage by Air Act provides:
“In the case of damage, the person entitled to delivery must complain to
the carrier forthwith after the discovery of the damage, and, at the latest,
within seven days from the date of receipt in the case of baggage ...”
Fothergill had flown from London to Rome on Monarch Airlines. When Fothergill
went to claim his baggage after the flight he noticed that the suitcase had been dam-
aged, and so filled out a form to claim compensation. Under the terms of his ticket he
had 7 days to claim for any damage to his luggage. After 7 days had passed, he noticed
that there were some items missing from the suitcase. He subsequently tried to add the
cost of these items to his previous claim.
Fothergill’s argument depended upon claiming that the loss of the items was not
“damage” under the Warsaw Convention. The civil courts and then the Court of Appeal
accepted this argument, but the House of Lords overturned these rulings and decided
that “damage” included loss of goods.
As in Buchanan v. Babco the issue at stake was not so much the actual meaning
of “damage” but the acceptable methods of interpretation. The Judges accepted the
argument that although within the English legal context damage and loss are different
things, since the Warsaw Convention is an international treaty a different interpretation
should be applied. The Convention was vague about whether “damage” should include
or exclude loss, but the preparatory work for the Convention indicated that “damage”
should include loss. So “damage” was interpreted as including loss.
The case is notable for the use of preparatory work for the Convention as an aid
to interpretation and the use of a purposive interpretation of the Convention. Since the
7 day limit had been intended to give the airlines a time limit for action against them
it was reasonable to interpret “damage” as including loss, otherwise airlines could be
liable for a greater time limit than the 7 days.
3.2.4.1 Argumentation
In the lower court proceedings51 the plaintiffs argued that: “Damage to baggage in
article 26 (2) of the Convention means physical and not economic damage and does
not include loss of the contents of registered baggage.”52
Regarding the use of the French text the plaintiffs argued that:
51Fothergill v Monarch Airlines, [1978] Q.B. 108
52ibid p110
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“Although under the terms of section 1 (2) of the Carriage by Air Act
1961 the French text is to prevail in cases of inconsistency, there is no
inconsistency or ambiguity here, as the ordinary meaning of damage is
clear. If however the court is in doubt as to its meaning, then the meaning
of its equivalent “avarie” in the French text is a question of fact and should
be proved by expert evidence. The court should call an interpreter or a
French lawyer. Dictionaries should not be used and travaux préparatories
are inadmissible as aids to construction”53
The plaintiffs cited the case of Porter v. Freudenberg to justify their claim that
travaux préparatories54 are inadmissible, and the case of Rustenburg Platinum Mines
Ltd v South African to justify their claim that the meaning of “avarie” in the French
text is a question of fact.
The defendants claimed that “In case of inconsistency between the English and
French text, the French text prevails”55 citing Corocraft v. Pan-American Airways
(see section 3.2.3), and “Avarie” in the French text can be interpreted with the aid
of French-English judicial and ordinary dictionaries”56 citing James Buchanan & Co.
Ltd. v. Babco Forwarding and Shipping (U.K.) Ltd. (see section 3.2.2).
Regarding the acceptable methods of interpretation the defendants argued “The
Convention should be construed as it would be in other countries, applying their prin-
ciples of statutory construction. The court is therefore entitled to have regard to travaux
préparatories and to foreign decisions, text books and commentaries, unless the mean-
ing of the Convention is obvious.”57 They cited the cases of Post Office v. Estuary
Radio Ltd. and Ulster-Swift v. Taunton Meat Haulage Ltd. as justification.
Judge Kerr notes that “I understand the action is in nature of a test case to resolve
the difference between the insurance market and the airlines about the effect of the
Convention in cases of loss of the contents of passenger’s registered baggage during the
carriage.”58 This observation indicates that the judiciary are aware of ulterior motives
held by the parties in the case, relevant to us as it indicates potential biases in the
reasoning.
Regarding the interpretation of “damage” as including loss of contents Judge Kerr
noted:
“ I can only think of one line of argument ... though it appears to me to
53ibid p110
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be highly legalistic. It is common ground that unless the carrier can bring
himself within some exempting provision he is liable (subject to limita-
tion) for the loss of contents of registered baggage during the carriage by
air. The subject matter of the contract of carriage is the baggage, not its
particular contents, about which the carrier knows nothing. Accordingly,
before construing article 26, one must have regard to article 18 (1) since
this is the provision under which any liability for loss of contents must
arise. This refers to “destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any registered
baggage...” A case of loss of the contents cannot be loss of the baggage, so
that it would follow that the draftsman evidently intended “damage to any
registered baggage” to cover a loss of the contents. On this basis it could
therefore be argued that the word “damage” must have the same wide (and
to my mind unnatural) meaning in article 26.”59
Judge Kerr instead argued for an ordinary interpretation of “damage”, arguing that:
“Damage” in article 26 (2) is used in the sense of physical injury and must mean dam-
age to the baggage ... The language illustrates the ordinary meaning of article 26 (2)
... This interpretation is reinforced to some extent by the words “in good condition” in
paragraph (1) of article 26. These appear to refer to the external condition of the bag-
gage and not to anything which may have been pilfered from it without any externally
visible sign.”60
At the House of Lords61, where the ruling in the lower court was overturned, Lord
Wilberforce argues “in an English legal context loss is one thing, damage another. But
the nature of the text in question does not suggest that it was drafted with strict English
meanings in mind.”62
Regarding the use of travaux préparatories, Lord Diplock notes
“I think the case is one where it is right to have recourse to the minutes
of the conference at The Hague ... This said, I do not myself derive any
great assistance from this source. With some personal experience of inter-
national conferences of this kind, I should not attach any great significance
to the fact that two delegates in withdrawing an amendment to article 26
which would have included in the article an express reference to partial
loss as well as to damage ... Machiavellism is not extinct at international
conferences.”63
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton notes that “Professor Emmanuel du Pontavice, Profes-
sor of the Faculty of Law and Economic Science of Nantes, in an article entitled “Air
59ibid p114
60ibid p114
61Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd, [1981] A.C. 251
62ibid p273, this quote is of interest to us for its explicit recognition of contexts, with the idea of an
English legal context.
63ibid p283
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Law,” published in the Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Commercial, vol. XXI, referred
to a decision by the Federal Chamber of Buenos Aires that a partial loss by theft con-
stituted an avarie, in the sense of article 26 (2)”64.
Lord Scarman notes “We know that in the great majority of the contracting states
the legislative history, the “travaux préparatoires,” the international case law (“la ju-
risprudence”) and the writings of jurists (“la doctrine”) would be admissible as aids to
the interpretation of the Convention. We know also that such sources would be used in
the practice of public international law.”65.
3.2.4.2 Ontology evolution
The change to the Act was based upon the meaning of the word “damage”. The ques-
tion was whether the definition of “damage” included partial loss of items in the bag-
gage.
So we have a partial formalisation of article 18 (1) as:
registered baggage(X)∧damage(X) → liable(carrier,X)
damage(X) ↔ destruction of (X)∨
loss of (X)∨
damage to(X)
We can also partially formalise article 26 (2) as:
damage(bag) → notify in seven days(owner(bag),carrier)
Note that we have had to use quite ad-hoc predicates, such as notify in seven days,
in order to formalise the article without having to use a more complex temporal repre-
sentation.
The change to the legislation is that “damage” includes the partial loss of baggage.
So we can change the formalisation of article 18 (1) to:
64ibid p287
65ibid p294
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registered baggage(X)∧damage(X) → liable(carrier,X)
damage(X) ↔ destruction of (X)∨
loss of (X)∨
damage to(X)∨
partial loss of (X)
However, again the major questions in the case were the methods of interpretation,
and we again have problems representing these. The arguments regarding the use
of travaux préparatories rely upon quite implicit warrants, such as the use of expert
opinion.
3.3 Features of Legal Reasoning
We discussed in section 3.1.1 two distinct kinds of uncertainty that can occur in the law,
inconsistent and incomplete law. The cases that we have looked at have involved both
problems. The Popov v. Hayashi case was a clear case of incomplete law, in which
the concept of possession was incomplete. The other cases involve elements of both
incomplete and inconsistent law. In these cases there are both foreign and domestic
sources of law that are relevant to the case, so we have multiple sources of relevant
law, but these laws are themselves incomplete, the terms they use are unclear. These
cases demonstrate that inconsistent and incomplete laws are not mutually exclusive
occurrences and that both are relevant causes of the ontology evolution in the law.
We have identified the following features of ontology evolution in law: the use
of context to provide resources for interpretation, the incremental nature of ontology
evolution, judicial discretion, linguistic ambiguities, and vague concepts.
The use of contextual features as aids to interpretation can be clearly seen in the
example cases. In Popov v. Hayashi the context of baseball was used to help define the
concept of legal possession over the baseball. And, in Buchanan v. Babco the context
of the French legal system featured in the arguments about the acceptable methods of
interpretation. However, it is not clear exactly what context is. There are surrounding
circumstances to a case, which are the context of a case, but there are also contexts for
different domains (such as Baseball, or French Law). In section 6.2 we will study the
concept of context and its relevance for ontology evolution.
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The incremental nature of ontology evolution can be seen in the cases cited in
our example cases. In particular the Buchanan v. Babco, Corocraft v. Pan-American
and Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines are interelated. Along with other cases they have
helped to define how international law is interpreted and applied in the UK courts. Col-
lectively these cases define an extensive addition to the ontology of UK law. However,
modelling the changes to the interpretation methods seems particularly difficult.
The argumentation in the cases reveals that judges have discretion in the decisions
they make in hard cases. When the law is uncertain how can judges determine what
it is? They have the ability to decide how a question of law should be resolved. Of
course, they can’t ignore valid arguments, but they can choose which arguments to
accept.
Language plays a central role to the functioning of the law and hence its evolution.
All of the cases involved some problem with interpreting language, whether it be a
grammatical ambiguity or a vague concept. Much of the argumentation in the case
seems to concern the definitions of various words and what methods can be used to
determine their meanings.
These problems of interpretation are caused by the problem of incomplete law we
discussed in section 3.1.1. The next chapter will study the role of language in law in
more detail.
We have also seen the following features of legal reasoning that are relevant to our
work: argumentation, commonsense reasoning, rhetoric, and value judgements.
All of the reasoning is based upon arguments regarding questions raised by a case.
In the cases we are interested in, the questions are about law, both parties agree upon
the facts of the case. The lawyers representing the different parties offer arguments
supporting different answers to the questions raised by the case.
The arguments are based upon ontologies of the domain, in particular the argu-
ments are implicitly dependent upon commonsense knowledge that is not formally part
of the law. For instance, in Corocraft v. Pan American various presumptions about the
concerns of international trade seem to be being made.
The argumentation doesn’t clearly map onto any particular structure and much of
the text of the legal decisions seems more like the judge is thinking out loud than
constructing a formal argument. Fitting the ideas in the discussion into a particular
argument structure is difficult, as it is not clear what the claims, warrants, and evidence
are (c.f. section 5.4). In particular, the warrants seem heavily dependent upon the legal
context of the case.
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Several arguments appeal to values rather than facts in order to justify their con-
clusions. The problem in these cases is that there are no facts about what the law is
that can resolve the case. The only recourse is to appeal to our sense of what the law
should be.
3.4 Summary
The cases involving interpretation of international law were chosen to demonstrate that
even within a domain of law that is largely abstracted from commonsense knowledge
about real-world situations it is still difficult to construct formal models. The abstract
constructions of international law are still dependent upon our implicit commonsense
conceptualisations. Any difficult legal case will raise similiar issues to the above cases.
The cases demonstrate a variety of different features of ontology evolution in the
legal domain which we will analyse in the forthcoming chapters. Chapter 4 looks at the
role of language in the law and its relevance for modelling ontology evolution. Chap-
ter 5 looks at existing research in AI and Law, in particular work on modelling legal
argumentation, and assesses its relevance for modelling ontology evolution. Chapter 6
surveys contextual logics and commonsense knowledge representation and reasoning
to investigate if these techniques could be used to model ontology evolution in legal
cases.
Chapter 4
Meaning in Legal Language
In the previous chapter we observed the importance of language to the law. Lawyers
depend upon language to communicate their conceptualisation of what the law is, or
how they think it should be.
However, language must be interpreted to access its meaning. There are a variety
of problems of interpretation, some of which we saw in the previous chapter. In this
chapter we survey research in Philosophy, Law, Cognitive Science and Artificial Intel-
ligence on the problems of natural language communication, and assess its relevance
to our problem.
Language is used to share conceptualisations, a speaker makes an utterance to cre-
ate a conceptualisation within the hearer. We must somehow use syntax and words to
share these conceptualisations. The problem of understanding meaning is to under-
stand how we associate words with meanings so that we can share conceptualisations.
The aim of this chapter is to survey our understanding of meaning so that we can
understand and justify the first claim of this thesis (see section 1.3) and investigate
whether the existing models of meaning can help us to model the ontology evolution
in the law.
4.1 Law and Language
The Law clearly depends upon natural language to fulfil its purpose. Governments
create new laws by drafting and publishing official statutes. Courts generate case pro-
ceedings detailing the arguments presented in a trial and its outcome. These documents
are referenced in subsequent legal cases. Laws are communicated and applied on the
basis of these documents, hence their interpretation determines what the law is.
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However, language is not a perfect medium for sharing conceptualisations. There
are a variety of problems that arise in our usage of language. We now look at the
following common problems: ambiguity, vagueness and open texture1.
4.1.1 Ambiguity
The term “ambiguity” is frequently used to refer to most problems involving unclear
language. We use the term here to describe linguistic objects, such as words and sen-
tences, which can be given more than one meaning. So an ambiguous word2 is one
which has many different senses and an ambiguous sentence is one which can be parsed
in multiple ways.
For example, the sentence “I went to the bank” is ambiguous as it uses the am-
biguous word3 “bank”, which could refer to either a financial bank or a river bank.
Alternatively, the sentence “every man loves a woman” is ambiguous regarding the
quantification over men. Does the sentence mean that there is one woman loved by
every man or that for every man there is a woman that he loves?
The problem in the Corocroft v. Pan-American case was the ambiguity in the
French version of the law. The English drafters eliminated the ambiguity from the
English version by choosing one of the possible interpretations.
Whilst ambiguity is a common problem in our use of language it is not of great
interest to us. In the case of ambiguity there are different well-defined meanings. The
ambiguity is removed by selecting one of the well-defined meanings. The removal of
the ambiguity doesn’t change the logical structure of any of the underlying meanings,
it just enables the lawyers to recognise one of the possible meanings as applicable.
It should be noted that ambiguity is removed from a logical formalisation of a
sentence, since the ambiguity is part of the translation between the sentence and a
logical representation. Modelling the reasoning about ambiguity requires representing
syntax and words as part of the domain of discourse and having relations over these
objects.
1For more details on these problems, c.f. [122] and [40]
2technically called a polysemous word
3A funnier example is a newspaper headline reading “March planned for next August” which is
ambiguous since “March” could refer to either the month (for an absurd interpretation) or to a gathering
of people (presumably the intended interpretation).
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4.1.2 Vagueness
Vagueness arises when we know what sense a word has, but there are unclear bound-
aries to its application. Vagueness is the property of a predicate that it has borderline
cases, i.e. there are individuals a such that neither P(a) nor ¬P(a) is definitely true.
For instance, the words “rich” and “tall” are vague as we know roughly what mean-
ing they have, but it isn’t always clear whether they should apply to a particular object.
Whether someone is rich or tall can depend upon the boundaries a person sets for those
terms.
Vague concepts are those for which there exist objects where it is not certain
whether or not the object belongs to the category defined by the concept. Typically
there is an underlying measure which the object has as a feature. The vagueness arises
because we don’t know in what region of the measure we can say the object belongs
to the category. For instance, baldness is vague with respect to the number of hairs
after which we can no longer say someone is bald, or tall is vague with respect to what
height is required to be considered tall.
Vagueness has led to several problems in creating formal accounts of the meaning
of terms in natural language. A well-known problem is the sorites paradox, also known
as the paradox of the heap. Suppose that one has a heap of sand, and that one removes a
grain from the heap. After this operation the heap of sand will still be a heap. However,
if this operation was applied many times the heap of sand would eventually vanish.
There is no single application of the operation after which we would declare that the
sand no longer formed a heap. This creates a paradox as we want to declare that
the composition of all these operations removes the heap, but any particular operation




These axioms state that if n grains of sand form a heap then n−1 grains of sand are
also a heap, 10100 grains of sand form a heap and 0 grains of sand don’t form a heap.
This theory is inconsistent as repeated application of the first axiom to heap(10100)
proves heap(0).
To resolve this problem we need something other than more axioms defining the
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concept. We need extensions to the reasoning mechanisms so that we don’t infer that
a pile of zero grains of sand is a heap.
4.1.3 Open texture
The notion of open texture was introduced by the philosopher Friedrich Waismann in
[147]. Waismann was concerned with the problem of verification: how do we verify
a logical proposition about the world to be true or false? He argued that our empiri-
cal concepts are open textured in that they do not have neat definitions that allow us
to verify the statements about them by breaking down their definitions into semantic
primitives that can be easily verified using sense data.
His thesis was that the categories in the ontologies which underlie our natural lan-
guage are not well defined. There are real world situations where we would not be able
to say if an object did or did not belong to the category. In particular, Waismann argues
that we can’t resolve this indeterminacy, and that there are always cases whereby a
natural-language concept is vague.
Waismann’s thesis conflicts with the classical model of concept definitions, which
states that concepts are based upon necessary and sufficient features for belonging to
a category. For example, a “cat” might be defined as an animal with whiskers and a
tail. So being an animal, having whiskers and having a tail would be necessary and
sufficient conditions for being a cat. It should be noted that this model of concepts is
still the basis of formal ontologies.
Open texture is similiar to vagueness, in that both are used to describe concepts for
which there are objects which are not clearly members of the concept. Open texture,
as Waismann defines it, is the property of our empirical concepts that they always have
the potential for vagueness. So a term such as “cat” may appear perfectly well defined
but there might still be objects about which it is uncertain whether we should call them
“cat” or not. This is distinct from stereotypically vague terms such as “tall” or “rich”
which we know do not match onto a specific range of height or wealth which can be
used to classify them.
Waismann gives the example of a friend telling you that there is a cat in his house,
but when you go to his house you find a huge cat-like creature which occupies several
floors of the house. In this case, the animal has the appearance of a cat, but is vastly
larger than anything we would normally call a cat. The expectations you have from
your friend’s utterance exclude a creature so massive.
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Waissman regarded open-textured concepts as having “the possibility of vagueness”[147].
We can understand his claim by noting that open-textured concepts don’t have a spe-
cific underlying range upon which the concept is vague, but that in specific uses of
the concept we can identify a range which is vague. Thus an open-textured concept is
one which always has the possibility of revealing vagueness when we try to apply it in
specific cases. For example, the massive cat-like creature reveals a vagueness upon the
size of a “cat”.
H. L. A. Hart adopted the term to describe uncertain legal rules [61] using the, now
popular, example of “no vehicles in the park”. He envisioned a scenario in which a
park had a bylaw stating that people could not bring “vehicles” into the park. In this
scenario the term ‘vehicle’ is open textured as there are objects, such as ‘skateboard’,
for which it is not clear whether they should be classified as vehicles in this context. He
distinguishes between the core of the rule, the situations to which it definitely applies,
and the penumbral situations about which there is possibility for debate. He argues
that legislators intended to make certain situations illegal but could not foresee all the
possible situations to which the law could be applied hence the open texture of the law
is an inevitability.
The problem of open texture has long been recognised within the field of AI and
Law, for example McCarty discusses it in [80]. There have been various approaches to
coping with the problem, which we shall examine in more detail in the next chapter.
The problem of representing and reasoning with open textured concepts has been
recognised within AI. John Sowa uses the metaphor of knowledge soup [125, 124] to
describe the fluidity of human understanding. Edwina Rissland points out the problem
of similarity [109] and the challenges it poses for AI. Both of them point out the need
for software systems to be able to reason about and adapt concepts in the same way
that humans do. Similarly John McCarthy has argued that most of our concepts are
what he terms “approximate” and don’t have necessary and sufficient conditions [79].
The idea of open texture is also related to Wittgenstein’s idea of “family resem-
blance”. In [154] he argues that our everyday concepts are defined not by the classical
model of concepts but instead by the resemblance that the members bear to each other.
He cites the example of games, and challenges the reader to come up with a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions. For example if you propose that a game must in-
volve more than one player you exclude a whole class of single player games (from the
card game solitaire to a whole industry of computer games). If you define a game as
requiring enjoyment then you ignore the ‘no pain no gain’ of competitive sports. This
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argument against categories defined by necessary and sufficient conditions has been
supported by studies in psychology, for instance in work of the Rosch et al [113].
4.1.4 Context
The above problems of language are quite regular occurrences, but most of the time
we can solve them well enough to communicate our message. What mechanisms do
we use?
The role of common ground in language use is widely recognised, for example
see [30]. The common ground consists of the shared knowledge that we have which
enables us to communicate conceptualisations of the world. This shared knowledge is
part of the context of an utterance, along with the situation in which the utterance is
made.
We can regard the shared knowledge as consisting of two types: linguistic and so-
cial. We have knowledge of how to interpret utterances. This knowledge may not be
explicit knowledge, but rather shared mechanisms for resolving problems in interpret-
ing utterances. For example, we know how to resolve the anaphora in the sentence “If
the milk is too cold for the baby, you must boil it” so that we boil the milk rather than
the baby, even if we can’t articulate the mechanisms we are using.
Social knowledge is the knowledge we have of the social contexts in which we use
language. This knowledge goes beyond our knowledge of how to parse language to
include knowledge about cultural and institutional contexts. The boundary between
social and linguistic knowledge is not precise. In the above example we might regard
the knowledge that one shouldn’t boil a baby, but it is ok to boil milk, as social (com-
monsense) knowledge that is combined with the mechanisms for parsing sentences.
We make the distinction as it is useful for our thesis, since we are mainly interested
in the social knowledge that is used to interpret the legal language, rather than the
natural-language parsing mechanisms.
4.1.5 Legal Interpretation
All of the above problems manifest themselves in legal language, so legal systems have
evolved a variety of mechanisms for resolving them. For instance, within English law
there are three rules which define the basic methods of interpretation.
1. Literal rule: read and apply the law with its literal meaning.
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2. Golden rule: apply the literal rule unless it leads to an absurd situation.
3. Mischief rule: identify what the mischief was that the law was designed to pre-
vent and interpret the law to prevent the mischief.
However, these principles are so vague as to be of limited practical use [158].
Their mention within legal cases is instead indicative of the style of interpretation most
commonly used in different periods. Traditionally English law has used the literal rule;
however recently there has been a shift to interpretation based upon purpose, arguably
due to the integration of European Union law into United Kingdom law.
The principles are arguably used more to justify decisions than to make them. The
principles do not provide enough detail to be used to guide decision making, but they
can provide a justification for a decision that has been made for other reasons.
In the UK, Acts of Parliament will typically contain interpretation sections which
detail the meaning of key terms in the Act. Legal Systems make extensive usage of
these meta-legal rules to dictate how the law should be interpreted in different circum-
stances.
Of course, formal legal rules on statutory interpretation can in themselves be vague
and in need of interpretation. Of the cases we discussed, this is most pertinent in
Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines. The Warsaw Convention is an international treaty.
There are rules under international law how to interpret this type of treaty to ensure
consistent application in all signatory states, but these rules on interpretation will in
turn be interpreted by national courts with their rules of interpretation [44].
One interesting feature of legal interpretation, that is shared by everyday discourse
interpretation, is the occurrence of metaphors in describing interpretations. Lawyers
will frequently talk of an interpretation of a word being “broad” or “narrow”. It seems
as though there are spatial metaphors being used to conceptualise a concept and its
meaning.
It is worth noting that the task of interpretation is frequently done by juries. The
meaning of ordinary words is a question of fact within English Law4, and so juries will
interpret these words. This means that many of the problems of natural-language in-
terpretation are only explicitly discussed when they relate to words that have a specific
legal meaning that is distinct from any commonsense meaning for the word.
It should also be noted that the task of legal interpretation is different from that
of interpreting an utterance in everyday discourse. Our ordinary use of language is
4A fact that was established with the case of ‘Brutus v. Cozens’ AC 854; [1972] 2 All ER 1297
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based upon a speaker-hearer model, in which a speaker makes an utterance which is
interpreted by a hearer. The utterance is created by the speaker to convey an intended
meaning to the hearer. Legal interpretation is a form of communication between the
drafters of the law and the lawyers. However, due to the collaborative nature of legal
drafting the single speaker-hearer model doesn’t apply to the legal domain. For in-
stance, we are no longer dealing with the communicative intentions of a single speaker,
there are several people involved in legal drafting and they may not have the same in-
tentions. This makes the model of the interpretative situation more complex than in
the single speaker-hearer case. This is relevant to us as it affects the conceptualisation
that lawyers and judges have of the interpretation of the law, and the acceptable forms
of arguments that can be used to justify an interpretation.
4.1.6 Legal indeterminacy
The concept of open texture was introduced by Hart into legal philosophy to explain the
role of judicial discretion in applying the law. Judges need to resolve the open texture
of the law in the borderline cases, such as whether skateboards should be classified as
vehicles in a park bylaw.
Judges have some discretion in how they apply the law due to the problems of
natural language communication and the lack of conclusive rules governing the inter-
pretation of the law.
The study of the biases that influence judicial reasoning is called critical-legal stud-
ies. There are variety of different types of biases5, such as the ones we discussed briefly
in section 2.3.6.
This research is of interest to us, since it studies the implicit forms of reasoning that
are responsible for changes to the law, but it is difficult to incorporate this research into
our work. Some of the results6 are based upon statistical analysis of court cases, which
is difficult to incorporate into a case study of a particular legal case, and some is based
upon speculation about the reasoning used in a legal case, which we would also have
to formalise and include into our model. We will see later that the significant problems
with constructing formal models are understanding the commonsense knowledge used
in legal argumentation, which is not discussed in the critical legal studies literature.
5For a survey of the different schools of critical-legal studies see [16]
6see [158] p354-360 for a discussion of various studies into judicial bias
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4.2 Philosophy of Language
The problem of interpretation arises because it is unclear what the meaning of an ut-
terance is. This section briefly surveys the conceptual models of natural language and
its meaning that philosophers have studied.
Philosophical discussion on meaning and language has existed since the beginnings
of Philosophy7. We are interested in the work that began with the development of
modern mathematical logic. The development of modern logic provided a basis for
formal accounts of meaning, language and algorithms.
Gottlob Frege and Charles Sander Pierce, both independent inventors of first-order
logic, each presented their own accounts of meaning and language.
Frege presented a model of meaning that gave a word a sense8 and a reference9.
The sense10 of a noun phrase was the method by which it determined what the word
denoted. The reference of the word was the actual object that it denoted. For instance,
the noun phrase “the evening star” had a sense of being the star-like object that could
be seen in the evening: we could use the sense of the term to identify the object. The
reference of “the evening star” is the planet Venus. The alternative noun phrase “the
morning star” has the same reference as “the evening star” but a distinct sense.
Pierce created the field of semiotics as the basis of his theories of meaning. The
core idea behind semiotics is that of a meaning triangle (see figure ??) composed of
three edges to represent the reference object, the symbol representing the object and
the context that connected them. Pierce’s ideas have influenced some modern work on
ontologies [123]. The main insight is to emphasis the idea of a context which connects
a symbol with what it represents. Peirce’s ideas are similar to Wittgenstein’s language
games, which we look at in section 4.2.2.
4.2.1 Logical Positivism
The logical positivists were a group of philosophers in the early twentieth century
who wanted to give a formal, rigorous basis for natural language. This work was
initiated after the development of modern mathematical logic and the work of the early
Wittgenstein on defining the logical basis for language use.
7for example, Plato’s dialogue Cratylus, available at http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/cratylus.html
8what is also termed the intension of a concept definition
9the set of possible referents of a concept are called the extension of the concept
10Frege’s ideas are quite subtle to explain, but only of general interest to our investigation, the inter-
ested reader should consult the references for a more detailed account
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Figure 4.1: An example of Peirce’s semiotic triangle. A cat called Yojo is represented by
a sign, a particular instance of the word “Yojo”. The sign “Yojo” and the cat are part of
the external environment. The connection between them is mediated by an agent with
a conceptual system which associates it’s concept of the cat, with the word and the cat
itself.
The aim of the logical positivists was to construct logical theories that could be
used to give rigorous statements about the state of the world. Rudolf Carnap led these
efforts through works such as The Logical Structure of the World [25].
However, they discovered that it wasn’t a trivial task to give formal definitions
of natural language terms. Friedrich Waismann, who was a member of this group,
noted the problem of open texture, see section 4.1.3. The logical positivists were the
original researchers of formal ontologies and the problems they faced are relevant to
contemporary research.
4.2.2 Language Games
Wittgenstein, who was an initial founder of logical positivism, later altered his views
on the role of logic in language use. His initial position was expressed in Tractatus
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Logico-Philosophicus. In this work11, he argued that language has a formal basis in
first-order logic statements which represent states of our physical world. Any attempts
to talk about things other than the physical world are misuses of the logic of our lan-
guage.
Wittgenstein introduced the idea of language games [154] to describe how meaning
can be dependent upon a community of language users. he described communities as
playing a language game in their usage of a term. This was a switch from viewing
meaning in language as being based upon a logical representation of the terms to a
view of meaning based upon the use of terms within a community to achieve various
goals.
The language games approach to word meaning has influenced research by Luc
Steels into language learning within a community of robotic agents [127].
4.2.3 Meaning
The problem of giving a formal foundation to the meaning of natural language terms
has been actively researched for quite some time. There are two perspectives on mean-
ing that have been discussed:
• Meaning as denotation
• Meaning as use
Formal logic provides the basis for attempts to formalise the meaning of natural
language terms upon their denotations. However the problems of open-texture and
vagueness demonstrate that the denotation of a term is frequently uncertain and can’t
be resolved simply by adding more axioms to the theories defining the term.
We can see the two different notions of meaning within the semiotic triangle. The
notion of meaning as denotation is represented as the link between a symbol and its
referent. The notion of meaning as use is represented by the links between the symbol
and the context and the context and the referent.
Logical positivism was primarily concerned with establishing a foundations for
meaning as denotation: by creating a formal language with rigorous semantics which
we could use to make clear statements about the world whose meaning would be
11Wittgenstein’s ideas are quite subtle and tersely described, the summary here is only intended to
give a very high-level description
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shared. Wittgenstein’s discussion of language games is about meaning as use, where
the meaning of a word is determined by what effects its use has within a community.
These problems of meaning have necessarily been discussed within the research
field of natural language processing, which we briefly survey next.
4.3 Natural Language Processing
Natural language processing is a subfield of Artificial Intelligence which uses al-
gorithms to process language to produce useful information. Natural language re-
searchers have developed a variety of techniques for resolving the ambiguity in lan-
guage that arises during parsing attempts.
Of interest to us is the subfield of discourse interpretation. This field deals with
some of the above problems of natural language interpretation and application.
4.3.1 Discourse Interpretation
Researchers in discourse interpretation are aiming to create mechanisms that can take
an unstructured text as input and produce a representation in a formal logic of the text’s
meaning. The focus of the research is upon developing formalisms and mechanisms to
cope with the above problems of natural language.
An exemplary problem that discourse representation research aims to solve is that
of anaphora resolution: the problem of determining the referents of pronouns. This
is the problem that was present in the “If the milk is too cool for the baby, you must
boil it” example. The “it” in the sentence could refer to either the milk or the baby.
The usual heuristic to resolve pronoun references, that is to interpret the pronoun as
referring to the last mentioned noun, does not work in this example. If we use the
usual heuristic we will interpret the “it” as referring to the baby, with disastrous con-
sequences.
The main problems that discourse interpretation aims to solve are related to the
interpretation of the syntax of language. We are mainly interested in the reasoning
that occurs after the language has been interpreted into a formal representation. The
discourse in the law will not make explicit mention of the mechanisms that the lawyers
are using to parse the language, since the lawyers are not aware of what mechanisms
they are using for this task.
An interesting approach to the problem of discourse interpretation is the use of
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abduction, combined with commonsense knowledge to interpret utterances. This ap-
proach was pursued by Jerry Hobbs et al with the TACITUS system [64]. We will look
at abduction further in the next chapter.
4.4 Meaning in Ontologies
We have seen that there are various problems with natural language communication,
and that there has been much research within a variety of fields upon these problems.
These problems involve the syntax of language, the semantics12 of language, the cate-
gorisations used in language and the pragmatics of language use.
Ontologies are based upon a formal logic, and so avoid the problems of parsing and
semantics, but still face the problems of categorisation and pragmatics. Ontologies are
used to convey information in a manner not dissimiliar to natural language. The formal
semantics for most ontologies, based upon Tarskian semantics, does not always capture
the intended meaning of an ontology. Ontologies are based upon the classical model
of concepts, which has been shown in psychological experiments to be an inaccurate
model of how people categorise [92], and Tarskian semantics, which is based upon a
denotational model of meaning. The features of open-texture and language games are
still present in how people use formal ontologies.
The basis of the problem is that most ontologies use natural language terms to
denote the concepts in the ontology. Without these natural language labels the meaning
of the terms in an ontology would be opaque, c.f. [88].
This critique of formal representations has been made within logicist AI13. Drew
McDermott has produced several critiques of research within this field [85] [86], which
have been continued by researchers within formal ontologies [151].
The solution people have for these problems is to use the context of an utterance to
aid its interpretation. There have been attempts to incorporate the community of agents
that uses an ontology into the representation of an ontology, such as Peter Mika’s
work [89]. However, this research is based upon lightweight formalisms that are not
expressive enough for us to represent the evolution in meaning of a legal ontology.
What is interesting to us are the mechanisms used in natural language to negotiate
a shared conceptualisation when the meaning of the language is uncertain. In these
12by semantics here we mean the meaning that is to be given to logical connectives, such as “and” or
“or”, and how they affect the meaning of an utterance.
13the school of AI research that uses formal logic as a basis for AI research.
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cases we appeal to the context of the use of language to determine a meaning for an
utterance.
Formalising these mechanisms goes beyond simply adding more axioms to our
domain ontologies and requires us to extend the logic upon which those ontologies are
based to include discussion of the meaning of the concepts in the ontology.
There has been some research on dynamically aligning the ontologies of agents
when communication mismatches occur, such as the ORS research. This research is of
interest to us, and we shall look at some of it further in the next chapter, but we face
a different problem to this research. Whereas this research aims to create mechanisms
for AI agents to resolve communication problems, we face the problem of modelling
the reasoning of people within a particular institutional context.
4.4.1 Authority
One important aspect of meaning in language that we haven’t touched upon so far is the
role of authority in determining what a word means. We have described the different
perspectives regarding what the meaning of language is based upon, but we haven’t
discussed how specific words in a language acquire meaning. Who determines what
the meaning of a word is?
We have seen that judges have some discretion in how they apply the law to a case,
due to the uncertainty in the meaning of the laws in some cases and the need to resolve
the uncertainty. Judges have authority over the meaning of the law within a legal case,
although their judgements may be overruled by higher courts.
More generally, there are members of a community who have authority over what
the concepts in an ontology mean. Hilary Putnam discusses what he terms the “linguis-
tic division of labour” whereby some people within a community are responsible for
determining the correct usage of a word [104]. For instance, in scientific communities
there are usually experts upon a particular domain who know the meaning of technical
terms and have authority over their definitions. Yorick Wilks had argued that it is us,
rather than scientific authorities, who should determine the meaning of Semantic Web
concepts [151]. The challenge for a more democratic form of determining meaning is
that we still need to have mechanisms to resolve disputes about meaning.
We can reason about, and change, who has authority within a community. For in-
stance, judges don’t have absolute authority over the law, they must defer to governing
bodies, such as Parliament within the English Legal system. These governing bodies
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have the ability to alter the legal system, and hence alter how the law is interpreted and
enforced.
The role of authority in determining meaning leads to distinctions in theories about
meaning. There are theories of meaning that aim to define how meaning should be as-
cribed to language. The logician’s approach to meaning is based upon a compositional
model of meaning, and a classical model of concepts, that is at odds with how people
actually use language. The logician’s model is normative: it is not aimed at describing
how language acquires meaning but about creating languages which have well-defined
meanings.
This hints at the second claim in this thesis: there are different types of theories
of ontology evolution. The different types of theories arise because there are different
approaches to modelling the evolution of the meaning of legal concepts. We can either
create a prescriptive theory, that specifies how the ontology of the law should evolve,
or we can try to model how the ontology of the law actually evolves.
In the prescriptive case we are playing the role of a government, by trying to specify
how the legal system should respond to uncertainty in the law. In the descriptive case
we are trying to model the judicial reasoning, to understand what changes to the law a
judge would accept.
4.5 Arguments about Meaning
We can now justify the first claim of this thesis:
Ontology evolution in legal cases occurs as a side effect of the argu-
ments about meaning in a legal case.
What exactly do we mean by this claim? We start from the basis that the explicit
sources of law are communicated through natural language texts. These texts contain
rules which state how the law should affect certain real-world situations. These rules
must be interpreted with respect to a particular real-world event, the current case in
dispute. An interpretation of a rule is a claim about the meaning of the rule. There
can be different interpretations of a rule which are then subject to argumentation. The
argumentation process leads to claims about how the legal system should resolve this
case. These claims can extend beyond just being about the meaning of the particular
rules in dispute and include larger problems, such as what methods can be used to
interpret the law. If the judges accept these claims then the ontology of the law evolves.
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If we think of the argumentation as a procedure to resolve the current case, the
ontology evolution is a side effect of the procedure. The argumentation generates
the discourse about the case, which communicates the changes to the meaning of the
law. The changes to the meaning are expressed in the arguments about the meaning
generated by the lawyers and judges within the case.
The law evolves in a legal case because the existing law is not clear. There is a
concept in case law or statutory law whose meaning is uncertain. The case is resolved
by determining the meaning of the uncertain concept with respect to the facts of the
case.
The arguments about meaning in a case make explicit some features of the context
of the case to justify an interpretation of the law. For instance, in Buchanan v. Babco
the interpretation methods of the French legal system, part of the context of the case,
were mentioned explicitly to justify an interpretation of the law.
Our thesis is a definitional claim about ontology evolution in a legal case, based
upon a conceptual analysis of the ontologies, ontology evolution and legal cases. We
have provided a conceptual model for understanding how ontology evolution occurs in
a legal case.
We can now also see the difference between our work and the research on repair
plans in section 2.2.3. Repair plans are designed to model the implicit reasoning per-
formed to create new theories. The reasoning about the meaning of the concepts in
the theory is performed by the repair plans. The reasoning in a legal case about the
meaning of the legal concepts is explicit. Lawyers must form explicit arguments about
meaning which they use within the case to achieve an outcome for the case. We need to
model both the mechanisms used to create new conceptualisations of the law and the
mechanisms used to generate arguments about these new conceptualisations. These
arguments are based upon meta-ontologies about the meaning of the ontologies in the
Law.
In this chapter we have reviewed various proposals about meaning in language, but
they are not immediately of any use to us in creating arguments about meaning. The
Philosophical approaches to meaning are foundational: they aim to clarify or create
a conceptual basis for understanding meaning in language; they are not concerned
with the problem of generating arguments about meaning in any particular context.
The approaches to meaning in Natural Language Processing are of interest to us, but
they can’t solve the problem within the legal domain, since they can’t (automatically)
supply the domain knowledge and reasoning mechanisms we would need to generate
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arguments about meaning.
Our discussion of the different approaches to modelling meaning and the role of
authority in meaning implies that there are two types of theory that we might want to
construct: a prescriptive or a descriptive theory.
A prescriptive theory might use one of the existing philosophical theories of mean-
ing as a basis for creating a model of legal interpretation which could be used to gener-
ate arguments about the interpretation of the law. The arguments produced would not
necessarily bear any resemblance to the arguments produced in actual legal cases.
The problem for a descriptive theory is to formalise the models of legal interpre-
tation that lawyers and judges actually use. This is a hard problem, the philosophical
models of meaning will not necessarily help us with this task. Although there is plenty
of research on the problem of categorisation and speaker-hearer communication this
research doesn’t address the specific institutional context in which legal interpretation
occurs.
4.6 Summary
We have discussed the problems of language and its interpretation, in particular as
they apply to legal reasoning. We have argued that ontologies have the same interpre-
tation problems as natural language. And that any legal ontology will depend upon
commonsense conceptualisations for its interpretation, unless we also formalise these
commonsense conceptualisations.
We have noted that there are methods in natural language discourse for resolv-
ing the problems of interpretation, and that there has been some research on similiar
mechanisms within ontologies research.
These observations have led to our first claim: ontology evolution in legal cases
occurs as a side effect of the arguments about meaning in a legal case.
We have also noted the different possible theories of meaning, and hence discussed
our second claim: there are different kinds of theories of ontology evolution. The
difficulties of formalising commonsense knowledge have been noted, we will return to
this problem in section 6.3.
In the next chapter we will look at research in AI and Law on argumentation, and
assess its application to our problem of modelling the arguments about meaning in a
legal case.
Chapter 5
Legal Case Modelling in AI and Law
In the previous chapter, we formed a conceptualisation of ontology evolution as being
based upon arguments about meaning. In this chapter, we want to understand the exist-
ing research on modelling legal reasoning and investigate what is useful for modelling
ontology evolution.
There have been a variety of AI techniques used to model legal reasoning. We
will look at the following techniques: Non-monotonic reasoning, Logic Programming,
Argumentation, Argument Schemes, Case-based reasoning, Theory Construction, Co-
herent reasoning and Meta-level reasoning.
5.1 Non-monotonic reasoning
Most mathematical logics are monotonic in the sense that adding another proposition
to a theory doesn’t make anything originally provable in the theory unprovable. The
problem with monotonicity for modelling reasoning is that new information can make
us reject an inference we previously believed. The classic example of this is the in-
ference from “All birds fly” and “Tweety is a bird” to “Tweety can fly”. This is an
acceptable everyday inference, but there are exceptions to the “All birds fly” rule. If
we learn that Tweety is an exception to this rule, for instance by learning that Tweety
is a penguin, then we will reject the inference.
There have been several formalisms proposed to tackle this problem. Most are
based upon adding in new rules of inference to cope with these exceptions, such as
Default Logic [107]. We mention this research as it is related to the argumentation
research we will survey later, but it is not directly of any relevance to us. Research into
argumentation theory subsumes the relevant aspects of non-monotonic reasoning.
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The most interesting aspect of non-monotonic reasoning1 is the problem that it is
trying to solve. This problem, coping with the exceptions to general rules, is precisely
the problem that occurs in the law, such as the example of “No Vehicles in the Park”
that we discussed in section 4.1.3.
5.2 Logic Programming
Some of the earliest work in AI and Law built upon logic programming. Logic pro-
gramming is a programming paradigm which identifies programs with logical theories
and control flow with deduction. The most popular logic programming language is
Prolog, which is based upon horn-clause logic (a subset of first-order logic).
In the 1980s one of the pioneers of logic programming, Robert Kowalski, started
using Prolog to model legal rules. His research group modelled the British Nationality
Act [115] as a Prolog program.
The idea behind modelling statutes as Prolog programs is that applying the act to
a particular case can be done by asking a query at the interpreter. The interpreter can
try to deduce the query from the program and so determine whether the law applies in
that case.
For instance, a query might be british(person101) which asks whether the person
identified by the constant person101 is British. Facts about the person were formalised
as Prolog assertions, such as born(US, person101), f ather(person101, person102)
and born(UK, person102), and the British Nationality Act was formalised as a set
of Prolog rules, such as British(X) :−born(UK,X).
The problem, for us, with this approach to modelling legal reasoning is that all the
work is done in formalising the facts of the case. The hard problem of matching the
real-world situation to the concepts in the rules is avoided.
There are extensions to the logic programming approach which add in meta-level
rules to enable reasoning about these interpretation problems. We shall look at these
extensions in section 5.8.
1Related to non-monotonic reasoning is defeasible reasoning, which discusses the same problem.
The differences between these research fields are irrelevant to us, so our discussion applies to both.
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5.3 Argumentation
We have already established that Legal reasoning is based upon argumentation. The
parties to a legal case will present their arguments regarding the questions raised by
the legal case, and will counter each other’s arguments. Modelling legal reasoning as
a Prolog program doesn’t capture this aspect of legal reasoning. Instead, we require
a representation that captures the conflicting arguments. This is what argumentation
frameworks provide: a representation of conflicting arguments and methods to resolve
the conflict.
The work of Phan Ming Dung provides a basis for much contemporary research in
argumentation [37]. He formalised an argumentation framework as a pair (AR,attacks)
where AR is the set of arguments and attacks is a binary relation between arguments,
which specifies which arguments are conflicting.
An argumentation framework is independent of the underlying logic used to for-
malise arguments. The logic simply provides well-formed formulae: the set of ar-
guments is a set of well-formed formulae in an underlying logic. The majority of
examples of argumentation frameworks, within AI and Law, use a propositional logic.
An example argumentation framework is shown in figure 5.1. This diagram shows
the arguments that might be proposed by Johnny and his mother in the case of using a
broom to hook a jam jar our of the pantry. The arguments both attack and support the
claim that Johnny has broken the rule that he must not enter the pantry.
A semantics for an argumentation framework specifies what set of arguments should
be believed given an argumentation framework, with a set of initial arguments AR. A
conflict-free set of arguments is one in which no arguments belonging to the set attack
another belonging to the set. An admissible set of arguments, S ⊆ AR, is conflict-free
and for every argument A ∈ S if there is an argument B ∈ AR which attacks A then B
is attacked by S (where a set attacks an argument if there is a member of the set which
attacks the argument). An example of a semantics for an argumentation framework is
the preferred extension which is a maximal subset of AR which is admissible.
A variety of semantics have been proposed for argumentation frameworks. There
is some debate about how these semantics should be evaluated with a criticism made
in [6] that many are assessed more on intuition (based upon examples) rather than any
principled evaluation.
Aside from Dung’s model, there are a variety of alternative formalisations of ar-
gumentation proposed [103] which explore reasoning with a potentially inconsistent






The intention of the 
rule was to prevent
Johnny getting the jam
Johnny used a 
broom to fetch
the jam
Figure 5.1: A basic argument graph for a few of the arguments proposed in the ‘Naughty
Johnny’ case. The nodes are arguments about the case, and the directed edges repre-
sent instances of the attacks relation between arguments. Note that the “Johnny wasn’t
in the pantry” argument also includes the proposition that Johnny not being in the pantry
means that he hasn’t broken the rule. An example of an admissible set would be the
set consisting of all the arguments except the “Johnny wasn’t in the pantry” argument.
knowledge base. The basic features of an argumentation system [24] are: an underly-
ing logic, a concept of argument, a concept of conflict amongst arguments, a notion of
defeat amongst arguments, and a notion of the acceptability of an argument.
Research on argumentation systems subsumes much research on non-monotonic
logics. In [37] Dung shows that Reiter’s default logic can be viewed as a preferred
extension over an underlying monotonic logic. In [17] Bondarenko et al propose
assumption-based frameworks for default reasoning which generalises many prior forms
of non-monotonic reasoning.
Recent work in argumentation has included the idea of an audience and their val-
ues in the argumentation framework. In [11] Trevor Bench-Capon et al introduce
value-based argumentation frameworks defined by a triple (AF,V,n) where AF is an
Chapter 5. Legal Case Modelling in AI and Law 84
argumentation framework (defined as above), V is a set of values and n is a function
n : AR→V . An audience defines a binary relation over values indicating which values
are preferred over others. This framework has been used to analyse legal cases in [10].
Argumentation frameworks are usually based upon a foundational approach to
epistemology [129], beliefs which are not attacked act as a foundation for justifying
other beliefs. This is distinct from the coherentist approach taken in Paul Thagard’s
work on coherent reasoning (see section 5.7).
There has been some research within multiagent systems that is of interest to us. In
[68] a framework for using argumentation to resolve ontology disputes between agent
ontologies is introduced. This work is similar to the ORS system we discussed in
section 2.2.2. The framework provides a meta-level ontology to formalise the relations
between the agents’ ontologies. These frameworks are certainly similar to what we
would like to create to model the ontology evolution in legal reasoning. However, it
isn’t clear whether the meta-level ontologies used in these frameworks can be applied
to our problem. We will look further at this problem in the next chapter.
5.4 Argument Schemes
The representations of argumentation we looked at in the previous section are designed
for reasoning with inconsistent arguments. However, the content of the arguments is
based upon theories in the underlying logic, which these frameworks are independent
of. The frameworks don’t describe the acceptable patterns of argumentation, as these
are considered to be part of the underlying logic.
Prakken points out in [101] that Logic is too abstract for modelling legal arguments.
There are recurrent patterns in legal argument that are not expressed when creating a
logical representation of the claims the arguments make.
An example of the use of argument schemes is in [156] in which argument schemes
for Witness Testimony, Video Tape evidence, Defeasible modus ponens and Purpose
are used to analyse the Popov v. Hayashi case. The Witness Testimony argument
scheme looks like:
WT: Witness says that P, therefore P.
where P is a proposition. This argument scheme is used in the case analysis to for-
malise the claims that Hayashi didn’t assault Popov made by witnesses, and so Hayashi
shouldn’t be prevented from possessing the ball.
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The challenge in modelling legal cases using argument schemes is to match the
argument scheme to the text describing the case. It is sometimes unclear how an argu-
ment can be fitted into an argument scheme [102].
The work on argument schemes is relevant to our work as some of the arguments
about the meaning of the law might follow a particular argument scheme. For example,
a judge in a case with an ambiguous international treaty which had an authoritative
French version might ask French lawyers to provide expert testimony regarding the
meaning of the French version in French law2.
It is unclear how we can use argument schemes. If there are particular argument
schemes for arguments about meaning, we should use these to model our legal cases.
But it is unclear exactly how arguments about meaning are conducted, and whether
the arguments that affect the meaning of a word are distinct from the arguments used
to justify other claims. For instance expert testimony might be used to justify a claim
about meaning in the same way that it would be used to justify any other claim in a
legal case, and so might not need a distinct argument scheme.
There is some discussion of argumentation about the meaning of natural language
expressions in [148] [152] . However, these are philosophical analyses that rely upon
implicit knowledge to analyse the arguments, and so it isn’t clear how these analyses
can be used to automate argument generation.
Another problem is that Argument schemes hide the underlying common-sense on-
tologies upon which they are based. For instance, an argument scheme about expert
opinion is a black box, the argument scheme can’t be deconstructed into underlying
presumptions about epistemology. However, in actual legal argumentation the argu-
ment can be decomposed into common-sense propositions about the reliability of ex-
perts. The ontologies behind the argument scheme are hidden, whereas we want them
to be explicitly available for reasoning.
5.5 Case-based reasoning
In common law one of the primary sources of law are the verdicts of prior legal cases.
There has been much research on using case-based reasoning to model the citing of
precedent legal cases as a form of legal argument.
The basis of case-based reasoning in law is to find cases which are similar to the
current case and to hence argue that a similar verdict should apply to the current case.
2c.f. Corocroft v. Pan-American
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This involves determining the ratio decidendi, the rule which lead to the verdict in the
prior case and which is binding upon future cases in lower courts. If this rule can be
argued to apply to the current case, a similar verdict must follow.
The challenge in this form of reasoning is to identify the reason in the prior case
and argue that the relevant features in the prior case hold, or not, in the current case.
An exemplary Case-based Reasoner is the HYPO system developed by Kevin Ash-
ley and Edwina Rissland [3]. HYPO was created for the domain of trade-secret law.
HYPO searched for similiarities between cases based upon their common collections
of facts.
HYPO had a database of 30 cases. Each case was represented as a legal-case frame,
which contained the factual predicates for the case, which formalised the facts of the
case. Reasoning was done using dimensions. The facts of the case determined whether
a dimension was applicable to a case. If a dimension was applicable, a subset of the
case facts would further determine in what way the dimension effected the case. The
dimension offered a range of possible values which reflected how strongly it effected
the case and which side it benefited.
When the system is applied to a new case, as input, it checks what dimensions
apply to the case and finds cases which share factors with the new one. The system then
identifies the most relevant ones to the new case and generates “3-ply” arguments, i.e.
an exchange of arguments about precedents for 3 steps (Plaintiff,Defendant,Plaintiff).
An example of a HYPO dimension is:
Secrets-Disclosed-Outsiders: Plaintiff strengthened the fewer disclosures
to outsiders it has made of confidential information.
This dimension is formalised by specifying the facts that have to hold in the case
for it to apply, facts such as “There is a corporate plaintiff”. The dimension would
weaken the plaintiff’s case the greater the number of disclosures were made by the
plaintiff. See [3] for more details.
The CABERET system [108] was later created to combine rule-based reasoning
with case-based reasoning, specifically to tackle the problem of legal interpretation for
open-textured rules. The system used case-based reasoning to determine the extension
of open-textured concepts, and rule-based reasoning to determine the consequences of
the open-textured rules. CABERET was applied to the domain of income-tax law, and
had a database of 23 cases.
Other systems have been based upon a different underlying representation of a legal
case [110] and its argumentation. The CATO system [4] (developed by Kevin Ashley
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and Vincent Aleven) was based upon a representation of cases using factors. A factor
represented a collection of facts which held in the current case and was labelled as
being either pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant. The important distinction between a factor
and a dimension is that a factor is unary, it’s presence is a benefit to one side and there
is no variation in how strongly it benefits that side, whereas a dimension can benefit
either side and to a varying degree.
The challenge for case-based reasoning is to define metrics of similiarity between
cases [57]. The algorithms that calculate these metrics need not be based upon infer-
ence with explicit ontologies; and they can be a form of implicit knowledge. In legal
reasoning, much as in everyday reasoning, we often can’t explain exactly why two
situations seem similiar, they simply do.
A problem with using case-based reasoning is the difficulty of forming representa-
tions of legal cases, although this is a problem for all the techniques we survey here.
All the above case-based reasoning systems are based upon small sets of cases whose
representations have been hand-crafted.
For our purposes, we can regard case-based reasoning as a source of arguments,
claims about the current case and its relationship to others. The connection between
case-based reasoning and argumentation is discussed in more detail in [119].
5.6 Theory Construction
One of the pioneers of AI and Law research, Thorne McCarty, advocated a conception
of legal reasoning as theory construction [83]3. McCarty argued that there is no right
answer to the legal problems in hard cases. In these cases lawyers are engaged in
theory construction: they are trying to take the facts of the case, and the relevant laws,
and combine them into a theory that justifies their desired outcome.
This model of legal reasoning is similiar to contemporary accounts in legal philos-
ophy, such as Dworkin’s model of Law in [38].
For example, Alison Chorley [29] describes the AGATHA system that constructs
case-law theories. The system searches through a case database to identify cases that
are similiar to the current one, and also identifies counter-arguments to the similiarity,
using a representation of cases similiar to Ashley’s HYPO.
A relevant form of reasoning for us is abduction, the form of reasoning that gener-
3“... Thus the important process in legal reasoning is not theory application but theory construction.”
p276
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ates hypotheses to explain observations. Abduction differs from the other fundamental
forms of reasoning: induction, the process of inferring a generalisation from examples,
and deduction, the process of inferring propositions using logical rules.
Arguments about meaning could be constructed abductively, by generating claims
that explain how the rules are connected with the facts of the case.
The problem with a model of legal reasoning as theory construction is that we
then need to account for why certain theories are accepted and others are rejected.
This problem has been discussed in research in AI on abduction as the problem of
hypothesis evaluation.
The problem of hypothesis evaluation can be solved using a coherentist approach
to epistemology. We mentioned earlier that argumentation frameworks are typically
based upon a foundationalist approach to epistemology. In a foundationalist episte-
mology a proposition is only known to be true if it can be logically deduced from a
foundational set of propositions. A coherentist epistemology doesn’t recognise any
privileged set of propositions and instead argues that a proposition is believed if it be-
longs to a set of propositions that “fit” together; we shall look at what that means in
the next section.
5.7 Coherent reasoning
In order to model legal reasoning as a form of theory construction there must be a
method to evaluate the resulting theories. There has been discussion in legal philoso-
phy of the use of measures of coherence to evaluate theories produced as legal solutions
to a case. However, this philosophical work typically doesn’t result in computational
implementations. But, there has been some research into implementing computational
models of measuring the coherence of a theory.
Paul Thagard’s work on coherence [136] is an attempt to provide a formal basis
for the various philosophical intuitions [31, 105] in favour of coherence as a basis for
knowledge. Thagard’s work constructs the coherence problem as one of constraint
satisfaction.
Thagard’s model of coherence regards the problem as one of finding a maximal
coherent subset of a set of propositions with coherence links between them [138]. The
propositions have weighted coherence relations between them which indicate the de-
gree of coherence or incoherence that propositions have with each other. The constraint
satisfaction problem is to find the subset of propositions which maximises the sum of
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these edges.
For example, if the domain is mathematics then the links between propositions
would simply be logical consistency and the maximal subset would be the largest con-
sistent subset.
This framework is very similar to that of argumentation, in that both are based
upon representations of propositions as nodes in a graph with edges indicating an epis-
temological connection. The distinction between them is that the coherence view takes
justification to be a two way link. The basis for this is that there is a problem of using
our sensory observations to justify our knowledge of the world, since our sensory ob-
servations can be false or incomplete; so we must use our background knowledge to
determine what is likely to be true. Neither the background knowledge nor the sensory
observations can be used as a basis to justify the other.
The primary motivation of Thagard’s work has been in Cognitive Science where
coherence has been proposed as a model of how people reason. This raises the ques-
tion of providing a justification for why the theory with the most explanatory coherence
should be regarded as the ‘truth’. The view in Thagard’s work is that the correspon-
dence theory of truth4 is correct but that we only have limited contact with reality and
hence must go on the balance of evidence to chose between conflicting hypotheses.
Thagard’s work has been applied to modelling conceptual change within the sci-
ences [135]. This has led to the formation of principles of explanatory coherence
which are used to determine how propositions can ‘cohere’ with one another. Taken
from [136] they are:
Principle E1: Symmetry. Explanatory coherence is a symmetric re-
lation, unlike, say, conditional probability. That is, two propositions
p and q cohere with each other equally.
Principle E2: Explanation. (a) A hypothesis coheres with what it
explains, which can either be evidence or another hypothesis. (b)
Hypotheses that together explain some other proposition cohere with
each other. (c) The more hypotheses it takes to explain something,
the lower the degree of coherence.
Principle E3: Analogy. Similar hypotheses that explain similar pieces
of evidence cohere.
Principle E4: Data Priority. Propositions that describe the results of
observations have a degree of acceptability on their own.
4The theory that true statements are those that correspond to states of the world.
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Principle E5: Contradiction. Contradictory propositions are inco-
herent with each other.
Principle E6: Competition. If p and q both explain a proposition, and
if p and q are not explanatorily connected, then p and q are incoherent
with each other (p and q are explanatorily connected if one explains
the other or if together they explain something).
Principle E7: Acceptance. The acceptability of a proposition in a
system of propositions depends on its coherence with them.
Explanatory coherence has been applied to the legal domain [137] where it has
been used to analyse the process of legal decision making. The models are, like argu-
mentation, based upon formalisations of the legal case in propositional logic.
For our purposes we must adapt the reasoning towards the agent’s goals. In de-
veloping a theory, lawyers are trying to justify the best outcome for their client. This
motivating element in developing theories has been discussed in [135] and would cor-
respond to biasing the coherence of a theory to ones which are coherent with our goals.
Coherence theories of law have been proposed, e.g. in [67]. These aim to describe
the process of legal decision making as one of seeking coherence within the law. J.C.
Hage presents a formalisation of legal coherence in [56].
In [12] Trevor Bench-Capon and Giovanni Sartor experiment with Thagard’s early
model of explanatory coherence [135]. This model is based around the use of neural
networks to calculate the explanatory coherence of a theory. They raise a few technical
questions, regarding the neural network implementation, which are not applicable to
the general model of coherence as constraint satisfaction presented in [136].
The problem with applying Thagard’s model is that the abstract coherence prin-
ciples must be connected with the argumentation in the legal case. We still have to
hand-craft the model of the case and the coherence edges between propositions. Tha-
gard’s model does not provide any mechanisms for generating theories, it only provides
a method to evaluate them.
We also have the same problem as the argument schemes: the coherence principles
are used to create the coherence edges, but are not part of the discourse themselves.
This is not the case in the law, where the principles involved in the case will be part of
the discourse.
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5.8 Meta-level reasoning
Legal reasoning and discourse is recognised as being highly reflective [111]: legal
rules reference other legal rules and lawyers will reflect upon their own reasoning and
values in a case.
For instance, Acts of the U.K. Parliament contain interpretation sections, which
state what the meaning of the concepts used in the other sections of the Act are. These
are rules which dictate how other rules should be interpreted.
It is also quite common within a legal system to have rules about the priorities of
various sources of law. For instance, in the U.K. new statutory-law has a higher priority
than old case-law.
We mentioned in section 2.1.2.2 the concept of the domain of discourse of a logical
theory. These are the objects that the logic makes assertions about. The objects usually
denote things in the real-world5, such as a particular skateboard or a particular person.
A legal rule might make an assertion about a physical state of the person, such as that
the person is riding a skateboard in a particular park, and a material consequence of
this state, such as a £10 fine.
The rule doesn’t describe how it should be applied. That information is contained
in the meta-logic of the logic that the rule belongs to. For instance if the logic is first-
order logic, the meta-logic will usually be the natural language discussion of first-order
inference.
The idea of meta-level reasoning is to formalise this meta-logic within another
formal logic. A further extension of this idea is to formalise the meta-level reasoning in
the same logic and include rules to enable inference at the meta-level to affect inference
at the object level, and vice-versa.
The FOL system was one of the first AI systems to explore this idea [150]. It
included “reflection principles”6 allowing the reification7 of object-level propositions
into propositions in a meta-level representation8.
For example, we might have a rule which states that “Park by-laws don’t have
affect on a Sunday”. This rule describes how park by-laws should be applied, and
would prevent the person above from being fined for riding a skateboard through a
5Although asbtract objects, and objects which have a social meaning, such as money, are also possi-
ble.
6Their usage of the term originates from the work of the logician Sol Feferman
7Reifying a concept or proposition means taking an assertion using the concept or proposition and
making it an object in the domain of discourse, at the meta-level.
8c.f. [46] for an axiomatisation of meta-level reasoning.
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park on the Sunday, since it would make the park by-law inapplicable.
There has been prior work on using meta-level reasoning to control legal interpre-
tation [100] [157]. This work is based upon hierarchies of meta-levels, with rules at
higher levels controlling the application of rules at lower levels. These higher-level
rules are used to resolve problems with applying the lower-level rules, such as the
existence of multiple inconsistent rules.
The most relevant work for us is the research by Jonas Barklund and Andreas
Hamfelt [5]. This research uses meta-logic programming, an extension of the logic
programming with meta-level reasoning. They represent meta-legal rules as meta-level
schemas which are applied to lower-level rules in the case of conflicts or ambiguities
in the law, such as the Swedish principle of “lex posterior legi priori derogat” which
means that more recent laws override older laws. Their system checks whether a legal
rule is applicable in the current case and also whether there are any relevant rules in
the meta-levels which override the application of the rule.
An extension of these ideas by Andreas Hamfelt in [60] is particularly interesting
to us as it includes a “Meaning” predicate, which relates a natural language expression
of a law with a proposition in formal logic. However, that system requires user input
to create the formalisations of the law.
Another interesting use of meta-logic is in [155] in which the authors note that ar-
gumentation frameworks are a form of meta-logic, since the argumentation framework
controls what can be inferred from the underlying logical theory.
5.9 Limitations of these techniques
The above techniques are primarily aimed at two tasks: rational reconstruction of legal
cases and automation of legal reasoning. The work on argumentation and coherence
is usually about creating a rational reconstruction of the reasoning in a legal case. The
work on logic programming, case-based reasoning and meta-level reasoning is usually
about trying to automate various aspects of legal reasoning. However, the tasks are not
mutually exclusive.
The aim of creating a rational reconstruction of a legal case is to improve our
understanding of the reasoning in the case by creating a formal model. The modeller
must take the discourse of the case and create a formal representation from it.
The representations used in a rational reconstruction are typically based upon a
propositional logic and will not formalise the commonsense warrants in an argument
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at a level of detail suitable for automated reasoning. The representations are hand-
crafted and the systems developed do not generate arguments autonomously.
The systems that try to automate some aspect of legal reasoning are typically
based upon quite small databases of legal cases, whose representations have been hand
crafted. The system expects input in a given format, which must also be hand crafted.
The feature of legal reasoning that we are interested in modelling is the argumenta-
tion about meaning in the legal case. As we have argued in section 4.5, this argumen-
tation depends upon a conceptualisation of what meaning is. We have also argued that
the context of a case will provide the information needed to create arguments about
meaning. Are the above techniques useful to us?
The problem with many of them, with the exception of meta-level reasoning, is
that they are based upon a conceptual model of legal reasoning that the system can’t
introspect upon. This means that they can only automate the reasoning in routine cases,
in which only standard reasoning is required, but not to the kinds of hard legal-cases
we have been studying, in which the ontology of the law changes9.
For instance, the coherence model proposed by Thagard relies upon various coher-
ence principles. These principles are used to create coherence links between propo-
sitions. It is the modeller’s task to apply these principles to a particular case. The
resulting coherence graph doesn’t include statements about the presumptions the mod-
eller was making when applying the principles to a case.
Also, the value-based argumentation model proposed by Bench-Capon et al re-
quires the modeller to determine what values were present in the case. The argumen-
tation framework doesn’t provide a mechanism to engage in argumentation about the
values, and whether they actually are present in the case.
However, our discussion of meta-level reasoning also raised the question of what
knowledge and reasoning should be introspectable. We need to have a conceptualisa-
tion of meaning and this conceptualisation should interact with the reasoning, so that
arguments about meaning affect what inferences can be made in the case.
The techniques we have surveyed are typically based upon prescriptive models
of reasoning, which specify exact standards of reasoning rather than modelling how
people actually reason. This feature, again, raises the issue of what kind of model of
ontology evolution we are trying to construct. We will return to this question in section
7.2.
9c.f. Ann Gardner’s thesis [45] which described a system which could identify situations in which
rules and/or precedents came into conflict, and so identify that there was a hard legal case, but the system
could not solve the problem.
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The techniques don’t seem to allow different perspectives on the case. There are
models, such as AGATHA, which represent the argumentation as a game, so there is an
association between the agents and the arguments they make. But these models don’t
provide a detailed representation for an agent’s perspective on the case, so couldn’t be
used for a task such as crafting arguments for a particular judge.
The meta-level reasoning techniques proposed so far don’t combine meta-level rea-
soning with object-level reasoning. They are based upon a layered approach in which
the higher-level rules are used to resolve conflicts at lower levels. This doesn’t seem
to match the use in a legal case. For instance, in Popov v. Hayashi, Popov argued
against the definition of possession proposed by Prof. Gray, since it would exclude
his possession claim, and instead advocated another definition which would allow him
possession. This reasoning combines reasoning about the meaning of a concept, a form
of meta-level reasoning, with reasoning about the material outcome of the case, a form
of object-level reasoning.
These limitations are not fatal to the usefulness of the techniques. However, they do
require careful consideration over the scope of any application they are used in. So far
we haven’t narrowed the task of reasoning about ontology evolution in legal reasoning
down to any particular domain of law. We have also not specified whether we are
aiming to rationally reconstruct the reasoning in a legal case, or trying to automate the
reasoning in a legal case.
The problem of automating the reasoning is harder, and so offers us a more general
problem to consider for the next chapter. However, we shall return to the problem of
the kind of theory of ontology evolution we are aiming for in chapter 7.
It is worth noting that we haven’t surveyed some of the techniques used within
formal logic and philosophy for modelling legal reasoning. In particular, there has
been much research on deontic logics, which use a modal logic to formalise legal
rules [65]. However, this research is not usually aimed at automating reasoning, and
we subscribe to the AI philosophy that these features can be expressed within a more
general logic [78].
5.10 Summary
We have surveyed the techniques proposed within AI and Law for modelling legal
reasoning, and evaluated their relevance to ontology evolution.
We have argued that the current techniques have various limitations, such as lack of
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introspection upon the reasoning mechanisms or lack of argument generation, which
make them inapplicable to generating the arguments about meaning in the hard legal
cases we have been studying.
We have again seen the problem of prescriptive vs. descriptive theories, and noted
that we haven’t clarified exactly what kind of theory or application we are trying to
develop. We will consider the more general problem, of argument generation, in the
next chapter and survey some AI techniques that might be applicable to our problem.
Chapter 6
Arguments about Meaning in Legal
Cases
In the previous chapter we have surveyed existing research on modelling legal argu-
mentation. In this chapter we look at the arguments about meaning that occur in a legal
case.
Our claim is that ontology evolution in a legal case occurs as a result of the ar-
guments about meaning proposed in the case. We further claim that the context of a
legal case supplies these arguments, and that commonsense knowledge is essential to
modelling these arguments.
We survey some of the existing research on contextual logics and commonsense
knowledge bases, and discuss its relevance to creating computational models of ontol-
ogy evolution in Law.
6.1 Arguments about Meaning
The argumentation frameworks discussed in the previous chapter are meta-logical (c.f.
[155]), in the sense that they are used to control the reasoning within a logic but are
independent of any particular logic. This implies that they are independent of the
ontologies that those arguments are based upon, since the ontologies are theories within
the logic. These argumentation frameworks have been used to model certain legal
cases, but the majority of these models rely upon simple propositional representations
of the domain. There is no (explicit) formal ontology that underlies these domain
representations.
The arguments that particularly interest us are the arguments about meaning. These
96
Chapter 6. Arguments about Meaning in Legal Cases 97
are the arguments that make, and justify, claims about interpretations of the meaning
of legal ontologies. These arguments must relate the legal ontologies to facts about
the case. In order to relate these ontologies there must be ontologies about meaning.
These ontologies contain rules that can link an object-level statement about the facts of
the case with a meta-level statement about the meaning of a law with respect to these
facts.
6.1.1 Ontologies of meaning
If we are to have arguments about meaning, those arguments must be based upon
ontologies about meaning. These ontologies must describe a conceptualisation of what
meaning in natural language is. But what concepts will this ontology contain, and what
definitions will the concepts have?
Firstly, it is worth noting that discussion of the meaning of “meaning” is not new.
As we discussed in chapter 4, problems of ascribing meaning to natural language ut-
terances have been extensively discussed in various different branches of Philosophy
and Computational Linguistics. We must clarify what form these arguments take in
particular legal cases.
In the case of Buchanan v. Babco (see section 3.2.2) we saw that lawyers ar-
gued over the meaning of “other charges ...”. These arguments made reference to the
“scheme” of the text, and whether other charges “included” excise duty.
Similiarly, in the case of Popov v. Hayashi (see section 3.2.1) there were arguments
over the meaning of “possession”, which used words such as “definition”.
Words such as “scheme” seem to denote meta-linguistic concepts which represent
features of the structure of a text. The word “included” seems to refer to a subsumption
relation between two categories. These concepts belong to an ontology of meaning,
since they are used to make claims about the meaning of a law.
But what role does an ontology of meaning play in legal reasoning? The meta-
level terms like “definition” and “includes” must be related to the object-level theories
in order to be useful. For example, consider the ’Naughty Johnny’ example case dis-
cussed in section 2.3.5.3. If Johnny can convince his mum that the meaning of “enter”
does not include his use of the broom then his mum can’t conclude that he entered
the pantry. The claims about the meaning of a concept will affect the inferences about
appropriate legal consequences.
However, any claim must be justified. In the case of ’Naughty Johnny’, Johnny can
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argue that the definition of “enter” requires that his whole body is in the space, since
this is how it is used in other contexts. So the claim about the meaning of “enter” in the
case with the broom is justified by appealing to evidence of a similiar usage in other
contexts. There is an underlying warrant here that the usage of the concept in other
contexts implies it should have a similiar meaning in the current context. But why do
we presume this warrant should hold?
There seems to be an underlying commonsense conceptualisation of what meaning
is that supplies these warrants. So certain arguments make sense to us, but without us
understanding why exactly they make sense.
6.1.2 Authority over meaning
Once we have concepts in our ontologies of meaning we need to define those concepts.
For example, when exactly should a concept X be defined by some proposition P? In
answering these kinds of questions lawyers are determining the definition of the object-
level concept X . We can assume that lawyers will want concepts to have a definition
that serves their (client’s) interests.
For example, Johnny will interpret “enter” as meaning a state in which a body is
entirely located within another, and Johnny’s mother will interpret “enter” as meaning
that a part of a body is located within another. Although there are some constraints
upon how these words can be interpreted since the open texture of natural language
allows both of these conflicting interpretations of the borderline case. Since the bor-
derline case was not foreseen, lawyers are free to alter the definition of concepts to suit
their purposes.
However, although this story makes sense for lawyers it doesn’t resolve the prob-
lem of determining what concepts should mean; what are the axioms in an ontology of
meaning? Here we need to consider the role of judges, since they have the authority to
accept or reject arguments about the meaning of legal ontologies.
Even for lawyers there are constraints upon what claims about meaning they will
make. Since their goal is to convince the judge that a concept has a given meaning
they will not make claims about the meaning that they don’t believe the judge would
accept. For example, Johnny would not try to alter the definition of “enter” to simply
being any state that he wasn’t in, as this definition is unlikely to be accepted by his
mother.
There is an issue of authority over meaning not just at the level of the object-
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level definitions, of concepts such as enter, but over the meaning of meta-ontological
concepts such as meaning. We discussed the role of authority in determining meaning
in section 4.4.1.
It seems as though there are difficulties determining what the meaning of the con-
cepts in the ontologies about meaning are, and that there different kinds of ontologies
of meaning. We can either prescribe axioms and concepts for an ontology of meaning,
or we can try to describe what axioms and concepts are in the ontologies of meaning
that people use. We discuss this problem further in the next chapter. In section 6.3 we
discuss the possible use of commonsense knowledge bases for a descriptive ontology
of meaning.
6.2 Context
We have discussed ontologies of meaning as being essential to forming arguments
about meaning. We have noted that finding axioms for these ontologies is hard, but
necessary if we want to create arguments about the meaning of a legal term. One source
of these axioms is to use the context of the case to justify a particular interpretation.
For instance, Johnny might argue for an interpretation of “enter” that is similiar to
that used in related contexts; similiarly, in the Popov v. Hayashi case the definition of
“possession” in the context of baseball is used to aid the interpretation of “possession”
in the Law; or in Buchanan v. Babco the French version of the text is used to aid the
interpretation of the English version of the text. In all these cases the context of the
case is being used to justify an interpretation. In particular, other contexts are being
used to provide evidence to justify an interpretation.
But what exactly is the context of a legal case? In this section we investigate
contextual logics and their use to model the arguments in a legal case.
There has been some discussion of the role of context within AI and Law. For
instance, in [55] Donald Berman and Carole Hafner present a case-based reasoning
system that represents the effect later verdicts have upon the strength of a precedent
case. In [9] the authors highlight the situational context of a legal case as one of the
avenues for future research in AI and Law.
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6.2.1 Contextual Logics
The idea of context has been used for some time in linguistics as a catch-all term for
the factors that affect the meaning of a term in a particular utterance [1]. Contextual
logics are an attempt to formalise the affect of context upon meaning and reasoning.
AI research on contextual logics began relatively recently: John McCarthy began
the research field of context in logical AI in the 1980s [76]. Many researchers have
studied contextual logics since then and there is now a sizable community, with a
biennial conference1.
The main approaches to contextual logics are those investigated at Stanford by John
McCarthy and others, and at Trento by Fausto Guinchiglia and others. There are some
alternative approaches to including context within a logic which we will also briefly
look at.
6.2.1.1 Stanford
The problem of context is related to the problem of non-monotonicity in reasoning,
which we briefly discussed in section 5.1. John McCarthy advocated the use of context
to cope with exceptional cases [77] to general rules. We can create rules that apply in
general contexts, and overrule them in specific contexts.
The basis of McCarthy’s contextual logic is a ist(c, p) predicate, which asserts
that proposition p is true in context c, and linking axioms, which assert a relationship
between ist predicates for different contexts2.
McCarthy further advocated the idea of combining reflection with contexts and the
idea of an outer context. All propositions are asserted with respect to a context, with
the outer context as the containing context for all contextual assertions.
McCarthy’s student Ramanathan Guha used these intuitions to form a contextual
logic which became the basis for the CYC knowledge base [54]. The CYC knowledge
base is the main application of this model of context and we shall investigate CYC
further in section 6.3.2.
There are some unresolved theoretical issues with the McCarthy model of contexts.
The ist predicate introduces a theory of truth into the logic, which potentially brings
problems such as Tarski’s paradox. These problems have not been fully investigated
[1] and we shall look at them again later in section 6.2.3.
1c.f. http://mainesail.umcs.maine.edu/Context/context-conferences/
2e.g. ist(c1, p1)→ ist(c2, p2)
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6.2.1.2 Trento
Fausto Guinchiglia had some similiar intuitions to McCarthy regarding the importance
of context to enabling robust reasoning in AI, these intuitions being developed with his
involvement in the FOL project [150]. This led Giunchiglia to propose his own model
of context [48], which has since been developed by himself and other researchers,
mainly at Trento University.
The Giunchiglia model of context is based upon the idea of a multi-context (MC)
system. These systems are based upon similiar intuitions to the McCarthy model of
context, but rather than introducing a ist predicate MC systems have context as part
of the meta-logic and introduce “bridge rules” to enable inter-context reasoning. This
difference also means that contexts and bridge rules are not, by default, first-class
objects in a MC system
A context consists of a logical language (e.g. first order logic), a set of axioms
in this language and a set of inference rules (e.g. the rules of natural deduction). So
in an MC system it is possible to use different logics in different contexts, whereas
McCarthy’s model is based upon first-order logic.
The notation c : Φ is used to express that formula Φ is true in context c. Reasoning
between contexts is done using bridge rules, rules whose premises and conclusion
belong to different contexts. The general form of a bridge rule is:
c1:Φ1,...,cn:Φn
cn+1:Φn+1
where c1, ...cn are contexts, Φ1, ...Φn are propositions, c1 : Φ1, ...,cn : Φn are the
premises of the rule and cn+1 : Φn+1 is the conclusion.
An example of a MC system is given in [49] where an agent, John, has a con-
text representing the beliefs of another agent, Mary. John has the beliefs Bm(P) and
Bm(P→ Q) where Bm(P) denotes that Mary believes proposition P. John uses re-
flective bridge rules to assert P and P→ Q in a different context, which represents a
simulation of Mary’s reasoning, and performs local inference there to derive Q. This
can then be reflected up to the context with the belief predicate to give us Bm(Q).
Local Model semantics has been developed to provide a semantics for MC systems,
a necessary development since MC systems have a distinct proof theory. The basic
principles behind local-model semantics are: locality, reasoning only uses a part of
the resources available; and compatibility, reasoning performed in different contexts
should be compatible. A model for a MC system is a compatibility relation which
describes the relationship between the models of the different contexts.
Chapter 6. Arguments about Meaning in Legal Cases 102
6.2.1.3 Alternatives
There have been several logics which attempt to incorporate some notion of context
[1]. We shall look at Situation theory and Buvac and Mason’s modal contextual logic
as distinct approaches.
Situation theory [98, 35] arose from related intuitions to research on contextual
logics within AI. The view was that traditional semantics for logic ignored the situated
nature of belief and reasoning. In particularly the partiality of representation: that we
do not know the truth or falsity of all propositions. This led to the development of
situation theory and situation semantics to handle this problem. The theory was based
around the idea of infons which formalise what is true in a given situation and the idea
of constraints holding between infons. The work on constraints was extended to an
account of the logic of information flow in distributed systems [8], using local logics
with channels between them to formalise the interactions between systems. This ap-
proach has been compared with the contextual logics above in [33] where local logics
are identified with contexts and channels with bridge rules.
What is most interesting about the Channel Theory approach is the use of tokens
of information in justifying the assertion of a proposition within a local logic. What
we are interested in is the connection between the objects in different contexts and
how we can justify identifying the signatures of different contexts. For instance in
the ‘Buchanan v. Babco’ case the excise duty, as an object within the context of the
real-world event, might be identified with the category defined in the text by the phrase
“charge incurred in respect of carriage”.
The difficulties with using the Channel Theory approach is the relatively compli-
cated, and specific, meta-theory for the logic. Unlike AI approaches, where this kind of
meta-theory would be handled by the use of meta-level reasoning within a conventional
logic, Channel Theory introduces a complex meta-theory specifically for studying in-
formation flow. It is unclear how this work could be adapted to modelling ontology
evolution in the Law, however the intuitions behind Channel Theory are useful.
Buvac and Mason were students of John McCarthy who formulated a contextual
logic which treated the ist predicate as a modality and gave it a Kripke semantics [23].
This provides a more sound theoretical basis to the contextual logic, but removed some
of the more flexible features (contexts as first-class objects). The use of modal-logics
also went against McCarthy’s advocacy of a contextual logic as an alternative to modal
logics.
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6.2.2 Contexts in Legal reasoning
If we want to use contextual logic to model the reasoning in a legal case, we must
investigate what kinds of context exist in legal reasoning.
In the examples of contextual propositions we give we use the Trento notation
c : p to indicate that proposition p is true in context c. However we use the McCarthy
approach to contexts, so that contexts can be treated as first-class objects within the
logic. The notation c : p should be considered shorthand for the assertion ist(c, p).
We can think of the following kinds of context that might be used to model legal
reasoning:
• Legal systems
• The current case
• The legal theories presented in a case
• The agents’ belief states
• Precedent cases
• Sources of evidence
• Legislation
• The real-world event
A legal-system context would define the rules that govern the reasoning and pro-
cedures within a given legal system. These rules place constraints upon how lawyers
can behave in a legal case, within that legal system. For example there might be the
following rule in the English Legal System:
english law : ∀X ,Y.similiar(X ,Y )∧∃V,V ′.verdict(X ,V )∧ verdict(Y,V ′).→ .V =V ′
which states that if two cases are similiar then their verdicts should be the same.
This rule (partially) expresses the principle of binding precedent in English law.
The current case is the legal case that is currently in disputed. The legal case
involves a real-world event, that caused the legal case, and the legal system. What
we want to represent is the discourse in the current case, the theories that the lawyers
produce in the case.
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The theories that the lawyers produce in a case are about what should be done in the
current case, and why these actions should be taken. More specifically, for an advocate
the theory states why the audience should behave in a certain way; for example the
theory might state:
discourse : theory : ((rwe : stole(person,money)).→ .convict(person))
This formula states that in the discourse context there is a theory, proposed by one of
the lawyers, which states that if a particular person (denoted person) stole some money
in the real-world event (denoted rwe) then they should be convicted. The theory makes
a claim about what should happen in the current case.
Legal theories are essentially plans for the current case with justifications for the
actions. A theory states what should be done in the current case and why it should
be done. To ‘win’ a legal case is to have your theory accepted and thus change the
behaviour of the judge(s).
A lawyer’s, or judge’s, belief state also constitutes a context. A belief context could
be used to represent the potential biases that exist on a judge’s thinking. A lawyer could
create a discourse context which uses those biases to create a desired belief about what
the appropriate outcome to the case should be.
Precedent cases could be represented as contexts which can be used to justify a
verdict in the current case. We could represent the discourse context in a precedent
case, and use a bridge rule to relate it to the current case.
Legislation could also form a context. There are different possibilities for repre-
senting legislation as a context. We could represent the legislation directly as a set of
propositions, which state the rules contained in the legislation. However, this represen-
tation would require us to formalise the legislation, and hence remove any ambiguities
in the text. Alternatively, we could represent the legislation as assertions about the
linguistic content of the text, and use bridge rules to represent the interpretation of the
linguistic content.
An example of the former approach might be an Act with the following rule:
act : stole(X ,Y ).→ .jail(X ,12months)
which states that if you steal something then you should go to jail for 12 months.
Lastly the real-world event is a context, a particular event that occurred which
provoked the legal case. This should be fairly straight-forward to represent as a context,
since it is just a description of the event. For example:
rwe : stole(man,purse)∧own(purse,woman)
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which states that in the real-world event a man stole a purse which was owned by a
particular woman.
6.2.3 Limitations of existing contextual logics
There are some problems with the existing contextual logics. We want the following
features from a contextual logic:
• Contexts as first class objects
• Ontology of contexts
• Reification of bridge rules
We would like contexts to be first-class objects and to be part of an ontology of
contexts. This is useful for representing the different kinds of context and their rela-
tionship. For instance, legislation contexts should be part of a category of contexts
representing legislation, with a default bridge rule for importing legal rules into the
current case.
We would like to be able to reify bridge rules. Lawyers are free to argue about
the rules that are invoked to justify a claim, and so any formalisation using contextual
logics must allow the contextual bridge rules to be argued about.
These features are present in the McCarthy model of context, when combined with
a meta-level first-order logic, but the meta-logical consequences of their inclusion are
not known.
MC systems have a well-researched proof theory and semantics, but they do not
include these features by default. In the MC systems approach contexts are part of
the meta-logic and are not directly accessible without introducing a theory of contexts,
as a theory within a particular context. It is unclear what the logical properties of
such a theory would be, e.g. would there be paradoxes, such as Tarski’s paradox for
embedding a theory of truth in first-order logic (c.f. [139] [34])?
The main limitation of current contextual logics is the simplicity of their example
applications. For instance, the most elaborate example of MC systems is the magic
box example [47] which is fairly trivial and does not suggest any useful real-world
application. The only exception to this is the CYC project, which has constructed a
large-scale implementation of a contextual logic. We shall consider the CYC project
further in section 6.3.2.
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6.2.4 Argumentation and Contextual logics
With a contextual logic we can represent the contextual knowledge in a legal case, but
we need to incorporate the reasoning into this representation. We have argued in the
previous chapters that legal reasoning is fundamentally a process of argumentation, so
we would like to incorporate this argumentation into the contextual logic representa-
tion.
There has been some research into combining contextual logics with default rea-
soning, a form of non-monotonic reasoning. Brewka et al introduce a form of Reiter’s
default logic for MC systems [21].
Since argumentation formalisms are independent of the underlying logic it should
be straightforward to combine an argumentation formalism with a contextual logic to
represent legal reasoning. However, the obvious way to combine the two, that is just
use the contextual logic as the logic underlying the argumentation formalism, does not
allow the argumentation itself to be easily reified. What we want is to be able to for-
malise arguments about the arguments in the current case, as these form an important
part of legal discourse. We shall return to this problem in section 6.4.
One possible advantage of using argumentation as a reasoning framework for con-
textual logics is that it might get around the problems of possible inconsistency caused
by the use of an ist predicate. Argumentation frameworks can provide different res-
olutions of Tarski’s paradox, depending upon the semantics of argumentation used
[103]. We have not investigated this property ourselves, but it seems like a reasonable
approach.
6.3 Commonsense
We have noted above that the ontologies of meaning seem to depend upon underly-
ing commonsense conceptualisations of meaning. In this section we shall consider the
role of commonsense knowledge in legal reasoning, and survey some existing com-
monsense knowledge bases and their limitations.
Commonsense knowledge is the knowledge of basic facts about the world that
we all share, facts such as “grass is green” or “people have two arms and two legs”.
However, these examples also demonstrate that commonsense knowledge is defeasible
(grass can be painted blue, people can lose limbs).
In the following sections we will look at the role of commonsense in legal reason-
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ing, some example commonsense knowledge bases and the limitations of common-
sense knowledge.
6.3.1 The role of Commonsense in Legal Reasoning
There are extensive rules governing how legal reasoning should be conducted. How-
ever, legal reasoning relies heavily upon our innate reasoning abilities and our com-
monsense knowledge to reach conclusions. It isn’t possible to define the meanings of
all the terms that appear in legislation, and would create a bootstrapping problem if
it were required. Instead, lawyers rely upon their commonsense knowledge to under-
stand the meaning of the law.
There are different kinds of commonsense knowledge that are relevant to the legal
domain. There is basic commonsense knowledge, of the kind McCarthy envisioned,
that enables lawyers to understand legislation. In particular, the use of the word “rea-
sonable” in legislation relies upon lawyers having the commonsense knowledge to
determine what reasonable behaviour would be in that context. This knowledge has to
cover knowing what events could occur in the domain and how available actions can
affect events.
Aside from this commonsense knowledge, there is also common knowledge about
the legal domain. This knowledge covers the legal system, the courts, legal cases,
etc. This is knowledge that is specific to the law, but not to any particular piece of
legislation. This kind of knowledge is considered to be of high value when conducting
a legal case, leading to the advice to advocates of “know your court”. A lawyer needs
this knowledge to generate arguments that will be persuasive to the judges in the case.
Beyond knowledge of basic facts about the world there is also “knowledge” about
human morality. Irregardless of whether people share a common sense of natural jus-
tice, most people are capable of assessing whether others would regard an action as
good or bad. This common knowledge can be used as an implicit or explicit support
for arguments. As an explicit support it might be stated as a support for an argument.
An an implicit support it might be used by a lawyer to generate an argument that ex-
ploits biases in judicial reasoning.
For example, in the Popov v. Hayashi case there was common knowledge that the
assault on Popov was wrong, a sign of excessive greed. This sense of injustice was
used to argue against awarding full possession to Hayashi, as it would be rewarding
the violent behaviour of the crowd.
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In the Buchanan v. Babco case, it might have been common knowledge that it was
unfair for the distillers to be charged excise duty due to a mistake on the part of the
carrier. This sense of injustice may have affected the reasoning, even though it was not
part of any explicit justification for the decision.
In general, there are limitations to what can be stated in legislation and case reports.
The main observation we make is that the law requires commonsense knowledge to
function, and that this commonsense knowledge can be controversial. We will discuss
the limitations of commonsense knowledge in section 6.3.3 and in the next chapter.
6.3.2 Commonsense Knowledge Bases
The CYC3 project is by far the most comprehensive attempt to create a knowledge base
of commonsense knowledge. CYC began as an attempt by Doug Lenat, and others, to
formalise all the knowledge in an encyclopedia4. They soon discovered that there was
a great deal of knowledge that was being presumed by encyclopedia editors, and which
was necessary to understand the articles. They then switched their focus to trying to
formalise this commonsense knowledge.
Knowledge is entered into CYC by knowledge engineers, people who specialise
in formalising knowledge into logical notation. The aim of the CYC project is to get
a critical mass of commonsense knowledge so that CYC can automatically acquire
commonsense knowledge from natural-language texts [71].
The CYC project has been ongoing for the past 20 years. There have been no major
applications resulting from CYC, but there is currently some interest in applications
within the intelligence community [118].
Research copies of the CYC knowledge base are available, and we have used one to
experiment with CYC. Our experience with CYC has not been particularly promising.
The documentation for the project is quite old, and not particularly clear.
As a test we looked up the concept of skateboard, to see whether we would be
able to find useful commonsense knowledge to argue about whether a skateboard is a
vehicle.
The skateboard collection5 is an instance of the type-of-vehicle collection6, which
is a second-order collection. So it seems as though CYC would interpret “vehicle”
3www.cyc.com
4Hence the name, enCYClopedia
5In CYC there is a distinction between collections and relations, see [74] for more details, this
distinction is not relevant to our discussion.
6see http://sw.opencyc.org/concept/Mx4rvViyvZwpEbGdrcN5Y29ycA
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as including “skateboard”, presuming that it associated the word “vehicle” with the
type-of-vehicle collection.
However, it isn’t clear why CYC has this definition of skateboard. There is no
justification of this definition within CYC, and it isn’t clear how we could use it in a
legal argument. CYC does not have any knowledge specific to the law. This means
that whilst it could be useful to supply some basic commonsense knowledge, it would
still be necessary to formalise all the common knowledge about the legal domain if we
wanted to automatically generate arguments about the meaning of the law.
Another problem with using CYC in any application is that it isn’t clear what au-
thority CYC definitions have. For instance, CYC has a concept of skateboard which
appears to include it as a vehicle, so a system based upon CYC might simply propose
that the rule “No vehicles in the park” applies in the case of skateboards. The prob-
lem with using this argument in a legal case is that the CYC definitions do not have
legal authority. An application based upon CYC would need to find further evidence
to support the definition of the term.
The knowledge in the CYC knowledge base is only useful to the extent that it is
common and uncontroversial. However, in the hard legal cases we have been looking
at the concepts that are evolving are controversial, and so the knowledge CYC has
about them may not be of any use.
As we noted in section 2.3.4, there has been discussion with the AI and Law com-
munity about the importance of commonsense ontologies to legal reasoning. In par-
ticular, in [63] John Henderson and Trevor Bench-Capon discuss the creation of a
general-purpose ontology for modelling legal cases. They develop a system which
uses a general ontology of occupations to describe the duty of care someone owes
within their occupation. This ontology is general purpose in that the conceptualisation
of occupations is not specific to this system. In their paper they describe the difficulties
of using WordNet for this purpose, as it is difficult to relate the natural language de-
scriptions of WordNet concepts to a case. They also discuss the need for the ontology
to contain concepts specific to the law.
Their proposal is interesting, but faces the difficult problems raised in this thesis.
In general, the attempts at creating a commonsense ontology within AI and Law have
been focused upon creating commonsense terminologies of limited scope, and don’t
formalise any commonsense rules, which restricts their usefulness for argument gen-
eration.
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6.3.3 Limitations of current Commonsense Knowledge-Bases
We noted in the previous chapter that some of the reasoning mechanisms appeared
to be ‘black boxes’ in that they presented an opaque representation of an underlying
phenomena that any system using them couldn’t introspect upon. For example, ar-
gument schemes are based upon an underlying commonsense model of the domain
of argumentation. The commonsense model that lead to the argument scheme can’t
be introspected upon by an automated reasoning system using the scheme. Similiarly
Thagard’s model of coherence uses various coherence principles to create weighted
links between propositions, but the resulting system can’t reflect upon the coherence
principles used to set the weights.
We mentioned in section 2.2 the role of implicit knowledge in ontology evolution.
However, we didn’t distinguish between implicit knowledge in the form of facts and
implicit knowledge in the form of procedures7.
An implicit procedure is a mechanism that we have to perform some reasoning
task, but that we can’t introspect upon. For example, most people can learn how to
navigate their way around a city, but they can’t introspect upon the algorithms they
are using to learn routes, or the algorithms they use to plan a route. These tasks are
typically performed automatically and subconsciously.
We have argued above that modelling ontology evolution in legal cases requires
ontologies about meaning, and that these ontologies about meaning are based upon our
commonsense representations of meaning. Some aspects of these ontologies might be
based upon implicit procedures.
The problem for modelling ontology evolution in legal reasoning is to understand
what aspects of the implicit knowledge should be in the form of commonsense facts,
such as “grass is green”, and what should be should be in the form of implicit proce-
dures.
The CYC knowledge base contains a large body of formalised commonsense facts,
but it doesn’t have any implicit procedures for reasoning. CYC can tell you that if
you drop a ball then it will fall to the ground, but it might not be able to estimate how
long that ball will take to fall as it doesn’t perform any physical simulations. We can,
as an example, contrast this with the AI research on qualitative physics [42], which
studies models for making these kind of estimates based upon features of the ball and
the distance it is going to fall.
7c.f. the distinction in AI between declarative and procedural knowledge
Chapter 6. Arguments about Meaning in Legal Cases 111
Some aspects of human moral reasoning may well be based upon such implicit
procedures. Some situations can seem wrong without us being able to describe exactly
why we think that they are wrong.
For instance, Jonathon Haidt has constructed the following example scenario as a
test of people’s moral judgements [58]:
Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are travelling together in
France on summer vacation from college. One night they are staying alone
in a cabin near the beach. They decide that it would be interesting and fun
if they tried making love. At very least it would be a new experience for
each of them. Julie was already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a
condom too, just to be safe. They both enjoy making love, but they decide
not to do it again. They keep that night as a special secret, which makes
them feel even closer to each other. What do you think about that, was it
OK for them to make love?
People who hear the story have an immediate moral reaction that what Julie and
Mark did is wrong. However, when asked about their reasons for their judgement
they frequently give answers that are inconsistent with the story, such as complaining
about the risk of children with birth defects, which is unlikely due to the use of birth
control. Most people belief that the scenario is wrong, but struggle to come up with a
justification for their belief.
More generally, Timothy Wilson [153] points out many circumstances in which
we rationalise subconscious instincts. There is certainly some evidence that people
form beliefs on the basis of intuitions that they can’t rationally justify. This affects any
attempt to construct a commonsense knowledge base, as we need to account for these
common intuitions.
As we noted above, knowledge about the legal system, and even about the partic-
ular court that you are arguing within, is very important for generating legally valid
arguments. This knowledge goes beyond having an upper ontology about the law, to
knowing the dark art of advocacy. There are no knowledge bases that represent this
knowledge.
It is important to note that the CYC project has been a massive investment of time
and money. The project has produced some interesting work, but does not appear to
have produced a general purpose commonsense-reasoning system8. This suggests that
creating a commonsense-reasoning system is hard, and certainly well beyond the scope
of this project.
8The CYC project has not created a system capable of understanding everyday stories in natural
language, which might be regarded as the gold standard for a system purporting to have commonsense.
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The problem is that it is difficult for us to determine the structure of our common-
sense knowledge. A member of the Vienna Circle (see section 4.2.1), Otto Neurath,
used an analogy with repairing a ship at sea to describe the problem. There is no place
for the sailors to dock the ship to begin repairs, everything that is replaced is currently
still being used to keep the ship afloat. Similiarly, we rely upon our commonsense
knowledge to help us determine what that commonsense knowledge is.
Even if we can create commonsense knowledge bases, we are still limited by the
acceptability of this knowledge in legal arguments. A judge would currently have no
reason to accept an argument which relied upon an axiom in CYC, unless they also
regarded this axiom as self-evident.
So we are stuck on two points. Firstly, the content of a general commonsense
knowledge base, which would be adequate for modelling the argumentation in any
legal case, is very difficult to create. And secondly, even if we can create this content,
it isn’t necessarily an accurate reflection of what would be acceptable in a legal case.
The consequences for our work is that creating a general ontology of meaning,
which we have argued is essential for generating arguments about meaning, is currently
infeasible, and it is unknown how to construct one. We will look at this problem further
in the next chapter.
6.4 Discourse Context
We can now present a model of argumentation about the meaning of the Law based
upon the idea of creating a discourse context. The discourse context represents the
social discourse that results from a legal case.
The purpose of the model is to consolidate our discussion of contextual logics, and
demonstrate their utility in legal case modelling.
In this model there are propositions representing claims about the meaning of the
law in the current case. Arguments are proposed by the lawyers to support or attack
these propositions. The arguments create theories for the competing parties in a case.
The theories refer to the context of the case, in order to justify their arguments about
the meaning of the law.
The discourse context contains claims made within various theory contexts about
the outcome to the current case. The discourse is about the current case, and so refers
to the contexts of the real-world event, the relevant legislation and the other contexts
relevant to the case.









Figure 6.1: A diagram showing an abstract instance of our discourse context model for
legal reasoning. The boxes represent contexts, so propositions within boxes should be
interpreted as ist assertions. The arrows represent linking axioms between propositions
in different contexts. In the abstract implementation, the Claimant makes a claim about
what the law states and what happened in the Real-World Event and uses these claims
to justify another claim within their theory. Similiarly, the Defendant makes a claim about
what the law states and uses this distinct claim to justify a claim within their theory. The
distinct claims about the law and the real-world event represent distinct interpretations
of the law and characterisations of the real-world event. These claims have not been
justified in this abstract implementation, but there might be further contextual sources of
evidence used to justify these claims. We have only shown a claimant and a defendant
theory, but the model could also include judicial theories.
Chapter 6. Arguments about Meaning in Legal Cases 114
The main intuition behind our model is that lawyers can create theories regarding
the current case as theories within the discourse context. They can use the represen-
tation of the discourse context to determine the consequences of a theory within the
current case. For instance, the discourse context allows reasoning about the conse-
quences of a claim about the meaning of the law, such as whether that claim would
enable the law to apply, or not, to the real-world event.
Our model is designed to represent both of the kinds of uncertainty in the law that
we discussed in section 3.1.1. Inconsistent law can be represented as multiple distinct
sources of law, represented as contexts, which are referenced in a legal-case context
as being relevant to the real-world event. The inconsistencies between the multiple
sources of law create a problem that must be resolved. Incomplete law is represented
by the existence of multiple conflicting mappings between a source of law and the
real-world event.
We presume a general contextual linking axiom that connects any assertion made
in a theory context with an assertion made in the discourse context, i.e. the theories are
flattened the discourse context. So since the claims made by the different lawyers will
conflict we have an inconsistent discourse context.
A lawyer could then apply an argumentation framework to the contextual logic the-
ory representing the discourse context. A semantics for the argumentation framework
would resolve the conflicts between the theories and justify an outcome for the case.
However, we don’t specify how this should be done within our model, since as we have
noted in previous chapters there is no consensus about the correct way to resolve these
problems. We discuss this problem further in section 7.2.
6.4.1 An example implementation of this model
Consider again the Buchanan v. Babco case 3.2.2. How could we implement a model
of this case as a discourse context? Here are two example theories, which might be pro-
duced by the plaintiff9 and defendant in the case. We formalise a few of the arguments
from section 3.2.2.1 into the discourse context model we described above.
We use the following contextual signature to formalise the theories:
Contexts:
• english denotes the English legal system.
9The discourse context model uses “Claimant” since this is the new term for plaintiff within English
law.
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• french denotes the French legal system.
• bvs denotes the case, in the Dutch courts, of British-American Tobacco Co.
(Nederland) B.V. v. van Swieten B.V..
• act denotes the Act of Parliament enacting the Convention.
• convention denotes the French original of the Convention.
• rwe denotes the real-world event that led to the case.
Predicates:
• openTexture(X) means the phrase X is open textured.
• treaty(X ,Y,C) means that the phrase X has a corresponding phrasing as Y
in an authoritative version of the international treaty C that the law is an
enactment of.
• includes(X ,Y ) means that noun phrase X includes the concept Y .
• purposeful(C,X) means that the interpretation of legislation context C as
including the proposition X is a purposeful interpretation of the legislation.
• expert(P) means that an expert has claimed proposition P.
Functions:
• “othercharges′′ denotes the phrase “other charges incurred in respect of
carriage” in the Act.
• excise denotes the concept of excise duty.
• “encourus′′ denotes the French phrasing of “other charges ...” in the Con-
vention.
Note that we don’t give formalisations of these concepts, since, as we noted above,
the commonsense definitions are too difficult to formalise currently. This is in part
why we don’t specify reasoning mechnanisms for our model, since any automated
reasoning system would require more extensive formalisations of the signature terms
that we use in order to generate interesting arguments.
The contexts represent the social, interpretative and situational contexts in the case.
The english and french contexts represent legal systems which are social contexts rep-
resenting a conceptualisation of the social institution of law. The act and convention
contexts are interpretative contexts representing the interpretation of legislation. And
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the bvs and rwe contexts represent situations which have occurred and whose details
are relevant to the case.
There are intuitive relationships between these contexts. The legal system contexts
contain the legislation contexts, for instance the act legislation context is within the
english legal system context. We have not attempted to formalise these relationships
due the difficulties of representing them; in particular, if we wanted to represent these
relationships we would need an ontology of contexts as discussed in section 6.2.3.
However, these relationships would be used by the modeller to create formal arguments
within this representation.
We don’t present full axiomatisations of the arguments we cover. Our aim is sim-
ply to discuss the main axioms, so that the difficulties involved in formalising the
arguments are clear.
6.4.2 Plaintiff
The plaintiff’s theory includes some of the arguments that were proposed by Buchanan
to justify their interpretation of the law. We use the same notation as in section 6.2.2.
We first try to formalise the argument that it is acceptable to consult the French
version of the convention. We use the following axioms, all of which are asserted
within the Plaintiff-theory context:
1. act : openTexture(“othercharges′′)
2. convention : includes(“encourus′′,excise)
3. treaty(“othercharges′′,“encourus′′,convention)
4. act : openTextured(X)∧ treaty(X ,Y,C).→ .
(C : includes(Y,A)→ act : includes(X ,A))
These axioms could be used to justify the following claim:
act : include(“othercharges′′,excise)
Note that we have omitted some of the necessary axioms to formally derive this.
The axioms state the following:
1. That the phrase “other charges ...” is open-textured.
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2. That in English law if an Act is open-textured and is part of an international
treaty with an authoritative version then if the interpretation of that phrase in the
treaty includes a concept A then the Act of Parliament should also include the
concept. This axiom is designed to express the idea of uniform interpretation
between local enactments of a law and an international treaty.
3. That the phrasing of the law in the Convention includes excise duty.
We next try to formalise the argument that we can use the French methods of inter-
pretation when consulting the English law.
1. french : purposeful(convention, includes(“encourus′′,excise))
2. french : purposeful(C,P)→C : P
3. french : purposeful(convention, includes(X ,A))∧openTextured(X)→
includes(X ,A)
These axioms could be used to justify the following claim:
act : include(“othercharges′′,excise)
The axioms state the following:
1. That there is a purposeful interpretation of the convention in the French legal
system which would include excise duty within the French phrasing of “other
charges ...”.
2. That if there is a purposeful interpretation of a legislation context in French law,
that interpretation is valid.
3. We should use this purposeful interpretation within the English legal system if
there is open texture in the English phrasing.
6.4.3 Defendant
For the defendant, Babco, we first try to formalise the argument that the Dutch prece-
dent could be used to justify the exclusion of excise duty from the phrase “other charges
...”.
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1. openTextured(X)∧ treaty(X ,Y,C)∧ForeignPrecedent : includes(Y,A).→ .
includes(X ,A)
2. bvs : ¬includes(“encourus′′,excise)
These axioms could be used to justify the following claim:
act : ¬includes(“othercharges′′,excise)
The axioms state the following:
1. That if a phrase is open textured, is part of an international treaty and there is
a foreign precedent in which the phrase was interpreted as including a concept
then we should interpret the phrase as including this concept. ForeignPrecedent
is a contextual variable that could be replaced by any foreign precedent case
which discusses the interpretation of the phrase.
2. The Dutch case did not include excise duty in “encourus ...”
We next try to formalise the argument that there was no expert evidence given to
the meaning of the French law, and so we can’t conclude what it means.
1. ¬expert(french : convention : includes(“encourus′′,excise))
2. (french : convention : P)→ expert(french : convention : P)
These axioms could be used to attack the following claim, since no expert evidence
for the interpretation of the French Convention exists.
act : ¬includes(“othercharges′′,excise)
The axioms state the following:
1. There is no expert evidence that the meaning of the French Convention would
include excise duty within the French phrasing of “other charges ...”.
2. If a claim is made about the interpretation of the convention in French Law then
there must also be an expert who supports this claim.
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6.4.4 Limitations of this model
Our model can be used as a framework to represent the discourse regarding the mean-
ing of the law in a legal case. However, there are some features of legal reasoning that
are not reflected in the model, at least as we have currently presented it. In particular,
we can see the following issues arising:
• Choice of contexts
• Perspective on the case
• Lack of commonsense knowledge
• No semantics or reasoning mechanisms
The contexts might be viewed as a bit ad-hoc, simply created for modelling pur-
poses and bearing no relation to the reasoning that actually occurred. In some respects
this is a general presumption behind contextual logics: that people simply do chunk
the world up into different contexts and limited their reasoning to local ones. What
is more of a concern is whether the contexts in our particular contextual model are an
accurate reflection of the distinctions made in the case.
We have presented the discourse context as a representation of the case, but whose
perspective on the case are we modelling? We can maintain a certain neutrality by not
specifying the reasoning mechanisms used in the case, so we don’t prescribe how the
arguments should be resolved, but it isn’t clear what perspective we are representing.
We argue that we are representing an agent’s perspective on the discourse context,
the agent who is doing the modelling of the case. If the agent were a lawyer tasked
with representing one of the sides in the legal case, the discourse context would be
their representation of one possible discourse based upon that lawyer’s presumptions
about the reasoning in the case.
We have not included judicial theories, however this is a straightforward addition
to the model. A modeller would just need to include a context representing the judge’s
theory in the case.
A more interesting omission from our model is the lack of belief states. It would
be interesting if we included contexts representing the belief states of the lawyers and
judges in the case, and could use them to resolve the reasoning in the case. This would
provide a mechanism to represent the biases that can affect the reasoning in the case.
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We have not investigated this possibility, since the belief states are not part of the
explicit discourse in the case, but it would be an interesting addition to the model.
As we have noted above, commonsense knowledge is a problem for constructing
models of legal reasoning. We have avoided the problem in this model, and left it
to the modeller to create commonsense warrants for their arguments. This is a major
problem for any attempt to automate the reasoning, since we require a person with
commonsense to input the information we would need to generate arguments.
Another problem for automation is the lack of reasoning mechanisms. The idea
of the discourse context is that it will inevitably form an inconsistent theory, since the
claimant and defendant theories will conflict and we assume contextual rules which
allow the inference of any proposition in one of the theory contexts into the discourse
context. Our intention is that the reasoning is done by mechanisms outside the contex-
tual logic. The logic just provides a mechanism to check whether a theory is consistent.
For instance, the conflicts in the discourse context could be resolved using either the
argumentation frameworks or Thagard’s coherence model from section 5.7. However,
for Thagard’s coherence model it would be the task of the modeller to determine the
weights and the links between propositions.
So, it seems that our model has several of the limitations that affect the techniques
we surveyed in the previous chapter. The novel feature of our model is that it can
represent the contexts in the reasoning of the case, and so can represent some aspects of
legal interpretation. In particular, our model can represent some aspects of the different
legal systems and the relationships between them; and so is well suited to representing
the interpretation of laws which have been enacted in multiple legal systems, such as
in Buchanan v. Babco.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter we have extended the core claim of this thesis: ontology evolution in
the law occurs as a result of the arguments about meaning proposed in a legal case.
However, we have also discussed the limitations of this representation of the problem.
Ontology Evolution is now more understandable, since it is simply another domain
of argumentation in a legal case, but also more complex, since the ontologies these
arguments depend upon are so heavily dependent upon commonsense knowledge.
We have looked at the usefulness of existing A.I. technologies, in contextual log-
ics and commonsense reasoning, to modelling the content of these arguments about
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meaning. In particular, we have proposed a model of legal reasoning based upon a dis-
course context. However, we have also noted the limitations of this model: primarily
that the contexts and the commonsense knowledge required to understand a legal case
are hard to make explicit. We have also not specified how the discourse context should
be created for a legal case. In the next chapter we will look at whether these limitations
could be overcome to construct computational models of the ontology evolution in a
legal case.
Chapter 7
Requirements on a Theory of
Ontology Evolution in Law
As a reminder we proposed the following theses in the introduction:
1. Ontology evolution in legal cases occurs as a side effect of arguments about the
meaning of legal rules and principles.
2. There is a distinction between prescriptive and descriptive theories of ontology
evolution in legal reasoning.
3. A complete descriptive theory of ontology evolution in legal reasoning is an AI-
complete problem.
4. A combination of the features of the different theories could provide the basis
for a useful system for aiding the construction of arguments about the mean-
ing of legal ontologies. However, any system would require significant human
interaction to produce useful output.
In this chapter we summarise our arguments for these theses and discuss their con-
sequences for developing applications and future research.
7.1 Ontology Evolution in Legal Reasoning
Our first claim, the main claim of this thesis, is about what ontology evolution in legal
reasoning actually is. At the beginning of this thesis we gave an intuitive idea of the
process of ontology evolution and how it occurs in the law. This intuitive idea was
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developed into a conceptual model of how ontology evolution occurs in legal cases
and a discussion of how we can construct formal models of this process.
The next few sections describe the main components of our model and summarise
the arguments we have presented to justify our model.
7.1.1 Arguments about Meaning
We have claimed that ontology evolution in legal cases occurs as a side effect of the
arguments about the meaning of a law. But what exactly does this claim mean?
We have argued that the reasoning in a legal case is driven by argumentation.
Lawyers will present arguments to support their claims about the case. These claims
are created to support the outcomes they desire for the case.
Lawyers can make claims about how the ontology of the law relates to the com-
monsense ontology that describes the real-world event in the case. These claims are
about the meaning of the legal rules in the relevant legislation. The claims provide an
interpretation of the law with respect to the real-world event.
Claims about meaning require meta-ontologies to formalise their content. For in-
stance, lawyers will argue about whether a term such as “vehicle” denotes a concept
which includes skateboards. Terms such as “includes” form a meta-ontology, an on-
tology used to describe the meaning of another ontology.
There are meta-ontologies used in everyday dialogue and there are meta-ontologies
which are specific to the legal domain, such as interpretation sections in an Act of
Parliament. Lawyers may also use meta-ontologies related to literary interpretation,
for instance they might talk about the “scheme” behind a statute1.
The claims are specific to the context of the current case. The claims do not com-
prehensively define the meaning of the term, but only clarify it enough to resolve the
uncertainty in the current case.
The claims are justified by using evidence in the context of the case. The context
of the case is used to generate the arguments about the meaning of the law in the
current case. For instance, a lawyer might argue that the intentions of the Council
were to ensure the safety of people using the park, and that this safety is not affected
by skateboarders. The argument uses a claim about the surrounding context to the case,
namely the intentions of the Council which created the park bylaw, to justify a claim
about the meaning of the law.
1c.f. Buchanan v. Babco
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If an argument about the meaning of the law is accepted by those who have author-
ity over the law, the meaning of the law can change. In common law jurisdictions this
change is made through the principle of binding precedent, future cases are bound by
the decision. In other jurisdictions the change is more subtle, the analysis in the case
can influence the analysis in future cases, even if it is not binding.
Our claim is that this process is how ontology evolution occurs in legal cases. Our
claim is based upon the definitions we have given of ontology evolution and legal
reasoning. In the beginning we presented an intuitive account of the process. We then
analysed what ontology, ontology evolution and legal reasoning were, and based upon
this analysis we presented an account of how legal ontologies could evolve in legal
cases. However, this claim just describes a mechanism for ontology evolution. It does
not define how ontology evolution will actually occur in specific cases. In section 7.2
we look at the kinds of theories that this claim allows.
7.1.2 Contextual knowledge
Our conceptual model of arguments about meaning depends upon the idea of context.
We have argued that claims about meaning are specific to a particular case, and that
the claims are justified using contextual sources of evidence.
What makes the sources of evidence contextual? Our argument here is based upon
the motivating intuitions for contextual logics, in particular the idea of knowledge rep-
resentation being contextual. The intuition is that we organise our background knowl-
edge into sets of propositions specific to a context. We then use inter-context rules to
infer information between contexts.
There is some psychological evidence to support a contextual model of represen-
tation. Barsalou has demonstrated that categorisations are situated, in that people can
change their categorisation of an object depending upon the situation they are in [7].
This gives some justification to the use of a contextual logic to represent the arguments
in a legal case, where we want to allow a concept to have different meanings depending
upon the context.
Another advantage of a contextual logic for our model is that we can represent dif-
ferent interpretations of the law as being different theories within the same discourse
context. The model also extends to modelling different conceptualisations of the dis-
course context, and hence different strategies to affect the judges’ conceptualisation of
the discourse context.
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7.1.3 Discourse Context
Our model of legal reasoning in hard legal cases is based upon the idea of a discourse
context. The idea of legal reasoning as forming a discourse in which lawyers present
theories is not new. Our addition to the idea is to demonstrate how such a model can
be formalised using contextual logics.
We presented our model in the section 6.4. We use a simple contextual logic rep-
resentation with an ist predicate and rules for inferring between contexts.
The basis of our model is a discourse context representing the arguments in the
current case. These arguments make reference to relevant background contexts in order
to justify a claim about how the meaning of the law, in a context representing the law,
relates to the commonsense description of what occurred in the real-world situation.
There are, of course, limitations to this model. The contexts we have used are
debatable, for instance separating theories into only claimant and defendant ignores
the judicial theories in a legal case. We have also not investigated the role of reasoning
about different representations of the discourse context. For instance, a lawyer might
represent the beliefs a judge has about the discourse context and plan their arguments
using this representation.
Another feature of legal reasoning we have not fully investigated is the role of re-
flection. The theories within the discourse context might have to refer to the discourse
context itself, and make claims about what should be true in the discourse context.
For instance, a lawyer might want to claim that a precedent should not apply to the
current case due to differences between the precedent case and the current case. This
claim could be formalised by asserting a proposition within a theory that states that
the discourse context (for the current case) is distinct from the discourse context in the
previous case due to the differences between the real-world events in the cases. This
would be a claim within the discourse context, which makes a claim about what is true
in the discourse context. This raises various difficulties for formalising the contextual
logic, as there is a risk of paradox. We have not investigated these issues, but they are
worth considering in future research.
We argue that we can make additions to our model to incorporate these features, as
the contextual logic framework is quite flexible, but we have not sufficiently investi-
gated these claims, instead we have left them for future investigation.
Our model does not specify how the discourse context should be created. Compet-
ing claims are made, but our model does not describe which claims should be accepted.
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In the next section we will argue that there are two different possible specifications for
modelling legal reasoning using our model.
7.2 Types of theories
We have seen that theories of reasoning and creating meaning can either be based
upon modelling how people perform these tasks, or constructing a normative model
of how the task should be performed, see chapters 4 and 5. These theories are termed
“descriptive” and “prescriptive” theories respectively.
Note that, this distinction is far from novel. Early logicists recognised that their
formal logics were not accurate models of human reasoning, but rather models of how
reasoning should be done. Both Paul Thagard in [136] and John Pollock in [99] give
discussions of the distinction and its relevance to creating computational models of
intelligent agency. We are interested in how the distinction specifically affects our
attempts to create computational models of ontology evolution in legal reasoning.
The model we presented in the preceding section gives a framework for understand-
ing ontology evolution in legal cases, but does not specify how the process of ontology
evolution should be done. We have not specified what semantics should be used to
accept or reject arguments about meaning in the discourse context. Since ontology
evolution depends upon reasoning and meaning we argue that it too has prescriptive
and descriptive theories. We describe these different kinds of theory in the following
sections.
7.2.1 Prescriptive theories
A prescriptive theory of ontology evolution is one which presents a model of how the
meaning of the law should evolve in cases where the meaning is uncertain. This theory
can ignore the process of ontology evolution as it is currently carried out by lawyers in
legal cases.
Most of the techniques we surveyed in chapter 5 are prescriptive theories of rea-
soning. For instance, the models of argumentation are not designed to perfectly mirror
real-world arguments, but are instead intended to describe how argumentation should
be performed. Exceptions to this are Walton’s research on argumentation schemes,
which capture existing patterns of argumentation, and Thagard’s coherent reasoning,
which attempts to model how people assess theories.
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A prescriptive theory of ontology evolution in legal reasoning would have to pre-
scribe both the acceptable meta-ontologies and the semantics of the argumentation
about meaning.
For instance, a prescriptive theory might specify a description logic formalism for
representing legal and commonsense concepts. This formalism would then have a
meta-ontology based upon a formalisation of the description logic’s meta-logic. The
theory might also specify a semantics for resolving conflicting contextual arguments,
for example based upon weighting the for and against arguments and selecting the side
with the highest collective weight.
Such a theory would determine what arguments are acceptable or not in a given
case, but it might not select the arguments that most people would agree with.
Although our model does not specify the semantics of the argumentation, it does
specify a contextual framework for ontology evolution in legal reasoning. This frame-
work makes some arguments easy to express, but might make some arguments awk-
ward. Since the framework is an attempt to formalise the natural language argumenta-
tion that already occurs, it is in part prescriptive as it places constraints upon how the
argumentation should occur.
7.2.2 Applicability of a Prescriptive theory
It is hard to create a prescriptive theory as one must have a theory and a philosophical
foundation to justify that theory.
In the case of first-order logic the justification was an intuitive idea that this for-
malism could represent mathematical arguments correctly. This intuition was later
formalised by Tarski using the idea of a model-theoretic semantics.
In the case of a theory of ontology evolution one would need a philosophical foun-
dations for the ontology and for the epistemology, to represent the concepts and deter-
mine what one can know about their relationships. We have seen that foundations for
ontology and epistemology are not universally agreed upon.
As has been noted in AI and Law research, any theory regarding legal reasoning
must take account of legal theory. There is no universally agreed theory of legal rea-
soning. There are several distinct theories about what the law is, and so we can not
base an uncontroversial theory of ontology evolution upon them.
A prescriptive theory could be enforced as a requirement for participating in a
legal system. For instance, if legal arguments were required to be represented in our
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framework, and there was a semantics for resolving conflicting arguments, then our
framework would be a prescriptive theory for ontology evolution in legal cases within
that legal system.
There is an analogy here with standardisation efforts for data interchange, such as
XML2. The standard becomes a prescriptive format into which data must be converted
for it to be accepted by others.
However, the applicability of such a theory depends upon it being enforced by
those who have authority, such as Parliament for the UK legal system. Without this
authority a prescriptive theory might not be much use, as it wouldn’t predict how the
actual judges in the case would decide the arguments and hence wouldn’t be useful to
a lawyer preparing arguments for a case.
A framework, such as the one we have presented, may be useful as an aid to a
lawyer to help them organise their arguments. An example of this is the use of Wig-
more argument schemes to help construct legal arguments as shown in [143].
7.2.3 Descriptive
A descriptive theory would describe how people actually argue for changes to legal
ontologies, and would make predictions about what changes to the law would occur to
resolve the uncertainty in the law with respect to a real-world event.
In order to construct such a theory we would need to know what claims about
the meaning of the law, and their supporting arguments, would be accepted by an
adjudicator. We focus upon adjudicators as they have authority over what changes to
the law will be accepted, and hence affect the outcome of the case.
However, there is an immediate problem with this approach: people differ in how
they want to resolve the uncertainty in the law. Some judges will accept arguments that
others reject.
So a descriptive theory would need to accommodate the different possible re-
sponses that an adjudicator might have to an argument. Some will reject it, and others
accept it. A descriptive theory might have to explain why a particular judge would
accept or reject an argument, what biases or values are invoked by the argument.
These explanations go beyond the problem that we have discussed so far in this
thesis, since we have to account not only for the arguments about meaning in a legal
case but also the affect of those arguments upon the mental state of the judges in a
2http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-xml/
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case. This task raises various AI-complete problems that we shall consider in the next
section.
7.2.4 Problems for a Descriptive theory
The third claim of this report is that a descriptive theory is an AI-complete problem.
A problem is AI-complete if it requires human-level AI in order to provide a solution.
We argue that a descriptive theory is an AI-complete problem as it requires a theory
of the meaning of natural language, i.e. that we would have to solve the problem of
natural language understanding.
Why would a theory of ontology evolution require solving natural language under-
standing? As we have noted, the Law uses natural language to communicate the laws
that should hold in a legal case. Interpreting those laws is one of the main problems
faced by lawyers in applying the law. In particular, the uncertainty in the law arises
due to the open-texture of the natural-language legal-rules.
7.2.4.1 Meaning in Language
Arguing for the changes to make to a law requires understanding the meaning of the ex-
isting natural-language legal rules, and how they could be interpreted by other people.
Applying the law involves understanding the natural-language texts used to describe
the real-world event and connecting the facts in these texts with legal rules.
An automated system would have to read and understand legal texts and texts de-
scribing real-world situations, and it would have to understand how a person might
read and apply those texts. This is far beyond the current state of the art.
7.2.4.2 Human Context
Understanding how a person might read and apply a legal rule to a real-world event
requires being able to model their mental state and reasoning processes. This requires
some very hard problems, which are far beyond the current state of the art. In partic-
ular, understanding human moral intuitions and how people assess similarity are hard
problems which would have to be solved to understand how another person might ap-
proach a problem of legal interpretation, and how an automated system might be able
to craft arguments to affect their interpretation.
People seem to share some values, but there are still significant differences between
groups. For instance, Jonathon Haig argues that there are differences between conser-
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vatives and liberals in what behaviours they consider to be morally acceptable [59].
These differences make it harder to create a descriptive theory, since an automated
system would have to account for the values of the individual judges when creating ar-
guments, rather than being able to construct a single account of human morality which
could be used in all cases.
There is much research discussing the importance of analogy to understanding hu-
man reasoning. The role of analogy is particularly important in common law legal
systems, where assessing similiarities between cases is the primary form of reasoning.
The difficulty in modelling this reasoning is that we don’t know how people assess
similiarity, since there is still much psychological research to be done in this area. This
prevents us from constructing a predictive system with the current state of the art, as
we don’t know how to form convincing arguments about similiarities between cases.
There is also the institutional knowledge that is common among the participants in
a legal system. An automated system, which had to construct arguments that would be
accepted within a legal system, would have to understand that legal system.
7.2.4.3 Reflection
A problem with making claims about how people ascribe meaning to language is to
account for our ability to reflect upon how we are interpreting an utterance and change
our interpretation.
Reflection raises the problem of epistemological foundations. We have noted the
foundationalist and coherentist approach to this problem, but we have not tried to in-
corporate either into our model. The problem is not so much what foundations should
hold over our reasoning, but what foundations do hold in most people’s reasoning.
Ultimately this is a hard problem that is well beyond the scope of this thesis. We
briefly discuss possible approaches to this problem, within the scope of ontology evo-
lution in legal reasoning, in the further work section.
7.3 Developing Applications
Our final claim was that we could use a combination of theories to develop applications
to aid lawyers in constructing arguments about the meaning of open-textured legal
rules.
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7.3.1 Kinds of application
What kinds of task would a theory of ontology evolution be useful for? We can think
of the following examples:
• Helping lawyers generate arguments about meaning
• Checking argument consistency
• Finding counter-arguments
• Suggesting interpretations of the law
Lawyers need to generate arguments to support their desired outcomes in a case.
A system which could help the lawyer construct these arguments might be useful.
Such a system could offer varying degrees of assistance, from providing a lightweight
framework for constructing arguments to full automation.
Once arguments have been created it is useful to check them for consistency. This
is the kind of task that could be relatively easily automated if the arguments have been
formalised, although finding inconsistencies might be difficult on large theories.
A related task to consistency checking is finding counter-arguments. For instance,
a counter-example found when checking consistency could be used to create a counter-
argument.
The hardest task to automate is finding interpretations of the law. Automating this
task requires formalised ontologies about meaning and abductive reasoning mecha-
nisms to find interpretations of the law that would achieve a goal within the case.
For any of these tasks there are some common implementation problems, which
we shall discuss next.
7.3.2 Developing ontologies
We have noted that modelling argumentation requires ontologies to describe the do-
main. Any application would require ontologies about the legal case and the relevant
laws.
There is an active research field in AI and Law which is creating legal ontologies.
However to be useful a system would have to have commonsense ontologies too, so
that it could formalise the relationship between the real-world event and the law. These
commonsense ontologies are much harder to form. There has been some discussion of
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commonsense ontologies within AI and Law, but there are no significant attempts to
solve the problem.
A practical approach would be to have the lawyer input the commonsense knowl-
edge and the system provide a partial formalisation of the legal knowledge. The lawyer
could enter their arguments in a subset of English that could be ambiguously parsed.
However, it might be difficult to extract the underlying commonsense knowledge that
the lawyer uses in their arguments, so the resulting formalisations might be incomplete.
There would be interface issues with this solution, and a learning curve for new
users to create unambiguous descriptions of their arguments. However, the alternative
is to try to work with pure natural language, which is currently unfeasible.
7.3.3 Developing reasoning mechanisms
The complements to any ontology are reasoning mechanisms to make inferences from
it. We have surveyed many different methods of reasoning in chapter 5.
The main problems are incorporating reflection in the argumentation and the rea-
soning about coherence of a theory. We can create argumentation frameworks, and
methods for theory evaluation, but we also need to provide a way for automated sys-
tems to reflect upon and argue about the arguments and methods of theory evaluation.
These too are part of the domain of legal discourse.
This presents a theoretical challenge, of formalising methods of reflection upon
argumentation and theory evaluation, and a technical challenge of creating systems
which can perform this task.
7.3.4 Usefulness of Applications
It is unknown how useful any applications would be, since we can’t fully automate any
aspect of the reasoning within the domain. The most useful applications appear to be
quite lightweight; they aren’t based upon deep philosophical theories about meaning.
An analogous domain is that of interactive mathematical theorem provers. These
systems can help mathematicians to develop mathematical proofs, by machine check-
ing the mathematical arguments within a formal logic. However, uptake of these sys-
tems by mathematicians is quite low, very few use such a system in their day-to-day
work.
The problem is that the systems don’t, or aren’t perceived to, interface well with the
mathematicians’ workflow, and it is difficult to learn how to use the system effectively.
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The arguments formalised within the system don’t resemble the more abstract proofs
which mathematicians discuss. So the only benefit of the system is to provide that
extra level of certainty that a proof is actually valid, and the effort required for this task
is seemingly not felt to be worthwhile.
This may be a sociological problem amongst mathematicians, perhaps a new gen-
eration who are familiar with the technology might make greater use of such tools. The
quality of the tools is also continually improving, making them more useful. However
it does give us some idea of how useful any system would be to lawyers.
It is unlikely that any system we can develop in the near future would be perceived
as being useful by lawyers. The system is trying to help the lawyer with a qualitative
task, but is imposing some constraints upon how that task should be performed. These
constraints may hinder the lawyers when they perform the task (c.f. [116]).
We can contrast this kind of qualitative application with a quantitative one: the
problem of information retrieval. Lawyers have a vast quantity of documents to search
through to find the relevant material for a case. This material is too great to read and
fully understand. There are useful systems which can search through the documents
looking for key words or features within the document. The user just has to create
appropriate queries to search through the documents.
The lawyer doesn’t have the time to search through all the documents, so this kind
of system is very useful. Creating arguments is something that the lawyer must do, and
requires an intricate understanding of the issues involved in the case. The advantage of
having software support for this task is not so clear, as the software doesn’t automate
the task and can only provide limited support, since it doesn’t fully understand the
meaning of the arguments.
The main incentive for lawyers to use such a system would be if it were manda-
tory, that is if lawyers had to provide their arguments in a logically formalised format.
However it isn’t clear why such a system would be created unless it was demanded by
Parliament, and it isn’t clear who would lobby Parliament for such a system.
So for the immediate future systems based upon theories of ontology evolution
do not appear particularly useful for creating arguments in legal cases. There might
however be an application in education. There are examples of case-based reasoning
systems being used to teach lawyers to identify and apply precedents [2]. Similiarly,
it might be possible to develop systems to teach lawyers how to form arguments about
meaning.
However, an argumentation aid would likely not be specific to forming arguments
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about meaning. Any system which taught students how to form coherent arguments
would likely extend to teaching students how to form arguments about meaning if it
had the necessary background knowledge.
So our conclusions regarding the usefulness of applications are somewhat mixed.
In the short term it seems unlikely that we can develop useful aids for lawyers, but
these may be useful in the long term. We can develop education tools to help students
learn how to form arguments about meaning, but these tools would likely be general
argumentation tools, rather than tools specific to ontology evolution.
7.4 Further Work
We have presented various claims about ontology evolution in law, and a conceptual
model of the process of ontology evolution in legal cases. In this section we discuss
the possible extensions to our research.
The main areas in which further work seems productive are:
• Ontologies about meaning
• Domain-specific case-studies of ontology evolution
• Contextual logics
• Interactive tools for constructing arguments about meaning
• Acquiring commonsense knowledge
7.4.1 Ontologies about Meaning
We have argued that ontologies about meaning are important to formalising the process
of ontology evolution in legal cases but we have not conducted a systematic study of
the content of these ontologies.
It would be useful to survey a wide variety of legal cases and note what meta-
ontological terms occur. You could then try to identify the axioms that are commonly
accepted for these terms and use them to create an ontology about meaning.
You could also look for examples of ontologies about meaning outside the legal
domain. For example, in literary interpretation there are extensive vocabularies used
in an interpretation of a text. The law uses many similiar terms, so this might lead to
further insight into these meta-ontologies.
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Psychological studies could be conducted to find out what axioms about meaning
are generally accepted by people, and what differences exist.
7.4.2 Domain-specific examples
More extensive examples using our model of creating the discourse context could be
created. These could form in-depth case studies of the ontology evolution in those
legal cases.
7.4.3 Contextual logics
We have noted that there are limitations to the current contextual logics. In particular
the foundations of contextual logics are uncertain and it isn’t clear how to combine
them with argumentation formalisms.
7.4.4 Interactive tools
We have argued that useful applications could be constructed, but we have not built
any prototypes ourselves. It would be interesting to try to create an interactive tool
using the discourse-context model we have presented in this thesis.
7.4.5 Commonsense knowledge
We have noted that commonsense knowledge is crucial to both forming and under-
standing arguments about meaning in hard legal cases. The argumentation in these
cases relies upon the common ground of commonsense knowledge that people have.
So developing software for automating tasks regarding ontology evolution requires an
extensive commonsense knowledge base.
There are two problems here: one is developing commonsense knowledge bases,
including creating expert knowledge that is specific to a legal system, and the other
is creating simulations of how people approach basic reasoning tasks. The former
problem has been attempted by systems such as CYC and the latter by research into
qualitative reasoning. It would be interesting to see if this work could be included into
a model of legal reasoning, such as the one we have presented in this thesis.
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7.5 Conclusion
We have presented and defended the claims we introduced at the beginning of the
thesis. Our main claim is that ontology evolution in legal cases occurs as a side effect
of the arguments about the meaning of the law in the case.
We have discussed the kinds of theories of ontology evolution that could be created
and their respective consequences. The consequences include the possibility of devel-
oping systems that help lawyers construct arguments about meaning. However, these
systems would require significant human interaction and further research is required to
understand how useful these systems would be and how they could be constructed.
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